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ABSTRACT 
Helsinki: AALTO UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS, 2011 
International Business: Master’s Thesis 
Shiho Hashimoto 
Objectives of the Research 
This study was part of the “Born Global Growth and Survival” joint project by Aalto 
University School of Economics and University of Vaasa. 
Based on a literature review and an empirical research, the growth phases of Born 
Global firms and factors that influence the growth and survival of these firms are 
introduced. This particular thesis contributes by focusing specifically on the Born 
Global firms in the software business. The literature review covers such topics as 
international business, management, growth, cycles, and internationalization. Software 
business in general and particularly in Finland is additionally discussed.  
Method of Research 
The empirical research of this thesis is based on a multiple case study of four Finnish 
software firms, three Born Globals and one Born International. A central tool used is the 
preliminary conceptual framework that was devised based on the extensive literature 
review.  
Findings and Conclusions 
Research findings suggest that commercial and global breakthrough of Born Global 
software firms is positively related to the industry growth rate, industry globalization 
drivers, the amount of firm resources and managerial experience, the existence of 
substantive, dynamic, and networking capabilities, high-levels of entrepreneurial 
orientation, compatibility with dominant players in the market, lock-in effects, 
appropriate software business models and growth strategies, existence of luck, 
internationalization and localization capabilities, and creativity. The maturity and global 
rationalization in turn is found to be positively related to increased global seller 
concentration, existence of networking capabilities, low level of entrepreneurial 
orientation and industry growth rate, and having appropriate software development 
processes in place. Finally, survival of these firms were found to be positively related to 
the industry growth rate, the amount of resources and managerial experience, the 
existence of substantive, dynamic, and networking capabilities, low level of 
entrepreneurial orientation, luck, capability to focus, and lower levels of growth 
aspirations.  
Key Words: Born Globals, International New Ventures, Growth, Survival, Software 
Industry, Software Business
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 1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
In the 1960s, the business slogan in Finland was “Export or die”, in the 1970s and 
1980s “Internationalize or die”, and in the 1990s and 2000, “Globalize or die” 
(Luostarinen & Gabrielsson, 2004). With the development of computers and the 
Internet, and improvements in many other communication and transportation 
infrastructure, the world seems to have become one big “global” market.  
For decades, many researchers have studied the internationalization process of firms. 
Much of the existing theory related to firms’ internationalization process was developed 
during the 1970s and 1980s (Rialp, et al., 2003). The mainstream theory has been that 
firms internationalize following a slow, gradual, evolutionary path of development 
(Rialp, et al., 2003; Luostarinen, 1979) after a stable domestic period. For example, 
Johanson and Vahlne (1977) introduced a model whereby firms gradually acquire, 
integrate, and use knowledge about foreign markets and operations, and incrementally 
increase commitments to foreign markets after a long domestic period. Luostarinen 
(1979) has stated that one of the reason for this is the lateral rigidity in decision-making 
by the managers. In other words, managers are rigid in a lateral direction towards new 
alternatives, but are elastic forwards, towards already known alternatives. Also, 
Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul (1975) proposed an “establishment chain” theory 
based on their study of four Swedish firms and postulated that a firm’s engagement in a 
specific foreign market develops according to an establishment chain.  
During the 1990s, following rapid change in the global business environment, a new 
phenomenon, ‘Born Global’ firms emerged (Kuivalainen, 2001; Laanti, et al., 2007, 
also see Luostarinen & Gabrielsson, 2006). These firms that start their business in 
foreign markets at inception have been studied as “deviations” to the conventional 
internationalization theories (Luostarinen & Gabrielsson, 2006). This new phenomenon 
can be increasingly seen all over the world and seemingly have changed the ways firms 
start up and grow due to external environmental changes. Some factors, causing this 
phenomenon, that have been identified include “falling trade barriers, deregulation and 
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privatization, maturity in domestic markets, faster information flows, improved 
communication and transportation networks, social developments such as more 
homogeneous consumer needs, tastes, and values, globally standardized products, high 
technology investments that cannot be covered by sales in domestic markets only, 
combined with shortening product life-cycles, other economies of scale benefits, global 
sourcing of resources and ideas, globalizing competitors and competition, and free 
movement of capital goods, services, and people.” (Laanti, et al., 2007, p.1105). 
Compared to conventional firms, Born Global firms’ resources are constrained by their 
young age and usually by small size (Oviatt & McDougall, 1994). However, these Born 
Globals somehow manage to take the world from day one, with exceptional skills. For 
example, some of the traditional theories argue that firms incrementally internationalize 
step by step after learning from their domestic period (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977), but 
Born Globals may already have the required knowledge even before they start to 
internationalize, as the key personnel could have gained international experience 
elsewhere in another firm prior to joining or the firm may have good connections within 
their network, thus decreasing the need of its own learning process (Kuivalainen, 2001).  
The interesting question is then, how do Born Global firms grow and sustain their 
competitive position to become a mature firm after their initial introductory phase? 
What are the factors for survival and growth of these special types of firms throughout 
their life cycle? A joint project led by Professor Mika Gabrielsson and Peter 
Gabrielsson started between Aalto University School of Economics, University of 
Vaasa, and some partner firms including Finpro, Biohit, IonPhasE, Innohome, Map 
Vision, and Hartwall Capital, in order to deepen our knowledge regarding Born Global 
firms’ growth and survival.  
While the general objective of the Research Group is to find out what are the growth 
phases of Born Global firms and what are the factors influencing the growth and 
survival of those firms, this particular thesis contributes by focusing on the Born Global 
firms in the software business. The reason that the software business has been chosen is 
because software has become a critical element of our life, in everyday operations and 
business development. Software industry has been growing rapidly over the years and is 
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an increasingly essential component of products and services in other industries 
(Hertzen, et al., 2009; Hoch, et al., 2000). It is thus interesting to study Born Global 
firms in such business area. Also, a significant portion of the current literature cover 
Born Global firms in the high-technology business area (Kuivalainen, 2001; McAuley, 
1999; Rialp, et al., 2005) and the software sector (Bell, 1995; Coviello & Munro, 1997; 
Coviello, 2006), which imply that good case studies are likely to exist. Finland was 
chosen as the country to select the case firms from, since Finland is a good example of a 
small and open economy (SMOPEC). SMOPEC countries usually face double jeopardy 
of targeting narrow niche markets in limited domestic markets (Luostarinen, 1994; 
Saarenketo, 2004) which themselves attracts foreign competition due to its openness. 
New start-ups from SMOPEC countries typically are pressured to globalize their 
business quickly compared to those originating from large nations, which have huge 
domestic markets (Luostarinen& Gabrielsson, 2004). As such, in the empirical section, 
four firms conducting software business in Finland will be studied. 
1.2 Research Gap and Research Problem 
The Born Global phenomenon is by now quite well documented, as described by Rialp, 
et al. (2005). There has been increasing research focused on describing, understanding, 
and interpreting the reasons underlying the actual emergence of Born Global firms. For 
example, Laanti, et al. (2007) discuss the globalization process of business-to-business 
Born Globals in the wireless technology industry, paying attention to how the founders 
and managers, networks, financial resources of the firms, and innovations behind the 
firms have roles in these firms’ emergence. Saarenketo (2004) also lists earlier 
international experience, global vision, and high-risk tolerances of managers as having a 
positive affect on rapid internationalization of small firms.  
However, despite the number of studies, little has been studied on how these Born 
Global firms progress in the future, specifically what are the growth phases of Born 
Global firms and what factors impact towards transformation to the next stage. Also, 
little has been researched on the actual survival and failure of Born Globals 
(Gabrielsson & Gabrielsson, 2009; Mudambi & Zahra, 2007; Sapienza, et al., 2006). 
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Zahra (2005) has pointed out that there has not yet been enough research on the 
probability of survival of Born Global firms after they have been established, and what 
becomes of those firms that do actually survive.  
In order to fill this gap in contemporary international business literature, the joint 
Research Group seeks to address the following major research problem: 
How can innovative Born Globals grow to become truly global firms  
while also surviving, taking into consideration their limited resources  
to address the global market opportunities and required holistic  
management of the process? 
 
1.3 Research Objectives and Questions 
A number of Master’s thesis is being written as part of this research project, each 
focusing on a specific area. This paper focuses on software business and examines 
holistically the growth and survival of Born Global software firms. Building on the 
shared concepts developed by Gabrielsson and Gabrielsson (2009b), this paper aims to 
contribute by adding software specific factors that affect the growth and survival of 
Born Global firms doing software business.  
Thus, the research objectives can be stated in the form of a research question and sub-
questions as follows: 
How do Born Global firms in the software industry become adults and what 
factors impact their global growth and survival? 
• What are the growth phases of these firms? 
• What are the factors that impact the growth and survival of these 
firms?  
• How do differences in the business model (software products, 
software services, and hybrid solutions) affect the different paths that 
firms should take to grow and survive? 
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1.4 Structure of the Study 
In order to answer to the research questions and ultimately the research objective, this 
thesis is separated into six chapters as shown in figure 1.  
 
 
Figure 1. Structure of the study 
 
The first chapter is the introduction, which contains a brief background to this study and 
lay out the research problem, objectives, and questions. The second chapter then 
provides a review of relevant literature on international business and software business. 
This chapter is further divided into seven sections. Chapter 2.1 will give a general 
overview of “Born Globals” and their characteristics, chapter 2.2 describes the software 
business, and chapter 2.3 lays out the general growth models of firms from relevant 
literature. Chapter 2.4 and 2.5 continues with identifying the growth phases and survival 
of Born Global firms as identified in recent studies. Chapter 2.6 gives an overview of 
various external and internal factors, which may influence the growth and survival of 
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Born Global firms. Finally, at the end of this chapter, a synthesis of the literature review 
will be presented with a preliminary theoretical framework and propositions related to 
growth and survival of Born Global software firms.   
The third chapter includes a description of the methodology, summarizing the research 
approach and material collection, as well as the limitations of this study. The empirical 
results of the in-depth case analysis of four software firms in Finland are then presented 
and discussed in the fourth and fifth chapters. Finally, some important implications for 
managers and policy makers are drawn from the findings. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In an attempt to establish a preliminary theoretical framework for empirical research, 
this literature review chapter examines earlier works of prominent academicians related 
to growth stages of firms, Born Global phenomenon, and internationalization. By 
synthesizing existing studies from the international business, management, and software 
business field, hints for answers to the research questions may be found, which can be 
utilized for empirical research in examining the growth stages and factors for growth 
and survival of Born Global software firms in Finland.  
First, definitions and characteristics of a Born Global are reviewed. This is important 
since Born Globals are rather distinct type of firms compared to the so-called traditional 
firms. Next, the software business field is studied, putting the focus on Finland. Then, 
earlier works on general growth models of firms and growth phases are investigated. It 
develops two dimensions; global growth and growth in the size of the firm. This is 
followed by review of the literature on survival of firms and tries to identify the factors 
that affect the growth and survival of Born Global software firms. Finally, a preliminary 
theoretical framework and propositions that explain the influence of the variables 
identified in the literature are presented. 
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2.1 Definitions and Characteristics of a Born Global 
This section defines the term “Born Global” and lays out the basic characteristics of 
these types of firms.  
2.1.1 Various Terms and Definitions 
Since the early 1990s when Born Global firms seem to have started to increasingly 
spring up, many researchers have attempted to explain their existence and analyze the 
emergence of the new type of phenomenon (Luostarinen & Gabrielsson, 2006, 
McDougall, et al., 1994; Rialp, et al., 2005). Across the management and 
entrepreneurship literature, various terms are used to point to a similar concept.  
International New Venture (INV), which is the most common term used thus far, is 
defined as firms that “from inception, seek to derive significant competitive advantage 
from the use of the resources and the sale of outputs to multiple countries” (Oviatt & 
McDougall, 1994, p.49). Oviatt & McDougall (1994) has identified four different types 
of INVs; 1) Export/import start-ups, 2) multinational traders, 3) geographically focused 
start-ups, and 4) global start-ups. This fourth type of INV, global start-ups, are the 
most difficult form to develop because they require skills at both geographic and 
activity coordination, but once successful, they appear to have the most sustainable 
competitive advantage.  
Global starts-ups, identified by Oviatt & McDougall (Ibid.) are also often referred to as 
born globals (Knight & Cavusgil, 1996). Knight and Cavusgil (1996, p11) define Born 
Global firms as being “small, technology-oriented companies that operate in 
international markets from the earliest days of their establishment”. Other similar terms 
used in the literature are High Technology Start-ups (Jolly, et al., 1992), Instant 
Exporters (McAuley, 1999), Instant Internationals (Fillis, 2001; McAuley, 1999), 
Born-Internationals (Kundu and Katz, 2003), Micromultinationals (Dimitratos, et al., 
2003), and Early Internationalizing Firms (Rialp, et al., 2005). Whatever terms may be 
used, researchers have attempted to understand the emergence of new firms that go 
global from inception, which seems to deviate from the traditional internationalization 
approach.  
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For the sake of being consistent throughout this paper, the term “Born Global” will be 
used, as I believe it best describes the characteristics of the firms under review.   
Born Globals can be defined in many ways. Global vision, time before starting to 
export, and export versus global growth are some criteria that have been used by 
different researchers for a firm to be called a Born Global (Gabrielsson, et al., 2008). 
For example, Knight and Cavusgil (1996) claimed that a Born Global firm management 
views the world as its marketplace from the outset, begins exporting one or several 
products within two years of establishment, and tends to export at least a quarter of total 
production. Luostarinen and Gabrielsson (2006) defined Born Globals as having a clear 
global vision and are on a global growth path, enter global markets at the outset, and 
makes over 50% of their sales outside its home continent. Oviatt and McDougall (1994) 
have put the focus on the age of the firm when they become international, and not its 
size, as a factor for being a Born Global. 
Focusing on the age or time period before starting to export can be a bit tricky because 
there tends to be a difficulty of defining the exact starting time of Born Globals due to 
their often long R&D period until the product is actually ready (Zahra, 2005). 
Gabrielsson, et al. (2008) also points out that exporting is not straightforward, especially 
for start-up companies with limited international experience, and that we should be 
flexible about the time period of when the Born Globals started to actually export. 
Focusing on the ratio of exports or range of geographic international activities can also 
be flawed since those numbers could be influenced by the size of the Born Global’s 
country of origin and economy, the country’s neighbor markets, and other factors such 
as the type of industry (Gabrielsson, et al., 2008). Kuivalainen, et al. (2007) also 
emphasized the need to distinguish firms even within the Born Global category: “true 
born global” and “apparently born-global (born international)”, whereby the former 
operate in more distant markets and the latter go into culturally closer markets and 
follow strategies which resemble more the traditional internationalization process.  
In order to avoid the strict numerical criteria related to export ratios and speed of export, 
some researchers have viewed Born Globals from the strategic perspective, 
(Luostarinen & Gabrielsson, 2004), whereby Born Globals 
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a) start international operations even before or simultaneously with 
domestic ones, 
b) base their visions and missions mainly on global markets and customers 
from the inception, 
c) plan their products, structures, systems and finances on a global basis, 
d) plan to become global market leaders as part of their vision, 
e) use different product, operation and market strategies than firms have 
traditionally done,  
f) follow different global marketing strategies, and 
g) grow exceptionally fast on global markets. 
In this paper, the above strategic perspective is adopted in addition to the following 
criteria for the purpose of selecting Born Global firms for qualitative case study.  
1) Foreign sales have reached 25% within three years of establishment. 
2) Sales from outside the home continent have reached 25% within six years of 
establishment.  
2.1.2 Characteristics of Born Global Firms 
Before stepping into the world of Born Global software firms, it may be beneficial to 
shortly highlight the general characteristics of Born Globals, as those characteristics 
differentiate themselves from other multinationals in their growth stages.  
The definition of Born Globals from the strategic perspective (Luostarinen & 
Gabrielsson, 2004) was introduced in the previous section. Born Globals typically 
operate in a narrowly defined market niche, which makes it harder to grow in a single, 
small home market (SMOPEC), such as Finland. A high degree of specialization 
requires internationalization if the firm wants to achieve substantial growth 
(Kuivalainen, et al., 2006). Although multinationals following the traditional 
internationalization approach and Born Globals both internationalize their activities at 
some point in order to grow, Born Globals are disadvantaged with respect to three 
aspects. Born Globals suffer from the liability of 1) foreignness (Zaheer & Mosakowski, 
1997), 2) newness (Stinchcombe, 1965), and 3) smallness (Zahra, 2005).  These 
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liabilities are discussed in more detail in chapter 2.5. Born Globals often possess unique 
resources and capabilities such as entrepreneurial orientation of the founders, innovation 
behind products and technology, accumulated knowledge of the founders and managers 
from previous work experience, and networking capabilities (Laanti, et al., 2006) 
A significant portion of the current literature cover Born Globals in the high-tech 
business area (McAuley, 1999; Rialp, et al., 2005), but there has also been studies 
covering Born Globals in the low-tech field such as clothing, traditional food, and 
furniture (Gabrielsson, et al., 2008).  For example, McAuley (1999) has conducted a 
study of “instant internationals” in the Scottish arts and crafts sector. Luostarinen and 
Gabrielsson’s (2004) pilot studies showed that Born Globals can be found from 1) high-
tech businesses, 2) high-design businesses, 3) high-service businesses, 4) high-know-
how businesses, and 5) high-system businesses. It can be argued that Born Globals are 
typically found in niche business areas where products are unique, and require high 
amount of research and development (Luostarinen & Gabrielsson, 2004).  
As for geographic locations of these Born Globals, their headquarters can be found in 
various countries, such as the United States, New Zealand, United Kingdom, 
Switzerland, Germany, France, Brazil, Israel, and Singapore (McDougall, et al., 1994). 
Rich and large countries give birth to Born Globals, as these countries have potential 
demand for unique products, plenty of global managerial and marketing professionals, 
and rich source of financial support. Foreign demands for unique products then often 
pull these firms to globalize quickly. On the other hand, Born Globals can also be found 
in SMOPEC. These firms often need to globalize quickly due to small market at home 
and pressure from competition coming from abroad. (Luostarinen & Gabrielsson, 2004) 
2.2 Software Business and Born Global Firms 
This section provides an overview of the software business in general, emergence of 
Born Global software firms, and a deeper look into the software business specifically in 
Finland.  
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2.2.1 Characteristics of Software Business 
The software industry has grown at a fast rate during the last two decades (Kuivalainen, 
et al., 2006) although it suffered during 2001-2002 due to the collapse of dot coms and 
telecommunications firms which was accompanied by a dramatic decline in the value of 
high-tech stocks, and tightening of wallets for technology spending by corporate 
customers in nearly all sectors around the world (Cusumano, 2004). According to 
Datamonitor (2008), the global software market grew by 6.5% in 2008 to reach a value 
of $303.8 billion and in 2013, this market is forecast to have a value of $457 billion, an 
increase of 50.5% since 2008. In general, United States is the largest single information 
technology market, however a more precise data on the number of firms in the software 
and information service industries worldwide as well as country comparisons are 
difficult to obtain because of lags in data collection and variations in definitions 
(Cusumano, 2004).  
The boundaries of the software industry are somewhat unclear and the definition differs 
according to various sources. Rönkkö, et al. (2007) defines the software business to be a 
“business, which is based on selling software owned by the company either as licenses 
or as services, and all other services which are tightly linked to this business”. 
Datamonitor (2008) divides software business to two subgroups: systems and 
application software. Systems software comprises operation systems, network and 
database management, development tools and programming languages, and some other 
systems software. Application software comprises general business productivity and 
home use applications, cross-industry and vertical market applications, and utilities and 
other application software. Software business is often hard to clearly define due to the 
pervasive nature of software. Software is a key component of many modern technology 
products, and is often provided as an integrated element with other services (Rönkkö, et 
al., 2008).  
For the purposes of this paper, software business is divided into five types, combining 
Hietala, et al.’s (2004) and Hoch, et al.’s (2000) categorization: packaged software 
products, embedded software, enterprise solution, customer-tailored software, and 
professional services. This division is not to be a comprehensive or exhaustive 
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classification of different areas of software industry, but rather serves the purposes of 
this paper. 
The five different software types are defined next. The degree of productization, which 
is the standardization of the elements in the offering, can be used to distinguish the 
different types. As Figure 2 shows, on one end of the extreme lie the packaged software 
products that usually consist of packaged physical software products. Typical examples 
include business solutions (CRM, ERP, and SCM), productivity applications (office 
tools and messaging applications), development tools (databases and integration tools), 
system tools (security packages, operating systems, drivers, and utilities), media and 
content, and games (Hertzen, et al., 2009). Software products have a unique 
characteristic in a sense that once it is developed, it can be replicated at close to zero 
marginal costs, and is often referred to as packed, mass-market, or shrink-wrap software 
(Hietala, et al., 2004). Software of this kind can be sold to millions of customers without 
any customer tailoring (Hietala, et al., 2004).  
 
Figure 2. Various types of software depending on productization degree (Source: 
adapted from Hoch, et al., 2000) 
 
Embedded software also has a high degree of productization. Embedded software is 
built into other products, such as refrigerators, paper machines, and cellular phones 
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(Hietala, et al., 2004) in order to handle information so that the hardware and software 
form a component of some larger system that may be expected to function with minimal 
human intervention (Hertzen, et al., 2009). 
On the other end of spectrum in Figure 2 lies the customer-tailored software, which is 
developed to the specifications and needs of single customers, thus has many 
characteristics of a service (Hietala, et al., 2004). This type of software requires a close 
interaction between buyer and seller to provide extensive client support in terms of 
consultancy, systems design, customization, installation, training, upgrading, and after-
sales services (Bell, 1995). This puts limit to the numbers of customers a firm can sell 
to, compared to software products. Professional services also have a low degree of 
productization and is typically consulting related to software development.  
In between these two extreme within the spectrum lies the enterprise solution business, 
in which case it is necessary to add some modification to the pre-developed software 
products to meet to customer’s specific information systems and infrastructure (Hietala, 
et al., 2004). It also often accompanies consulting services when dealing with enterprise 
customers.  
In order to simplify the identification of factors for growth and survival and the 
comparison of various growth paths and phases, these five software types are divided 
into three different business models, whereby the high end of standardization degree is 
grouped as the “software products” business, and the lower end as “software services” 
business, with an overlap above the enterprise solution type as the “hybrid solutions” 
business. This grouping is sometimes also referred to as soft and hard services 
(Erramilli, 1990; Kuivalainen, 2001). Software products business is a form of business 
model whereby firms “get all or most of their revenues from new product sales (called 
“software license fees”)” (Cusumano, 2004, p4). Software services business is a form 
of business model whereby firms “get a majority of their revenues from IT consulting, 
custom software development, integration work, technical support, systems 
maintenance, and related activities” (Cusumano, 2004, p4). Finally, hybrid solutions 
business is a form of business model whereby firms get “some new product sales but 
derive as much as 80 percent of their revenues from services and maintenance 
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(incremental product updates or special enhancements sold through long-term 
contracts to the purchasers of the initial software license)” (Cusumano, 2004, p4). As 
Nambisan (2002, p. 146) points out, the boundary between service business and product 
business is becoming increasingly fainter, “with more and more firms successful 
straddling the two sectors”. Most software firms need to have a good balance of 
product and service revenues to survive in bad times and to grow rapidly and profitably 
in good times (Cusumano, 2004).  
In general, business related to software has a short product life cycle before a new 
technology, substitute products, or competitors capture the same market (Kuivalainen, 
2001). Both software products and services are also unique in a way that the value is 
often dependent on the number of other users of the product (Kuivalainen, et al., 2006). 
Table 1 summarizes the main differences in characteristics between software products 
and services that may affect strategies for firm growth and survival.  
Table 1. Characteristics of software products versus software services 
  Software services/soft services Software products/hard services 
Type of product 
Tailor-made, specifically designed for 
individual customers. 
Often tangible in the form of a packaged 
boxed product. 
Heterogeneity Often customized to individual needs. 
Standardized, though may require some 
localization of package, manual, and 
GUI. 
Export Channels Need direct contact with customers. 
No need for physical interaction with 
customers, enabling sales through 
intermediaries. 
Duration of 
relationship Often long-lasting.  
Ends at purchase or occasional 
interaction again when requiring 
upgrades.  
Sales forecasting 
Revenue forecasting may be difficult but 
once deal is made, large income is 
expected. A variable-cost structure.  
Possible to forecast demand based on 
sales history and general economic 
conditions. A fixed-cost structure.  
Holy grail Economies of scope Economies of scale 
Marketing 
Strategies 
Building relationships with potential 
customers and educating them takes 
time.  
General advertising and mass sales 
promotion can increase sales. 
Source: author 
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The software products business is mainly about volume sales – selling or licensing as 
many copies of a standardized product as you can. The basic growth strategies are 
scaling or duplicating what you have done in similar markets (Cusumano, 2004). The 
Holy Grail in this business is to achieve economies of scale. Mass marketing and 
distribution skills are critical. On the other hand, the software services business is 
mainly about people and building specific customer relationships. It is about getting 
enough profitable accounts to keep your consultants and developers busy close to 100% 
of the time (Cusumano, 2004). Software services also have unique characteristics: 
inseparability, intangibility, perishability, and heterogeneity (Erramilli, 1990). The Holy 
Grail in this business is economies of scope. This can be achieved by managing 
projects, customizing applications, conducting user acceptance testing, or reusing 
design frameworks and even pieces of code across different projects and customers, as 
well as implementing excellent account management.  
The distinction between these two categories is not black and white. Even a packaged 
software product could be integrated into another software product (Kuivalainen, 2001), 
thus requiring a different type of relationship with the customer, in which case the 
customer would be a partnering company requiring a long-term relationship. There may 
also be a need to localize standardized software products such as the package, manual, 
and GUI (graphical user interface) (Kuivalainen, 2001).  
The global software industry is currently experiencing consolidation and seeing several 
new modes of operation emerging. This consolidation is a sign that the industry itself is 
maturing and acquisitions have become one of the most important ways to grow for 
some of the larger companies (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2008). In addition to industry 
maturity, the software industry is facing some acute challenges. First of all, traditional 
hardware vendors are expanding their business by developing software of its own, 
cannibalizing existing business by bundling those new software platform into their own 
hardware (Rönkkö, et al., 2008). Naturally, the third-party vendors that used to provide 
the software to hardware vendors lose business. Such an example is Nokia in Finland, 
who is increasingly developing software products to be bundled in their mobile phones 
(McKay, 2001). Second, some developing countries such as India started to grow as 
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information technology powerhouse, increasing competition for cheaper personnel costs 
and outsourcing (Maps of India, 2010). Finally, popularity of open source software is 
challenging the existing business by providing a zero cost licensing model and benefits 
of user-driven innovation (Rönkkö, et al., 2008) which in turn decreases profit margins.  
2.2.2 Emergence of Born Global Software Firms 
Many researchers have examined both internal and external key driving forces and 
triggering factors behind the emergence of Born Global firms (Rialp, et al, 2005) in 
general. What are especially applicable to software firms are the fact that software 
product life cycles are exceptionally shorter due to technological developments, and 
globalization of markets and technologies (Kuivalainen, 2001) and operates in a narrow 
niche market scattered thinly across different countries (Saarenketo, 2004), all of which 
encourages firms to globalize quickly. Furthermore, consumer’s tastes and needs have 
become similar across different countries, enabling firms to quickly expand their sales 
outside of their own country or even continent, in order to achieve economies of scale 
and cover their high up-front R&D costs.  
Proliferation of computing devices and popularity of broadband access has certainly 
helped software firms to develop and grow globally (Rönkkö, et al., 2008). Especially 
the wide adoption and use of the Internet has opened up simple channels to deliver 
software products easily and fast to any location in the world. This has allowed many 
software products to be delivered to customers electronically (Coviello & Munro, 
1997).  
The software industry characteristic has also promoted emergence of Born Global 
software firms. The development and marketing agreements between hardware vendors 
and software developers is an industry norm, thus the software industry is characterized 
by inter-firm cooperation (Coviello & Munro, 1997). As Coviello & Munro’s (1997) 
research on four small software firms in New Zealand has identified, partnering with 
large, internationally established hardware vendors during their early growth phases 
provided the catalyst and resources for international growth, supplementing the 
resource-constraint that is typical of small software firms.  
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2.2.3 Software Business in Finland 
Although Finnish software industry has grown rapidly since the 1990s, Finnish and 
other European firms have lagged behind the US firms especially in the software 
product business, due primarily to small and diverse home markets, as well as to the low 
degree of productization (Kuivalainen, et al., 2006). In 2007, the revenue of software 
product business in Finland grew by 8.6% and was !1.52 billion. International revenue 
grew by 12 % and was 45% of total revenues of the industry (Rönkkö, et al., 2008).  
Figure 3. Industry level revenues 2000-2007 
 
 
Source: National Software Industry Survey 2008 (Rönkkö, et al., 2008) 
 
 
 
There were about 8,500 firms employing 49,000 employees in the Finnish IT sector in 
2007 of which 25,500 people were in the software industry (note that this figure only 
covers firms whose main business is software). Typical software firm is very small; 
sometimes there are fewer than 5 employees. The given explanation for this is that 
software firms in Finland are so easy to establish, with very little capital and personnel. 
Most software firms are located in the largest cities, such as the capital district 
(Helsinki, Espoo, Vantaa, and Kauniainen), Tampere, and Turku, due to the fact that 
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those cities are also home to technology centers and universities. Universities are a 
source of innovation for new technologies and products, giving birth to new ideas, 
entrepreneurs, and skilled work force. (Rönkkö, et al., 2008) 
Finland is a country with small home market, thus internationalization is often 
considered a natural step in the life course of software firms (Rönkkö, et al., 2008). 
According to Rönkkö, et al.’s (2008) national software survey in 2007, half of the firms 
with international sales received only 20% or less of their revenue from abroad (see 
figure 4). On the other hand, almost one fifth of the firms generated more than 80% of 
their revenues from abroad. It seems that most of the Finnish software firms 
internationalized only a little if selling abroad can be easily done, and others who were 
successful at internationalization gained substantial growth, increasing foreign sales 
rapidly, surpassing domestic revenues from the small market. Also, many small service-
based firms were found, which does not seek fast growth nor international expansion 
since service business lacks some of the economies of scale present in product business 
and thus the possible gains from internationalizing are probably not worth the risks and 
costs associated with it. (Rönkkö, et al., 2008) 
 
Figure 4. Extent of international operations of firms with international revenue 
 
Source: National Software Industry Survey 2008 (Rönkkö, et al., 2008) 
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There are some challenges that Finnish software industry faces. First, the home market 
is too small. Second, Finland lacks large firms that could consolidate smaller ones 
through acquisitions, which is one of the ways for smaller firms to grow or survive. 
Third, Finnish software firms have so far been too technology driven, missing out on 
the importance of marketing capabilities and truly understanding the market and 
customers. Last but not least, these firms are finding it difficult to grow, lacking 
contacts especially when trying to internationalize. Some do, in fact, remain small 
intentionally due to lack of motivation and/or due to the type of service they provide. 
(Rönkkö, et al., 2008).  
2.3 General Growth Models of Firms  
Amongst the various authors in management literature related to firm growth, Penrose’s 
(1959) resource-based view has received much attention. She presented a theory 
whereby firms grow because they have underutilized resources within the firm and 
because profit seeking entrepreneurial motivation and accomplishment seeking 
managerial motivation exists. Firms can grow if there is a good balance between 
exploitation of current resources and exploration of new ones (Penrose, 1959).  
Many other authors have introduced stage models of firm growth, which shares an 
underlying logic where growth stages emerge in a well-defined sequence so that the 
solution of one set of problems or tasks leads to a new set of problems or tasks that 
firms must address (Kazanjian & Drazin, 1989). Examples can be found of three-stage 
models, four-stage models, and even five or more stage models (Kazanjian & Drazin, 
1989).  
Kazanjian (1988) suggested a four-stage model for technology-based new ventures; 
Conception and Development, Commercialization, Growth, and Stability. This model 
assumed that there are dominant problems at a given point in firm’s history and these 
dominant problems pushes firms to change their organizational structures and routines 
to respond to these problems (Kazanjian & Drazin, 1989) which facilitates growth, 
welcoming new problems with further changes and growth. Similarly, Greiner (1972) 
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argued that firms move through five stages of evolution and revolution, each phase 
ending in a management crisis leading to the next stage. The small difference between 
these two models is that Kazanjian (1988)’s reference to dominant problems arise from 
issues encountered in the technological development, funding, marketing, and 
manufacturing of the product itself whereas Greiner (1972) saw crisis arising internally 
from social interactions amongst personnel (Kazanjian & Drazin, 1989).  
Churchill & Lewis (1983) criticized earlier models for not being applicable to smaller 
businesses since they assumed that firms must grow and pass through all stages of 
development or die in the attempt, and they also did not put any particular focus on 
early stages of firms’ origin and growth. Growth models for smaller businesses have 
been developed by authors such as Steinmetz (1969), Barnes & Hershon (1976), 
Churchill & Lewis (1983), and Scott & Bruce (1987). Churchill & Lewis (1983) 
presented a five-stage growth model consisting of 1) Existence, 2) Survival, 3) Success, 
4) Take-off, and 5) Resource maturity, and advised managers to understand existing 
problems and anticipate future challenges. Based on the model of Churchill & Lewis 
(1983), Scott & Bruce (1987) also developed a five-stage model for small businesses 
consisting of 1) Inception, 2) Survival, 3) Growth, 4) Expansion, and 5) Maturity.   
A commonality amongst these different stage models is that transition from one stage to 
the next is often accompanied by a crisis that may be either external or internal to the 
firm. If the crisis is not managed well, firms can fail at any point during its growth 
(Gabrielsson & Gabrielsson, 2009; Scott & Bruce, 1987). Managers should be in a 
position to predict future problems (Greiner, 1972) and be proactive rather than reactive 
(Scott & Bruce, 1987). For this, managers with a sense of its own firm’s history may 
anticipate and prepare for the next developmental crisis, which can be turned into 
opportunities for growth (Greiner, 1972).  
Kazanjian’s (1988) four-stage model, mentioned above, was significant in a sense that it 
focused on technology-based new ventures which are set apart from other type of firms 
by the important role technology plays in their product designs (Kazanjian & Drazin, 
1989) which must be incorporated into their processes at all times. However, this theory 
did not necessarily focus on “international” new ventures (Born Globals) since 
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expansion of the business into new geographic territories and markets is mentioned only 
in the final “stability” stage, whereas it is assumed with Born Global firms that they 
start their sales to global markets at inception. Also, the model held only for firms 
selling physical products and explained only internally generated growth, not growth by 
acquisition or merger (Kazanjian & Drazin, 1990). Churchill and Lewis’s (1983) five-
stage model incorporated a possibility that “high-technology start-ups” may jump over 
stages due to their motivation to grow rapidly depending on the resources provided by 
outside capital. Yet again, similar to Kazanjian’s (1988) model, this five-stage model 
did not focus particularly on firms that globalize at inception.  
On the other hand, McHugh (1999) proposed a growth model specifically for early 
stage software firms, whereby firms typically go through stages 1) version 1, 2) roll-out, 
3) early growth, and 4) high growth. This model is significant as it studied specifically 
the software firms but did not focus particularly on firms that globalize at inception.  
2.4 Development and Growth Phases of Born Global Software Firms 
Gabrielsson, et al. (2008) has attempted to analyze the evolution of Born Global firms 
in different stages of their development, and have introduced three distinctive phases: 1) 
introductory, 2) growth and resource accumulation, and 3) break-out phases. However, 
this model did not include a phase where Born Globals may become multinational 
corporations (Gabrielsson & Gabrielsson, 2009b). Luostarinen and Gabrielsson (2006) 
introduced a seven-stage model where the three preliminary stages include 1) research 
& development, 2) domestic, and 3) entry, and the latter four major stages include 4) 
starting, 5) development, 6) growth, and 7) mature. However, each phase was not 
analyzed in depth as these stages were used primarily to categorize their case sample 
companies instead of studying how each firm evolves from one phase to another and 
what factors impact the survival of these firms.  
When looking at the growth of firms, it is important to take note that there is two 
dimensions to consider related to growth (Gabrielsson & Gabrielsson, 2009b). The first 
dimension is of firm size. Firm size can grow with respect to their cumulative sales or 
number of employees (Coad & Hölzl, 2009; Delmar, et al., 2003; Greiner, 1972) and 
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can be, for example, categorized into micro, small, medium, and large size. According 
to the European Commission’s 2005 classification, micro-size is defined as an 
enterprise employing fewer than 10 persons with less than !2 M in sales revenue, small-
size as fewer than 50 persons with less than !10 M, and medium-size as fewer than 250 
persons with less than !50 M (Summaries of EU legislation). Thus, large-size enterprise 
would be employing more than 250 persons with more than !50 M in sales revenue.  
The other growth dimension is the rate of foreign expansion (Oviatt & McDougall, 
1994). This can be measured, for example, by the firms’ internationalization degree (the 
extent of sales originating from outside of the home country), globalization degree (the 
extent of sales derived from outside of the home continent), and the increasing 
commitment the firms have in their operation modes to other countries (Luostarinen & 
Gabrielsson, 2006). Most of the stage model of firm growth introduced in the earlier 
section has neglected this dimension.  
Based on Gabrielsson and Gabrielsson’s (2009b) framework, Born Global firms are 
expected to go through four phases during their growth: 1) introductory, 2) commercial 
breakthrough and foreign growth, 3) global breakthrough and expansion, and 4) global 
rationalization and maturity phase. Each of the phases is described in detail in the 
following section, incorporating software firm specific features, and summarized in 
table 2.  
Table 2. Description of the growth phases of a Born Global software firm 
Phase 1. Introductory 2. Commercial 
breakthrough and 
foreign growth 
3. Global 
breakthrough and 
expansion 
4. Global 
rationalization and 
maturity 
Key strategy Development of 
commercially 
acceptable products, 
securing adequate 
finance, developing 
market, and 
receiving first sales 
revenues. 
Making further 
successful foreign 
entries, selling 
products in large 
volumes to reach 
economies of scale 
and managing the 
rapid growth. 
Expansion to new 
continents and 
penetration to 
countries in which 
presence has been 
established to 
leverage economies 
of scope. 
Alignment of global 
operations and 
marketing across 
countries to benefit 
from global 
synergies. 
Growth and size 
of the firm 
(sales, 
employees) 
Micro-sized with only 
a few employees 
with priority on 
making the first deal. 
High relative sales 
and employment 
growth, becoming an 
SME in size. 
Positive relative 
sales and 
employment growth 
continues becoming 
a bigger SME.  
The growth rate 
starts to slow down 
when reaching a 
large size. 
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Foreign 
expansion 
(markets/share) 
Entry to first foreign 
markets with below 
25% 
internationalization 
degree. Sales in less 
than six countries. 
Expansion to foreign 
markets continue, 
25-50% 
internationalization 
degree. Sales in size 
or more countries. 
Expansion to new 
continents and 
penetration to 
existing countries 
with globalization 
degree of 25-50%. 
Sales in at least 
three continents. 
Global presence with 
globalization degree 
over 50%. Sales in 
all major continents.  
Operation mode 
and networks.  
Mainly exporting for 
software products, 
building networks 
and piloting with 
MNCs or other 
channel partners. 
Network is especially 
important for 
software services.  
In addition to 
exporting, sales 
subsidiaries may be 
established. 
Producing, selling, 
and distributing in 
large volumes. 
Growth using MNC 
and foreign channels.  
Large variety of 
operation modes in 
use. Independence 
from large MNCs and 
establishing own 
channel network.  
Alignment of 
operation modes and 
channels.  
Products Reaching concept 
proof of products. 
Focused product 
offering. Localization 
of packages and 
documentation 
material for 
packaged software 
products may begin 
for major countries.  
Expansion of the 
product offering by 
introducing new 
products to current 
customers, or 
expanding 
marketing activities 
to reach new 
customers (within 
the same country). 
Software product 
firms enter the 
service arena. 
Adopting modular 
product structures to 
achieve economies 
of scope. Search for 
new growth 
opportunities 
through new product 
development, 
diversification (of 
products & markets), 
or acquisition.  
Organizational 
structure 
Systems, structures, 
and formality are 
almost nonexistent 
with informal 
communication. 
Founder remains 
central to decision-
making but adopts 
more functional, 
formal structures. 
Decentralized 
structure, more 
responsibility given 
to the managers in 
the field, with 
greater authority 
and incentive. 
Formal 
communication and 
business processes 
supported by IT 
systems. 
Bureaucratic 
principles, formal 
structure with 
standardized rules 
and procedures. 
Centralization and 
decentralization 
balanced. Emphasis 
on improving 
software 
development 
processes.  
Survival crisis Failure in obtaining 
needed managerial 
expertise, resources, 
and capabilities 
needed for the next 
phase.  
Failure in 
safeguarding the 
continued growth 
and change towards 
more professional 
management, 
balancing hierarchy 
and freedom. 
Failure to align 
activities to avoid 
cost inefficiencies 
and duplication of 
efforts, and inability 
to respond to 
competitors and 
global customer 
needs. 
MNC-specific 
challenges (outside 
the scope of this 
study). 
Source: adapted from Gabrielsson & Gabrielsson, 2009b (“Organizational structure” 
section added) 
2.4.1 Introductory Phase 
In the introductory phase, Born Globals primarily focus on inventing and developing a 
product and/or technology, securing adequate finance, and identifying market 
opportunities (Kazanjian & Drazin, 1989). They must find ways to expand from one key 
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customer to broader audience, and have enough cash to cover different activities 
(Churchill & Lewis, 1983). Entry to first foreign market starts during this phase, with 0-
25% internationalization degree and sales in less than six countries (Gabrielsson & 
Gabrielsson, 2009b).  
Software product firms tend to, on average, grow larger and faster than software service 
firms due to the fact that it is easier to grow internationally by exporting physical 
products than to do the same as pure software service firms. Software products, which 
can be replicated at close to zero marginal costs once it is developed, can be sold to 
millions of customers without any customer tailoring (Hietala, et al., 2004). Thus, it is 
easy to start exporting software products to other countries via intermediaries such as 
distributors and Internet channels once the software is replicated and packaged. 
Software products also enable scalable business models introducing potential for fast 
growth (Rönkkö, et al., 2008).  
Whether the software firm is in the software products business or services business, 
they tend to externalize their activities during the initial internationalization process, 
often relying on network relationships for market selection as well as mode of entry 
(Coviello & Munro, 1997). This is due to limited resources at the beginning and if the 
firm decides to collaborate with multinational enterprises (MNEs), it may achieve rapid 
growth (Gabrielsson, et al., 2008). For software service firms, simply “exporting” to 
foreign markets is not possible because the nature of services require production and 
consumption to be physically proximate (inseparability) (Erramilli, 1990). Thus, 
software service firms are expected to heavily network with partners when starting to 
internationalize, often going abroad primarily in order to serve the overseas affiliates of 
their domestic clients (Erramilli, 1990; Rönkkö, et al., 2008).  
Systems, structures, and formality are almost nonexistent (Churchill & Lewis, 1983; 
Kazanjian & Drazin, 1989) and communication among employees is frequent and 
informal (Greiner, 1972) during this phase. Employees work long hours (Greiner, 
1972), which is often accompanied by strong motivation to succeed and getting a piece 
of ownership advantages.  
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The development of the first product is crucial thus skillful R&D personnel should be 
put in place (Luostarinen & Gabrielsson, 2006). However, when trying to achieve 
commercial breakthrough towards the next phase, it is important to allocate early 
enough competent marketing and sales personnel, which are substantially different 
types of resources than the R&D personnel. Also, the young founders of Born Global 
firms are usually technically or entrepreneurially oriented (Greiner, 1972), and often 
rely on their own abilities and skills, attracting similar employees to the management 
team with little business experience (Luostarinen & Gabrielsson, 2006). However, as 
the firm continues to grow, managing more employees with informal structure and 
organization starts to become chaotic, requiring placement of formalized systems and 
record keeping (Scott & Bruce, 1987). Founders tend to hate stepping aside, though 
they may not be the most suitable business managers (Greiner, 1972). If the firm fails to 
obtain necessary managerial expertise and evolve the organization to match to the 
changing environment before the firm and its challenges get any bigger, the firm’s 
survival may be at risk.  
2.4.2 Commercial Breakthrough and Foreign Growth Phase 
In the commercial breakthrough and foreign growth phase, the market accepts Born 
Global firms’ products and services and revenue starts to grow with solid sales pipeline. 
Expansion to foreign markets continue, reaching 25-50% internationalization degree 
with sales in six or more countries, and sells products in large volumes to reach 
economies of scale (Gabrielsson & Gabrielsson, 2009b). Many software firms in 
Finland are initially entering countries that are geographically nearby (Sweden, Norway, 
Estonia, and Russia), and countries that have big markets such as USA, Germany, UK, 
and China (Rönkkö, et al., 2008). Subsidiaries may be established to better cater to 
different markets in addition to export activities (Gabrielsson & Gabrielsson, 2009b). 
During this phase, pressure to attain profitability is high, and firms must carefully 
balance profits against future growth (Kazanjian & Drazin, 1990). To maintain a solid 
equity base and to finance the growth, further capital will need to be issued (Bruce & 
Scott, 1987).  
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Customer feedback becomes critical, especially to software products firms, if they want 
to target mainstream users. What customers are saying about the product in the field and 
about what features they want in the next version must be heard and incorporated into 
the software development process (Cusumano, 2004). Software product firms may also 
start to localize some of the documentation, package material, and GUI (Graphical User 
Interface) to target more users in countries where English is not their first language.   
Due to the limited resources that Born Globals usually face, they collaborate even more 
with MNEs as in the previous phase. However, in doing so, there is a risk of becoming 
overly dependent on a particular relationship (Gabrielsson & Kirpalani, 2004; 
Gabrielsson, et al., 2008).  
The founder often remains central to all decision-making, but throughout this phase, 
there is an increasing sense of hierarchy, need for functional specialization and division, 
and the move towards more professionally trained and experienced personnel 
(Kazanjian & Drazin, 1990). In most cases, functional organizational structure is 
introduced, accounting systems for inventory and purchasing are put into place, and 
incentive and budget standards are adopted (Bruce & Scott, 1987; Greiner, 1972). 
Communication becomes more formal and impersonal as hierarchy of titles and 
positions are created (Greiner, 1972). Although young entrepreneurial firms tend to 
dislike bureaucracy, it is essential for managers to come up with a way to enforce these 
structural controls at the same time as leaving room for some creativity and flexibility 
(Cusumano, 2004). Software development process should especially be emphasized if 
not done so already.  
Firms also need to increase the amount of personnel as they continue to grow during 
this phase. As the firm becomes more and more structured, centralized, and formalized, 
lower-level specialists start to feel torn between following procedures and taking 
initiatives on their own (Greiner, 1972). They look back to the “good old days” when 
friends were working together, having fun. Also, trying to control different geographic 
locations start to become difficult, demanding for decentralization and delegation 
(Bruce & Scott, 1987). It is often difficult for managers to give up their power and 
responsibility, but unless firms are able to change the organization and start delegating, 
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lower-level personnel with specialized skills may leave the firm (Greiner, 1972). Firms 
must also be careful with overtrading during this rapid growth phase (Bruce & Scott, 
1987). If too much investment is done at the same time in many geographic locations, 
firms may realize too late that resources have been overstretched, and face bankruptcy.  
2.4.3 Global Breakthrough and Expansion Phase 
In the global breakthrough and expansion phase, expansion to new continents and 
penetration to countries with existing presence continues. Globalization degree is at 25-
50% with sales in at least three continents (Gabrielsson & Gabrielsson, 2009b). As 
product matures the firm, fearing the loss of overseas markets, firms will start to 
establish their own sales office in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI) instead of 
solely relying on exports and partners, in order to further exploit its monopolistic 
advantage (Vernon, 1966). FDI will enable firms to have direct contacts with customers 
in addition to using various distribution channels. Dependency on multinational 
corporations as sales partners may start to decrease, but increasing amount of marketing 
partnership will be made. Firms will start to become more like a SME through the 
increase of personnel to support the growth and expansion (Gabrielsson & Gabrielsson, 
2009b).  
During this phase, especially software service firms may actually start to face a different 
type of challenge, which they did not face during the initial foreign expansion phase. 
When trying to achieve global breakthrough, firms will start to take on more distant and 
challenging markets, thereby facing increasing difficulties in cultural, legal, and 
localization issues (Rönkkö, et al., 2008).  
In order to penetrate the markets where they are already present, firms will need to 
expand their product offering by introducing new products to current customers, or 
expand marketing activities to reach new customers (within the same country). Software 
product firms who expanded rapidly at the beginning due to its “hit product”, may 
struggle at this point to come up with continuous stream of new products that sell in 
both bad and good economies, thus eventually pushing them into a more service-
oriented approach with their business, which may secure continuous stream of revenue 
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in the form of longer-term maintenance contracts (Cusumano, 2004). Commoditization 
of the products market may also drop the price points down, further encouraging firms 
to start providing services and maintenance. Other ways to fend off commoditization are 
to release new, more advanced products, emphasize quality, or market heavily with a 
strong emphasis on the brand (Ibid.). However, since managing a software product 
business and software service business is inherently different, managing the change in 
its business model is of utmost importance to firm survival.  
Within the decentralized organizational structure, more responsibility is given to the 
managers in the field, and with greater authority and incentive, they are able to penetrate 
larger markets and respond to customer needs quicker (Greiner, 1972). However, this 
brings on a new type of crisis, where top executives feel they are losing control over a 
highly diversified field operation (Greiner, 1972). The firm increasingly face cost 
inefficiencies and duplication of efforts between countries (Gabrielsson & Gabrielsson, 
2009b). Also, even if the delegation style was sought in, the increasing amount of new 
“professional” managers do not have the same commitment or spirit compared to the 
older employees who sacrificed themselves for the sake of the business. This brings on 
the “crisis of culture” (Scott & Bruce, 1987). Unless these numerous challenges are 
faced seriously, the firm may be at survival risk.  
2.4.4 Global Rationalization and Maturity Phase 
The major challenge during the global rationalization and maturity phase is to maintain 
growth momentum and market position (Kazanjian & Drazin, 1990). Globalization 
degree is over 50% with sales in all major continents (Gabrielsson & Gabrielsson, 
2009b).  
By this phase, the firm has become a stable operating firm characterized by bureaucratic 
principles, formal structure with standardized rules and procedures (Kazanjian & 
Drazin, 1990) and will become more or less like a MNC (Gabrielsson & Gabrielsson, 
2009b). The firm will constantly be under the pressures from stakeholders to ensure the 
future of the firm (Scott & Bruce, 1987). In order to balance the benefits and 
disadvantages of centralization and decentralization, firms will increasingly adopt the 
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collaboration style whereby social control and self-discipline is emphasized and matrix-
type structure is introduced (Greiner, 1972). There is an increasing need for alignment 
of operations and marketing to be able to reach global synergies (Gabrielsson & 
Gabrielsson, 2009b). Firms should also have adopted modular product structures by this 
phase, if not sooner, in order to achieve economies of scope (Cusumano, 2004).  
Born Global software firms which typically initially develop their niche products for the 
niche market target vertical markets such as a specific industry (e.g., software for the 
healthcare industry), a technical specialty (e.g., computer-aided design programs), or a 
platform-specific market (e.g., an application that runs only on a particular operating 
system and computer hardware combination). If the firm has reached the maturity phase 
in a specific vertical market, the firm may perhaps move on to master another vertical 
market. If the firm is able to master several vertical markets, it may expand to horizontal 
markets, which covers most or all PC users, regardless of their industry or functional 
specialization. By segmenting markets both horizontally and vertically, software firms 
obtain a blueprint for diversification and expansion while still remaining close to their 
core of expertise (Cusumano, 2004). Firms may also diversify product offerings and the 
organizational structure by creating new, small business units to target new product 
opportunities (Cusumano, 2004).  
If firms see a potential of growth stopping due to saturated market or not being able to 
come up with next generation products, they may decide to go for mergers and 
acquisitions with other similar firms, in order to maintain the growth momentum and 
seek new opportunities. As Delmar, et al. (2003) stress, organic growth tends to be 
associated with smaller firms, younger firms, and emerging industries, whereas 
acquisition growth is more likely in older and larger firms, and in mature industries.   
Mature firms may have some slack to improve the software development process, which 
is critical to software firms (Cusumano, 2004). Reducing defects and improving the 
ability to trace bugs back to their sources can save enormous time and effort when it 
comes to software debugging and stabilization, which is one of the most important 
element in creating a reliable software product. Enhancing process capabilities for better 
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managing schedules, budgetary constraints, change requests, and customer feedback, 
can contribute to the continuous growth and survival of software firms. 
Once firms have grown up to this phase, they risk a danger of facing ossification. 
Ossification is characterized by a lack of innovative decision-making and avoidance of 
risk-taking, commonly seen in large firms with large market share, buying power, and 
financial resources to keep them viable (Churchill & Lewis, 1983). It is important to 
continue cultivating the innovative culture to develop new products, or eventually 
competitors can eat the firms up.  
As seen from the general growth theories of firms, when firms go through different 
phases, they may face crises, questioning their survival. Hence, the following discusses 
survival in the context of Born Global software firms.  
2.5 Survival of Born Global Software Firms 
Survival of firms is an important topic since only those that survive can benefit their 
national economies (Gabrielsson & Gabrielsson, 2009a). “Survival of Born Globals” in 
this research does not necessarily mean that the firm has not gone bankrupt. A firm is 
not classified as a successful Born Global if it had set out to conquer the whole world 
but after the initial introductory phase, decide to withdraw from all markets other than 
nearby ones and its home market. It has failed if the original vision of the Born Global 
is not pursued for one reason or the other (Gabrielsson & Gabrielsson, 2009b). 
Gabrielsson and Gabrielsson (2009a) pointed out that Born Globals face three risks 
when moving toward ‘adulthood’: a) they do not succeed in growing beyond their initial 
phase, b) they encounter financial problems and are acquired or merged by larger firms, 
or c) they go bankrupt. 
Earlier research suggested that probability of failure of new ventures is highest in the 
firm’s early years, and that it usually declines as the firm ages (Zimmerman & Zeitz, 
2002). Yet, there has not been enough research on the survival rates of Born Global 
firms after they have been established (Zahra, 2005) and the factors that influence them.  
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According to Zahra (2005), Born Globals experience three types of liability that 
influences their survival. First of all, Born Globals are new and inexperienced in the 
market so they have limitation to accessing resources and existing networks. This 
liability of newness (Stinchcombe, 1965) also means that Born Globals’ various 
stakeholders are not yet confident about the firm. Second, Born Globals are usually 
small in size, and this limits the slack resources that they have to overcome challenges 
of internationalization. Third and final liability that Zahra (2005) focused on is Born 
Globals’ foreignness. Born Globals have to work hard to overcome barriers to entry, 
build networks to customers and suppliers, and gain acceptance from potential 
customers. Additional coordination costs, unfamiliarity with the local culture, lack of 
information networks and political influence in the host country may also be 
problematic (Zaheer & Mosakowski, 1997). Any of these liabilities can increase the risk 
of Born Globals’ potential failure.  
In addition, Shrader, et al. (2000) suggested that accelerated internationalization 
involves significant international risks that must be managed “by trading foreign 
location, entry mode commitment, and foreign revenue exposure off against each other 
in each country they enter” (Shrader, et al, 2000, p.1228). Mudambi and Zahra (2007) 
also acknowledged that Born Globals may face substantial handicaps, but in their study 
of how survival probabilities of firms progressing via the traditional internationalizing 
approach (incremental, step-by-step) and firms expanding immediately to foreign 
countries differ, they found that survival rates may not differ, as long as the latter would 
have appropriate resources and competences to overcome the various liabilities and 
challenges.  
In an attempt to understand how firms can avoid survival risks, Oviatt and McDougall 
(1994) argued that international experiences make managers more aware of the 
challenges associated with conducting businesses on a global scale. However, Zahra 
(2005) argues toward this by pointing out that experience might induce rigidity as 
managers develop their own preferred ways of dealing with the challenges of 
multinationality. These mental shortcuts may deprive Born Globals of a potentially rich 
source of innovativeness in their operations, thus experimentation and openness to 
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experimentation are said to be essential for Born Globals to “discover the winning 
business model and market receipt” (Zahra, 2005, p.24). Autio, et al. (2000) have also 
similarly suggested that younger firms do not have established routines that hinder their 
learning opportunities in foreign settings, so they may be able to use their learning 
advantage of newness to grow more rapidly. Shepherd, et al. (2000) who particularly 
focused on the liability of newness concept, which is largely dependent on the degree of 
novelty (ignorance) with regards to three dimensions, viz.: to the market, to the 
technology of production, and to management, suggested that if information is acquired 
and distributed quickly and appropriately, mortality rate may decrease.  
Zaheer & Mosakowski (1997) found out in their study that firm-level sources of 
competitive advantage such as technology adoption and nonhierarchical modes of 
control increased the rate of survival of foreign firms. Raz and Gloor’s (2007) study of 
Israeli software start-ups indicated that firm size and firm age impacts survival. The 
older a company is, the better is its chance to survive. The larger a firm is, the better its 
chance to survive. These may well be factors for survival in the later stages of Born 
Global software firms but does not help in the early stages when they are typically small 
in size that just started their business. Garengo and Bernardi (2007) points out that a 
factor for small and medium sized firms’ survival lies in its capability to implement 
managerial processes not in their later years but early in advance before management 
crisis hits them.  
During the data-gathering period (2001-mid 2002) in their study, Luostarinen and 
Gabrielsson (2006) found that 10.1% of the Born Globals examined had entered 
liquidation or had been acquired or merged with another firm. New ventures usually 
have a higher risk of failures (Shepherd, et al., 2000). Some studies have also shown 
that only a low percentage of new and small firms are able to survive (Westhead, 1995). 
It is apparent that Born Globals operate in a highly challenging business environment 
with very limited resources.  
In the following section, factors influencing the growth and survival of Born Global 
software firms are reviewed in more detail.  
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2.6 Factors Influencing the Growth and Survival of Born Global 
Software Firms 
Earlier research has recognized some factors that are essential for growth and survival 
of Born Global firms, often grouped under industry and firm factors (e.g. Mudambi & 
Zahra, 2007), while Nambisan (2002) made a literature review on firm growth from 
software firms’ perspective and found out several external and internal factors that 
determine software firm growth, as summarized in table 3.  
Table 3. Determinants of software firm growth and evolution: a literature review. 
External Factors Internal Factors 
    
Industry Characteristics (market 
structure, competitive environment, etc.) 
Founding Condition of the Firm (Initial 
technology strategy, initial financial 
resources, etc.) 
Technology Characteristics (technology 
life cycle, technology standards, etc.) 
Strategic Factors (strategic aggressiveness, 
strategic alliances, product strategy, etc.) 
Economic and Technological 
Infrastructure (venture capital, 
manpower resources, telecommunication 
infrastructure, etc.) 
Firm Resources and Competencies 
(managerial capabilities, development 
processes, marketing skills, etc) 
Regulatory Infrastructure (taxation & 
fiscal incentives, intellectual property 
regime, etc.) 
Internal Stakeholder Characteristics 
(personality traits, demographics, 
experience, innovation-orientation, etc.) 
Regional Culture & External 
Stakeholder Characteristics (innovation-
orientation, experience, regional networks 
of learning ,etc.) 
  
Source: Nambisan, 2002, p. 152. 
In line with Gabrielsson and Gabrielsson (2009b), industry factors, firm factors, and 
entrepreneurial orientation and lateral rigidity are discussed in the following section. To 
direct the focus towards software business, relevant literature connecting these factors 
with software business is also briefly covered in some sections.  
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2.6.1 Industry Factors 
Based on earlier research, Gabrielsson and Gabrielsson (2009b) suggest that, as industry 
factors, industry growth rate, rate of penetration by foreign firms and seller 
concentration in the industry, and industry globalization drivers potentially have impact 
on the growth and survival of Born Global firms.  
a) Industry Growth 
The industry growth rate (Hennart & Park, 1993, Vernon, 1966) can be expected to 
influence Born Global growth phases and survival (Gabrielsson & Gabrielsson, 2009b). 
For example, a firm in a rapidly expanding market may need to add employees quickly 
which ignites organizational changes and growth, whereas poor market conditions may 
hit the firm hard in a way that firms cannot overcome turbulent times (Greiner, 1972). 
High-growth industries, such as the software industry, are resource-rich environments 
with opportunities for firms to grow (Mudambi & Zahra, 2007).  
b) Penetration by Foreign Firms and Seller Concentration in the Industry 
A higher level of existing foreign penetration of an industry reduces the probability of 
survival for the newcomer as competition intensifies and finding a space in the niche 
market may be difficult (Mudambi & Zahra, 2007). Mudambi & Zahra (2007) also 
argued that higher seller concentration reduces the probability of survival. This may 
lead us to believe that firms should try to be a first mover into the niche market so to 
gain first access to distribution channels, develop good will with customers, or develop 
a positive reputation, all before other competing firms do (Barney, 1991). However, 
Christensen, et al. (1998) argue that, in a fast-paced industry, firms should enter the 
market during the “window of opportunity”, which is a bit after the first movers but 
long before many others. This is because in a fast-changing industry, technology 
changes rapidly, so that capabilities and knowledge gained at earlier stages in an 
industry’s development may become obsolete quickly. Firms entering too early may 
miss the most attractive value network and spend too much resources in acquiring 
knowledge that may become obsolete, and firms entering too late may face heavy entry 
barriers (Christensen, et al., 1998).  
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c) Industry Globalization Drivers 
Yip (1989) argued that industry globalization drivers that are related to market, cost, 
government, and competition affect the possibilities to grow. For example, favorable 
trade policies, compatible technical standards, homogenous customer needs, and 
common market regulations open up the global market for new, Born Global firms to 
enter and grow. In addition, Luostarinen (1994) presented the idea that the peripheral 
location, smallness, and openness of the home market are expected to push firms 
originating from those market to globalize, while large size and openness of the target 
markets is expected to pull those firms to globalize.  
2.6.2 Firm Factors: Resources and Capabilities 
Firm factors that are important for growth and survival of Born Globals are the amount 
of resources, various capabilities (Teece, et al., 1997), managerial and international 
experience (Mudambi & Zahra’s, 2007), resource fungibility (Sapienza, et al., 2006), 
and the availability of government support (Knight & Cavusgil, 2005).   
Resource Amount 
Some researchers have argued that an abundance of resources is necessary for survival 
and growth (Laanti, et al., 2007) while others asserted that it may also cause problems 
(Autio, et al., 2000).  
Specifically, following resources are needed for growth and survival: 
• Financial resources such as cash and borrowing power (Churchill & Lewis, 
1983) are needed.  
• Personnel resources: the quality of staff and suitable amount at the relevant 
growth stage is needed (Churchill & Lewis, 1983). This is especially an 
important factor in a knowledge-intensive industry like the software industry, 
where competitive advantage often arise from the skills and know-how of 
personnel than from other resources the firm possesses (Cusumano, 2004; 
Rönkkö, et al., 2008).  
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• Adequate system resources such as sophisticated information and planning and 
control systems are needed (Churchill & Lews, 1983). 
However valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable, and unsubstitutable these resources could 
be, resource fungibility is also essential in facilitating development of new capabilities 
(Sapienza, et al., 2006), especially in a volatile international business environment. 
Sapienza, et al. (2006) argue that resource fungibility, the extent to which resources can 
be deployed for alternative uses at low cost, is more important for growth and survival 
of firms than the actual amount of resources that these firms possess.  
Managerial and International Experience 
Mudambi & Zahra’s (2007) study showed that firms with higher levels of international 
experience had a higher probability of survival. McDougall, et al. (1994) also 
emphasized that founder’s experience and internal training programs are important 
factors for success of Born Global firms.  
When assessing managerial and international experience as factors for growth and 
survival, it is important to distinguish between stock, variety, and stream (Reuber & 
Fischer, 1999). Stock refers to the experience the founders and managers bring into the 
firm, stream refers to the learning that happens within the firm, and variety means 
breadth and depth of their experience. The survival probability of Born Globals is 
higher especially at the early growth stages if the entrepreneurs have experience with 
previous start up firms (stock), thus being able to cope with uncertainty, conflict, and 
confusion that tends to reside in growing small organizations (Shepherd, et al., 2000). If 
there is not enough stock when needed, the firm should think about hiring a professional 
management team to bring both experience and contacts into the firm (Rönkkö, et al., 
2008). The variety of international experience is also important. Different types of 
people could be hired to the advisory board to provide the firm with advice. Use of the 
expertise of the venture capital firms that invest in the firm’s business is also beneficial, 
as they often employ experienced business managers who have large contact networks 
(Luostarinen & Gabrielsson, 2006). Stream of experience becomes important if firms 
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want to grow. Each customer case, even the failed ones, should be studied so to gain 
experimental knowledge (Ruokolainen, 2008).  
Capabilities (Substantive, dynamic, and networking) 
Capabilities differ from resources in a sense that the former is needed to be able to 
deploy and coordinate the various resources the firm has in order to achieve its goals 
(Gabrielsson & Gabrielsson, 2009a; Sapienza, et al., 2006). Knight and Cavusgil (2004) 
have noted how capabilities are essential for Born Globals rapid internationalization and 
their subsequent growth.    
Capabilities that affect growth and survival of Born Globals can be divided into three 
types: Substantive, dynamic, and networking (Gabrielsson & Gabrielsson, 2009a). 
Possession and management of all three types of capabilities can increase firm’s 
competitive advantage, increasing the chance for growth and survival.  
Substantive capabilities 
Substantive capabilities are sets of abilities and resources that enable firms to solve 
problems or achieve an outcome (Zahra, et al., 2006). Substantive capabilities, which 
are factors for growth and survival of Born Global firms, can be further divided into 
three categories; management capabilities, technological capabilities, and networking 
capabilities (Gabrielsson & Gabrielsson, 2009a).  
Management capabilities: Earlier management practices that suited smaller sized firms 
may not necessarily suit firms that are growing. Unless management are able to 
abandon past practices and undergo organizational changes that suits the firm at a new 
point, the firm may not survive (Churchill & Lewis, 1987; Greiner, 1972). Garengo and 
Bernardi (2007) also point out that small and medium sized firms tend to dedicate most 
of their attention to operational and technological aspects, neglecting organizational and 
managerial problems. Especially in software business, the founders are generally 
technology-oriented yet manages the business at the same time as developing the new 
products. These founders’ operational abilities in doing marketing, investing, producing, 
and managing distribution are essential to the survival of the firm in the early stages 
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(Churchill & Lewis, 1987), but if these abilities are not good enough as the firm grows, 
it is best to step aside and give way to other experienced managers.  
Technological capabilities: Mudambi & Zahra’s (2007) study showed that firms with 
higher levels of technological competences had higher probability of survival. 
Technological capabilities include R&D, manufacturing, design, technological 
knowledge, architecture knowledge, and aesthetics knowledge (Gabrielsson & 
Gabrielsson, 2009a). Especially having a technological leadership, being at the leading 
technological edge of its industry, as well as using advanced technologies in its 
products, methods, and other outputs, is essential for growth (Knight & Cavusgil, 2005). 
Similarly, Nambisan (2002) has also pointed out that in software business, technology 
leadership is essential to create and capture new markets and to grow, and as such it is a 
critical success factor.  
Marketing capabilities: Traditionally, Finnish software firms have been too technology 
oriented, considering their technology to be the source of competitive advantage, but 
now when new software products are increasingly fast to build relying on existing 
technologies, understanding of the market and customers is becoming increasingly 
important (Rönkkö, et al., 2008). As such, marketing capabilities have been identified as 
one of the important capabilities for Born Globals to position themselves in foreign 
markets. When firms possess high-levels of marketing capabilities and international 
marketing orientation, firms can develop unique products, focus on quality, and find 
competent foreign intermediaries such as distributors. (Knight & Cavusgil, 2004). It is 
also important to have different marketing capabilities depending on who are the target 
customers, since marketing to individual customers or enterprise customers has a big 
difference (Cusumano, 2004).  
Dynamic capabilities 
Dynamic capability is the dynamic ability to change or reconfigure existing substantive 
capabilities, routines, and resources, “in the manner envisioned and deemed 
appropriate by the firm’s principal decision-maker(s)” (Zahra, et al., 2006, p.924). 
With dynamic capability, firms can create new resource configurations as markets 
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emerge, collide, split, evolve, and die (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). Possession of 
dynamic capabilities alone does not necessarily provide any substantial advantage to 
firms, but being able to manage the dynamic capabilities to achieve their strategic goals 
provides performance-related advantages to firms (Ibid.). In addition to the substantive 
capabilities mentioned above, which address current challenges, having dynamic 
capabilities to redeploy or configure those substantive capabilities according to the 
strategic goals will help firms grow and survive as they face changes within the internal 
and external environment (Zahra, et al., 2006).  
Networking capabilities 
Networking capability can be defined as the firm’s “ability to develop and utilize inter-
organizational relationships to gain access to various resources held by other actors” 
(Walter, et al., 2006, p. 542). Walter, et al. (2006) suggest that managerial attention 
should focus on increasing coordination, relational skills, market information, and 
internal communication to develop network capability, which was found to positively 
affect growth of university spin-off firms. Coviello & Munro’s (1997) study on small 
software firms originating from New Zealand also showed that managing existing 
networks and establishing new network relationships is one of the key competitive 
capabilities for international growth. Raz and Gloor (2007) studied the progress of 
Israeli software start-ups from the dot-com economic growth era to eight years later 
when the dot-com bubble burst, and found that firms that have larger informal 
communication networks – the weak ties - increased their chance of survival. Weak ties 
provide access to non-redundant knowledge, ideas, and different social capital, which 
normally requires years to obtain (Raz & Gloor, 2007; Rönkkö, et al., 2008).  
Networking capabilities are important for all types of software firms. Partners can 
provide firms with key resources (capital, marketing, distribution, etc.), which tend to 
be lacking in small Born Global firms. Particularly, tailor-made software usually 
involve cooperation or co-development in projects with the customer, thus, if the 
domestic customer/partner decides to internationalize, the software firm may also 
follow suit (Kuivalainen, et al., 2006). For packaged software products, networking 
helps in channel building in international markets and building alliances in the industry. 
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As Nambisan (2002) summarizes, external networks are critical for software firms not 
only for understanding market requirements and evaluating product feasibility, but also 
for filling critical internal technology gaps and deploying innovative marketing 
strategies. Hence, having the ability to choose the right partner at the right time is 
extremely important for growth and survival of Born Global software firms.  
Government Support 
Because Born Globals in general tend to be young, inexperienced, and lack resources 
that are essential to the survival in the international market, government support may be 
able to contribute to the growth and survival of these firms by providing training, 
financial support, information, and other resources (Knight & Cavusgil, 2005). 
Especially the need for support in marketing planning and implementation is high 
(Luostarinen & Gabrielsson, 2006).  
2.6.3 Entrepreneurial Orientation and Agility 
Industry factors influencing growth and survival of Born Globals are beyond the control 
of managers, but managerial choice and decision-making related to the firm factors may 
have great impact on the growth and survival (Christensen et, al., 1998; Gabrielsson & 
Gabrielsson, 2009a). Such a dimension is the firm’s entrepreneurial orientation. 
Entrepreneurial orientation is associated with managerial vision, innovativeness, and 
pro-active competitive posture in international markets (Knight & Cavusgil, 2005). 
Entrepreneurial characteristics include autonomy, risk-taking, innovativeness, 
proactiveness, flexibility, readiness for change, and advantage-seeking behavior 
(Gabrielsson & Gabrielsson, 2009b; Karagozoglu & Lindell, 1998; Laanti, et al., 2007). 
In their study, Knight & Cavusgil (2005) found that possession of entrepreneurial 
orientation by Born Globals drove superior international performance.  
Kuivalainen, et al. (2007) found that different dimensions of entrepreneurial orientation 
are more important than others in different stages of firm’s life cycle. Younger and 
smaller firms at the beginning of rapidly internationalizing phase may still be risk taking 
and proactive compared to the more advanced globalized firms, in order to expand their 
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business to further markets. On the other hand, the more globalized and established 
Born Globals might not anymore be proactively looking for new markets or 
opportunities but may compete in a more aggressive manner in their present markets 
and follow a market-penetration strategy. Walter, et al. (2006) regarded entrepreneurial 
orientation as an entrance ticket that allows for a higher impact of competencies on 
performance but argued that entrepreneurial orientation alone is not enough to guarantee 
growth. Their claim is that if it is combined with firm’s network capability, it can have 
positive influence on performance. In any case, entrepreneurial orientation in decision-
making seems to be an important element for rapid growth of Born Globals. However, 
the more entrepreneurial orientation the firm has, the more risks it would take for rapid 
growth, thus the higher the risk of non-survival (Gabrielsson & Gabrielsson, 2009a).  
The earlier stage-wise internationalization models (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977; 
Luostarinen, 1979), which suggested that firms internationalize in slow, incremental 
steps, were built on the behavioral theory of the firm (Cyert & March, 1963). Firm’s 
decision-making was described as having a number of conflicting objectives, seeking 
simple-minded decisions, and focusing on the short-term. This has been characterized as 
firm’s decision-making being laterally rigid. According to Vaivio (1963), lateral rigidity 
means that firms try to stick to their plans and even when faced with a shock, firms tend 
to make only minor adjustments to their behavior. Built on this, Luostarinen (1979) 
argued that internationalization efforts of firms are characterized by a laterally rigid 
decision process, whereby firms are laterally rigid towards new alternatives but are 
elastic forwards, towards known alternatives. Thus, lateral rigidity in decision-making 
enhances the probability of the survival of the firm by taking risk-cautious path 
(Gabrielsson & Gabrielsson, 2009a). However, this naturally slows the growth of firms 
in the international market, which contradicts to the characteristic of Born Globals.  
Autio, et al. (2000) found that firms that are relatively young when they first 
internationalize benefit from leaning advantages of newness, which was one of the 
liabilities of survival of Born Globals, mentioned earlier. The younger the firms are, the 
more novel approaches they adopt for internationalization, such as fewer routines, 
simpler decision-making, and flexibility to rapidly learn new competences. However, 
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these characteristics decrease with age and the ability to internationalize and grow 
abroad decrease the longer the firm waits to do so. This behavior is in line with the 
laterally rigid decision-making described earlier for established firms if the age of the 
Born Global is considered to reduce lateral rigidity. Born Globals may be less rigid and 
more entrepreneurially oriented due to their previous international experience and/or 
innovativeness that lowers the lateral rigidity that would otherwise rule. Therefore, the 
younger a firm is at the stage of its first international entry, the more entrepreneurial its 
orientation and the lesser the lateral rigidity in its decision-making. Thus, the growth 
can be expected to be more rapid, although the risk of non-survival may also increase 
(Gabrielsson & Gabrielsson, 2009b). 
Entrepreneurial orientation and agility/lateral rigidity are characteristics that are usually 
formed by the key persons in the firm. Young founders of Born Globals are usually 
entrepreneurially oriented (Greiner, 1972) and often remain central to all decision-
making, especially during the first two phases of growth. In addition to the 
entrepreneurial orientation as a key factor for growth and survival, Rönkkö, et al. (2008) 
found that the founder’s growth aspirations and growth willingness is one of the most 
important requirements for successful growth of Finnish software firms. Growth 
aspirations refer to the idea of the scale to which the firm would like to grow and 
growth willingness refer to the degree to which growth is emphasized in the firms. They 
explain that one of the reasons why so many Finnish software firms remain small is 
because the founders have low level of growth aspirations and are unwilling to grow the 
business considering the increased level of risk associated with it. Quite often when 
founders have achieved a good standard of living from the firm they founded, they lose 
willingness to take risks and hunger for more growth. Thus, if a personal level target 
setting and will on the part of the founders and managers are low, growth seems to be 
highly unlikely. (Rönkkö, et al., 2008) 
2.6.4 Software Business Specific Factors 
In addition to the industry and firm-level factors, there are also specific factors related 
to the software business that may contribute to the growth and survival of Born Global 
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software firms. Here, it is assumed that theories for general software firms are also 
applicable to Born Global software firms.  
Compatibility with Dominant Players 
Software is not useful unless there is a platform on which it can be executed, namely 
hardware and systems software. In this sense, software products and other platforms 
complement each other to provide the intended value to customers. Thus, compatibility 
with other hardware and software is an important element in developing software. 
(Rönkkö & Pöyry, 2006) 
However, there is always uncertainty about which products or systems actually become 
a success and adopted by customers. In this sense, software firm’s growth and survival 
can depend on whether they have complemented the product/system that actually 
becomes a dominant one in the market. These are long-term strategic decisions that can 
go very right or very wrong (Cusumano, 2004). Pouring all the precious R&D resources 
into developing software compatible for certain new hardware/operating system, which 
ends up being pulled out of the market due to low customer demand, can have a 
detrimental effect on the software firm.  
Ensuring compatibility with numbers of vendors is also important. As Coviello & 
Munro’s (1997) study revealed, in their early phases of growth, some small software 
firms may develop products specifically for their partner’s hardware platform, 
increasing dependency on that firm. Although being an exclusive partner to one leading 
hardware firm has its advantages, total dependence on one firm can be risky in case that 
partner firm encounters financial difficulties of its own for various reasons or loses 
market share to their competitors. Ensuring compatibility not only with dominant 
players, but also with wide number of vendors is important for growth and survival.  
Lock-in Effects 
Rönkkö and Pöyry (2006) argued that the ability to build lock-in is one of the corner 
stones for creating sustainable competitive advantage. Lock-in happens when a 
customer for some reason is either unable to or unwilling to change the current provider 
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of a product or service (Cusumano, 2004). Once the software firm has developed certain 
features or cost-structure that makes it difficult for the customer to switch to another 
product or service later on, this software firm can enjoy a long-term revenue flow in a 
form of maintenance and upgrade agreements. Software firms that enter a new market 
early enough also have a good chance for their products to become standards or 
platforms, which can eventually make it difficult for customers to switch from one 
vendor to another (Cusumano, 2004).  
If the software firm’s products or services have absolutely no lock-in effect and is easy 
to switch to competitor products for whatever reasons, this software firm’s survival may 
be at stake.  
Software Development Process 
Nambisan (2002) pointed out that software firms have traditionally lacked rigor and 
discipline in their development process and that the software industry has been 
notorious for the large number of project failures, project delays, and cost overruns. 
Cusumano (2004) argues that managing software design and development better is 
central to firms’ survival. Software development process usually consists of everything 
from defining product requirements and system architectures to final testing and 
technical support, including the feedback mechanisms during the different phases and 
the functions involved in completing a product. Problems in software development can 
hurt a firm’s short-term profits and long-term credibility with customers.  
Sometimes, good software engineers tend to be too creative and individualistic 
(Cusumano, 2004), leading to a situation where many individual engineers work on 
different projects and codes, leaving chaos behind with little coordination. Cusumano 
(2004) has identified common problems inherent in software firms in general, which 
applies to Born Global software firms as well. For younger firms who usually dislike 
bureaucracy and have to complete with lean budgets in fast-paced markets, it is 
important for managers to create enough structure to keep projects under control but not 
so much that “the process” disturbs creativity and flexibility. For more mature, larger 
firms, managers must obtain process capabilities to better manage schedules, cost 
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overruns, change requests, and overall quality of the process as well as the products. 
(Nambisan, 2002; Cusumano, 2004). 
Software product firms must always try to understand general user needs and 
incorporate those needed features into the product and release it much quicker than their 
competition. Software service firms who work closely with particular customers must 
find ways to incorporate sudden change requests and scheduling demands. As such, 
adapting easily to change during a project at the features level, and producing 
incremental releases relatively quickly are essential elements to any kind of software 
businesses. There is no one best way to develop all software for all kinds of customers 
(Cusumano, 2004) but it is essential that top management’s attitude towards process 
rigor and discipline assumes importance since without that, proper investments may not 
be made in implementing appropriate processes (Nambisan, 2002).  
Open Source Software 
The most striking thing about selling software product licenses compared to software 
services is the relative gross profit margins (Cusumano, 2004). The cost of software 
license fees consists mainly of materials such as compact discs, printed manuals, 
packaging, freight, inventory, third-party royalties, and amortization expense related to 
capitalized software development costs, and thus the gross profit margin is much higher 
compared to firms providing software services. Distributing software electronically via 
the Internet is also increasingly popular. This is why venture capitalists often assess 
software product firms to have high growth potential.  
However, with the proliferation of computing devices and the Internet, millions of 
people around the world are instantly connected, providing an environment for cross-
border communication and cooperation. In this way, open source software has become 
popular, threatening those software product firms who seek profit, as open source 
software is often provided free of charge to anyone (Rönkkö, et al., 2008).  
The term “open source” refers to software programs whose source code is freely 
available, such as through the Internet, and generally not owned and sold by any one 
person or organization (Cusumano, 2004). Programming engineers from all over the 
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world can basically contribute by fixing bugs, improving ideas, or even making the 
software do something entirely new. Although open source programs have brought 
various positive impacts to the software industry, the fact that they are as good or 
sometimes even better than commercial software products, and on top of that free-of-
charge, can have negative impact on software firms.  
The challenge for software firms then is to make their own products so much better than 
the open source versions so that people will pay for them. Coming up with a viable 
licensing and pricing model, adding support services and other professional services, 
and establishing credibility and trust especially with corporate customers, can help firms 
survive the competition against open source network.   
Software business models and growth strategies 
Rapidly growing firms have much better chances of survival (Cusumano, 2004). There 
is three types of growth strategies, identified by Cusumano (2004), which firms can 
adopt: scaling, duplicating, and granulating. Scaling is simply about doing more of what 
the firm is already doing, such as launching a bigger marketing and sales campaign to 
sell more of the same software to similar customers. Duplicating is to extend the same 
strategy to other geographical markets or very similar product markets (e.g., targeting 
different vertical markets). Finally, granulating is about diversifying product offerings 
to related product lines and technologies, and adjusting the organizational structure by 
creating new, small business units to target new product opportunities. Software firms 
should carefully select the right growth strategies, as selecting the wrong strategy such 
as the wrong diversification strategy, may risk the survival of the firm.  
When times are good, it is easy for software product firms to grow revenues, but when 
times are bad, revenues can collapse because customers can simply stop buying new 
products. It is also sometimes challenging to come up with new products after the “hit 
product” that made the firms grow rapidly in the beginning. The firms most likely to 
survive the down times are those with a solid base of loyal, satisfied customers who pay 
“recurring” fees over long-term contracts for product updates, bug fixes, customization, 
and other services (Cusumano, 2004).  
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As such, pure software product firms are more and more moving into the service arena, 
making them more of a “hybrid solution” firms. However, as discussed in the earlier 
chapters, software product and service firms differ in their business model so much that 
unless firms understand the differences, they are likely to fail in their transition. Firms 
must choose a primary strategic orientation since selling mainly software products to 
new customers requires very different strategies, organizational capabilities, and 
financial investments compared to selling mainly software services and product 
upgrades to an existing customer base (Cusumano, 2004). If a software firm has been 
mainly a software product firm specialized in making mass copies of the same hit 
product and distributing them through vast channel networks, they must learn how to 
interact with customers, where sales cycles are much longer, and require understanding 
of different sets of customer needs and requirements. Understanding the differences in 
these business models and making adjustments when necessary is an important key to 
survival of these firms in the turbulent times.   
For pure software product firms, they also have a challenge of strategizing clearly who 
are their target customers. Selling shrink-wrapped packaged software to individuals 
through vast distribution network and the Internet channels is rather different from 
selling the same product to enterprise customers. Enterprise customers usually require 
“whole solution”, which includes good documentation, thorough technical support, and 
a full array of complementary products and services (Cusumano, 2004), eventually 
pushing the software product firm to enter the “service” business model. When bigger 
enterprise customers start demanding for special features to that product, which would 
take up most of the firm’s R&D efforts, maintaining the standardized product sold to 
individual customers gets pushed to the background, eventually ending up with various 
versions of the same product. It can be said that growth through only selling to 
individual customers may be limited, but targeting also the enterprise customers which 
may guarantee continuous revenue stream in the form of maintenance contracts (usually 
paying additional 15-25% annually of the initial cost of the software product) and up 
selling (selling other software products that the firm develops), may contribute to longer 
growth.  
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If pure software product firms are completely unwilling to or unable to enter the service 
market, they may still be able to secure predictable revenue stream by creating upgraded 
versions that are incompatible with older file formats or at least make old software 
programs more difficult to use with new versions of the same programs. Guaranteeing 
some measure of backward compatibility (i.e., you can read old files with new 
programs) but not forward compatibility (i.e., you can not read new files with old 
programs) will push customers to buy the upgrade version, securing new license fee 
revenues for the firm.   
 
In summary, there has been a gap in contemporary literature regarding growth phases 
and factors influencing growth and survival of Born Global firms. Research on firm 
growth stages has traditionally focused more on the development of the structure and 
domestic operations. However, in this modern business environment, there is a call for a 
two-dimensional model for growth that takes into account the growth in size as well as 
the growth in the international direction. Also, understanding the underlying factors that 
influence the growth and survival of these new types of firms helps to deepen our 
knowledge on the Born Global phenomenon. The following section provides a 
framework that synthesizes the literature review into a conceptual tool for analyzing the 
growth phases and survival of Born Global firms, especially in the software industry.  
 
2.7 Preliminary Theoretical Framework and Propositions 
On the basis of the literature review, the preliminary theoretical framework is 
introduced in this section. The framework seeks to explain graphically the answers to 
the research questions presented in section 1.3. More specifically, the first framework 
attempts to explain the growth phases of Born Global software firms and the second the 
factors that influence growth and survival of such firms, both based on Gabrielsson & 
Gabrielsson (2009b). The novelty of this paper is in directing the focus particularly to 
software firms.   
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2.7.1 Growth Phases of Born Global Firms 
Figure 5 shows the preliminary theoretical framework for the growth phases of Born 
Global software firms. Born Global software firms are expected to evolve through four 
phases during growth towards large firms:  
1) Introductory,  
2) Commercial breakthrough and foreign growth,  
3) Global breakthrough and expansion, and  
4) Global rationalization and maturity phase.  
As the firms go through each phase, they are faced with different types of challenges 
and problems, which they need to overcome in order to proceed to the next growth 
phase, or they may face failure. As described earlier in section 2.4, Born Globals grow 
with respect to size in employees and sales revenue as well as in international direction.  
On the other hand, Born Internationals, which enters nearby markets rapidly but fails to 
expand to other continents (Kuivalainen, et al., 2007), are expected to go through only 
the first two phases before the growth matures.  
 
Figure 5: Growth phases of Born Global firms 
Source: Gabrielsson & Gabrielsson, 2009b 
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2.7.2 Factors for Growth and Survival 
Figure 6 shows the preliminary framework for growth and survival factors of Born 
Global software firms. It consists of growth and survival outcomes as dependent factors 
and the anteceding factors for these. As described in the earlier literature review section, 
these factors can be grouped into four categories: 1) industry factors, 2) firm factors, 3) 
entrepreneurial orientation and agility, and 4) software business specific factors.  
 
Figure 6: Framework for the growth and survival of Born Global software firms 
Source: adapted from Gabrielsson & Gabrielsson, 2009b, by inserting a new section on 
software business specific factors 
Industry factors include the industry growth rate (Hennart & Park, 1993, Vernon, 1966) 
and penetration by foreign firms and seller concentration (Driffield & Munday, 1997). 
Also, the extent the industry is globally integrated and global enablers are present is 
expected to impact positively on global growth opportunities (Oviatt & McDougall, 
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1994; Shrader, et al., 2000) and may influence survival as well (Mudambi & Zahra, 
2007).  
Firm factors that may have influence on growth and survival of Born Global firms 
include various resources including managerial experience (Reuber & Fischer, 1999), 
resource fungibility (Sapienza, et al. 2006), different types of capabilities (Teece, et al., 
1997), and entrepreneurial orientation (Knight & Cavusgil, 2005). Entrepreneurial 
orientation and agility are factors related to the growth aspirations of the founders, and 
how balanced the characteristics such as risk-taking and flexibility goes with the 
laterally rigid decision-making processes. Firm size and governmental support are 
factors that have been proposed to affect survival, but only the former has found support 
in recent studies (Mudambi & Zahra, 2007).  
Software business specific factors include the compatibility with dominant players 
(Cusumano, 2004), lock-in effects (Rönkkö & Pöyry, 2006), open source software 
(Rönkkö, et al., 2008), software development process, and growth strategies and 
business models (Cusumano, 2004).  
Born Global software firms are expected to grow and survive by fostering these various 
factors in the often volatile and competitive software industry. It is important to note 
that the anteceding factors are not expected to influence growth and survival to the same 
extent. These two key outcomes have proved to be conceptually distinct, and their 
empirical relationship quite complex (Sapienza, et al., 2006). Due to the gap in 
contemporary knowledge as to this relationship, this paper hopes to shed more light 
onto the topic.  
2.7.3 Propositions for Empirical Study 
The literature review and the preliminary theoretical framework introduced earlier helps 
to draw up propositions that are expected to emerge from the empirical case studies. 
The propositions have been based on Gabrielsson & Gabrielsson (2009b), further 
including additional insights for the Born Global software firms, which is the focus of 
this paper.  
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Born Global growth 
Although resource is assumed to play a critical part in the growth of Born Globals, they 
suffer from resource limitations (Oviatt & McDougall, 1994), amount of resources 
(Hannan, 1998), and resource fungibility (Sapienza, et al., 2006). Managerial experience 
in terms of stock, stream, and variety (Reuber & Fischer, 1999) are also considered 
important for growth. However, resources as such do not provide growth if firms do not 
possess capabilities for deploying and coordinating the various resources (Verona, 
1999). Based on previous studies, long-term growth may only be achieved if these 
capabilities are of a substantive and dynamic nature (Zahra, et al., 2006). In addition, 
entrepreneurial orientation should be high (Knight & Cavusgil, 2005), and founders and 
management team members should be experienced enough so that the firm does not 
suffer from lateral rigidity (Luostarinen, 1979), which may limit firms from exploring 
new opportunities and methods and instead go with the known alternatives.  
Finally, high industry growth rate and high levels of globalizing enablers are expected 
to provide growth opportunities (Oviatt & McDougall, 1994). These industry and firm 
factors are assumed to be critical drivers in reaching the commercial breakthrough 
(phase 2) and global breakthrough (phase 3). These factors may also drive the start of 
the global rationalization (phase 4) but in a reverse manner. In other words, when 
industry growth slows down, the need for firms to rationalize their activities globally is 
enhanced, driving the need for resource alignment (Douglas & Craig, 1989). Greater 
seller concentration (Driffield & Munday, 1997) also increases the need to rationalize.  
Thus, the following may be postulated: 
Proposition 1a: The commercial and global breakthrough of a born global firm is 
positively related to the industry growth rate, the globalizing enablers in the industry, 
the amount of resources and managerial experience, the existence of substantive and 
dynamic capabilities, and a high level of entrepreneurial orientation in decision-making 
(Gabrielsson & Gabrielsson, 2009b, p13) 
Proposition 1b: The global rationalization of a born global firm is positively related to 
higher global seller concentration, pressure for resource alignment, and a low level of 
both industry growth rate and entrepreneurial orientation in decision-making. 
(Gabrielsson & Gabrielsson, 2009b, p13) 
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Born Global survival 
Entering foreign markets usually requires substantial investment (Zott, 2003) in terms 
of creating new routines and adapting to them (Sapienza, et al., 2006). These 
investments are especially demanding for Born Globals due to their liability of 
foreignness (Zaheer & Mosakowski, 1997) and newness (Zahra, 2005). Hence, 
Sapienza, et al. (2006) argues that the act of internationalizing decreases the chance of 
survival of Born Global firms. In order to increase the chance of surviving the 
challenging internationalization process, firms need to possess adequate capabilities to 
obtain financing such as venture capital (Gabrielsson, et al., 2004), other endowments 
from founders (Hannan, 1989), and government (Mudambi & Zahra, 2007).  
In addition, as Johanson and Vahlne (1977) and Luostarinen (1979) have proposed with 
their stage-wise internationalization model, it is less risky to advance in stage wise 
slowly than to jump over stages in an accelerated way like the Born Global firms. In 
other words, the lower the entrepreneurial orientation (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996) and the 
more lateral rigidity in decision-making (Luostarinen, 1979) there is, the higher 
probability for survival. The changes in decision-making behavior that happens as 
firm’s age (Autio, et al., 2000) would indicate that lateral rigidity may increase as firms’ 
age and thus Born Global firms face the greatest risk of failure at the very initial phase 
of internationalization efforts (Scott & Bruce, 1987). It has also been found that high 
industry growth rate increases the survival of Born Globals (Mudambi & Zahra, 2007).  
Thus, the following may be postulated: 
Proposition 2: The survival of a born global is positively related to the industry growth 
rate, the amount of resources and managerial experience, the existence of substantive 
and dynamic capabilities, and lower level of entrepreneurial orientation. (Gabrielsson 
& Gabrielsson, 2009b, p13) 
 
Both growth and survival of Born Global 
Looking at proposition one and two, it seems difficult for Born Global firms to have the 
highest possibility of both rapid growth and survival, as they call for a different type of 
decision-making behavior. The existence of lateral rigidity (Luostarinen, 1979) 
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increases the odds of survival but restricts growth. On the other hand, the higher 
entrepreneurial orientation with lower lateral rigidity in decision-making enhances rapid 
growth but increases risk for survival.  
Based on earlier studies, capabilities of firms play a critical role, and particularly the 
networking capabilities help Born Globals establish credibility and find international 
opportunities. With the help of partners, Born Global firms can globalize their activities 
without making large investments and facing unnecessary risks. Also, networking 
capabilities are found to be important for Born Globals in different development phases 
(Laanti, et al., 2007) and for larger MNCs, in addition to external networks, internal 
networks within the firm becomes important (Andersson, et al., 2007).  
Thus, the following may be postulated: 
Proposition 3: The commercial breakthrough, global breakthrough, global 
rationalization, and survival of a born global are positively related to high networking 
capabilities (Gabrielsson & Gabrielsson, 2009b, p14).  
 
Software business specific factors for both growth and survival 
In addition to propositions one to three which may be applied to high-tech firms in 
general, software business specific characteristics deserve separate attention with 
regards to growth and survival.  
First of all, due to the nature of software products, compatibility with other software and 
hardware, especially the ones dominating the market, is considered critical (Coviello & 
Munro, 1997; Cusumano, 2004). If firms pour all R&D resources into another third-
party system that eventually gets pulled out of the market, the firm may be at survival 
risk. Thus, firms should ensure compatibility with numbers of vendors to avoid being 
reliant on only one platform or system, and this can also enhance growth since more 
users are able to use the particular software product with various systems. Second, 
ensuring that software products contain lock-in features that makes it almost impossible 
for customers to switch to another product also ensure growth in the form of recurring 
revenue (Cusumano, 2004). If the software firm’s product or services do not have any 
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lock-in features and is easy for customers to switch to other vendors, this firm’s survival 
rate decreases. Last but not least, choosing the right growth strategies in terms of 
scaling, duplicating, and granulating (Cusumano, 2004) at the appropriate growth 
phases and understanding the differences in various business models (product, services, 
or hybrid) are important for both growth and survival. Sometimes product firms may 
need to enter the services arena in order to continue growing or the product market may 
get saturated and if the firm does not come up with another “hit” product, they may be 
at survival risk (Cusumano, 2004).  
Also, the longer the firm’s product has been in the market, the higher chance that 
brilliant software engineers all around the world come together through the Internet to 
create a free open-source version. Software product firms must make their own priced 
version much better than the open source free versions or they may lose to the 
competition (Cusumano, 2004). 
Thus, the following may be postulated: 
Proposition 4a: The growth throughout different phases and survival of a born global 
are positively related to the level of compatibility with dominant players, existence of 
lock-in effects, and choosing the appropriate strategies for growth and business models, 
and are negatively related to the existence of open source software. 
 
Cusumano (2004) argues that managing software design and development better is 
central to firms’ survival. Problems in software development can hurt a firm’s short-
term profits and long-term credibility with customers by having too many bugs in the 
products or long delays in delivery schedules. Management of software development 
especially becomes more complex and complicated as the amount of products and 
customers increase. As firms mature, they should have some slack to improve the 
software development process for better managing schedules, budgetary constraints, and 
change requests can contribute to the continuous growth and survival of these firms.  
Thus, the following may be postulated: 
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Proposition 4b:The global breakthrough, global rationalization (latter two phases of 
growth) and survival are positively related to mastering the management of software 
development process.  
 
Finally, when comparing firms in software product business and in software service 
business, it is much easier for packaged software products to be exported globally 
through Internet channels and distribution network (Rönkkö, et al., 2008) than software 
service firms that require customer contacts more frequently. Also, since exporting is 
not possible for software services, managers marketing those services do not have the 
benefit of gaining international marketing experience prior to making substantial 
resource commitments to foreign markets by way of foreign direct investment, which 
makes the decision to go abroad all the more risky and difficult (Erramilli, 1990). 
Although software product firms may achieve faster internationalization, when 
economy is bad or the market becomes saturated, revenues can collapse for product 
firms since customers can simply stop buying new products. As Cusumano (2004) 
suggests, firms most likely to survive the down times are those with a solid base of 
loyal, satisfied customers, who pay “recurring” fees over long-term contracts for 
product updates, bug fixes, customization, and other services.  
Thus, the following may be postulated: 
Proposition 4c: Software product firms are expected to grow at a much faster rate than 
software service firms but there may be a limit to growth, thus they are bound to enter 
the service arena, creating more and more hybrid firms, doing both software product 
and service business, in order to increase the chance for survival.  
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3. METHOD OF RESEARCH 
In this section, the selection of the empirical research approach and method is presented 
and the selection of the data sources involved in this research is clarified. In addition, 
validity and reliability as well as limitations of the study is presented.  
3.1 Research Approach 
There are two broad methods of reasoning in research – deductive and inductive 
approaches. This study will utilize both of the approaches, supporting the view by 
Saunders, et al. (2000) that uniting these two approaches are advantageous.  
Chalmers (1999) summarizes the two approaches in figure 7. “The laws and theories 
that make up scientific knowledge are derived by induction from a factual basis 
supplied by observation and experiment. Once such general knowledge is available, it 
can be draw on to make predictions and offer explanations.” (Chalmers, 1999) 
 
 
Figure 7. Induction and deduction. Source: Chalmers, 1999. 
 
In short, an inductive approach is concerned with the generation of theory from data and 
empirical observations. Here, theory follows data (Saunders, et al., 2000). Induction is 
used to obtain an understanding of meanings that humans attach to events (Ibid.). On 
the other hand, a deductive approach is concerned with testing the theory. As such, 
scholars in this type of research construct hypotheses or propositions from existing 
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works of literature, which can then be subjected to empirical scrutiny and thus rejected 
or accepted (Ghauri & Gronhaug, 2002).  
According to Ghauri and Gronhaug (2002), the inductive and deductive approaches are 
not totally exclusive of each other, with inductive approach including deductive 
elements and vice versa. As mentioned earlier, Born Global firms’ growth phases and 
factors related to their growth and survival have been under-researched (Rialp, et al., 
2005; Zahra, 2005). However, this study has proposed a preliminary theoretical 
framework and a set of propositions based on various stream of literatures including 
international entrepreneurship (Oviatt & McDougall, 1994), internationalization 
theories, Born Global phenomenon, growth models of firms, and software business. 
Gathering empirical facts to confirm or disprove hypothesized relationships of 
variables, which have been deduced from contemporary knowledge, adheres to 
deductive thinking. At the same time, this study tries to generate new theory based on 
facts derived from the empirical observations, which adheres to inductive thinking. 
After the empirical analysis, the preliminary theoretical framework is reviewed and 
revised accordingly. Thus, a combination of inductive and deductive approach 
underpins the overall research method of this study.  
3.2 Selection of Research Method 
Research methods refer to rules and procedures, and can be regarded as tools or ways of 
proceeding to solve the research questions (Ghauri & Gronhaug, 2002). Choosing a 
method requires understanding of the actual research problem (Ibid.). Generally, 
research methods are divided into qualitative and quantitative methods and their 
superiority is often debated (Silverman, 2005). This research is qualitative and 
exploratory in nature, due to the research questions posed (“how” and why”) earlier in 
the study, as well as the fact that still little is known about this particular topic forcing 
the researcher to explore and provide a starting point for further research.  
The research method chosen for the empirical part of this study is multiple-case study 
method, which provides a dynamic and holistic view of the research under investigation 
(Yin, 2003). Case studies are preferred when “how” and “why” questions are being 
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posed, the researcher has little control over events, and when the focus is on a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context (Yin, 2003, 9). Also, according to 
Eisenhardt (1989), case study methodology is most appropriate in the early stages of 
research on a new topic or to provide new insights to an already researched topic. To 
recall, the research problem of this study is “How can innovative Born Globals grow to 
become truly global firms while also surviving, taking into consideration their limited 
resources to address the global market opportunities and required holistic management 
of the process? ” and the topic is in the early stages of research (Rialp, et al., 2005).  
The phenomena under investigation is too complex to study by surveys or experimental 
strategies and deals with operational links needing to be traced over time, rather than 
mere frequencies or incidence (Yin, 2003). The unique strengths of case study method 
over other methods such as surveys is the ability to deal with a full variety of evidence, 
such as documents, interviews, and observations (Ibid., 8). In addition, case study 
method is more likely to generate novel theory with less research bias (Eisenhardt, 
1989). However, it has its disadvantages as well. For example, case studies are 
criticized for lacking systematic handling of data, long and unreadable documents, and 
their little basis for scientific generalization (Yin, 2003). Yin (2003) answers to these 
criticisms by arguing that the lack of rigor in some studies may have been caused by the 
lack of specific guidelines to follow when doing case studies, and that in some cases, 
case study research may have been confused with case study teaching where “case study 
materials may be deliberately altered to demonstrate a particular point more effectively” 
(Yin, 2003, p. 10). Related to the generalization issue, he states: 
 “… case studies, like experiments, are generalizable to theoretical propositions 
and not to populations or universes. In this sense, the case study, like the experiment, 
does not represent a ‘sample’, and in doing a case study, your goal will be to expand 
and generalize theories (analytic generalization) and not to enumerate frequencies 
(statistical generalization).” (Yin, 2003, p. 10) 
Thus, in this study, the goal is not to arrive at statistically generalizable results, but 
rather to investigate whether the theories are supported by the real-life phenomenon, i.e. 
the case firms.  
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After which the case study methodology is chosen, it is necessary to choose between a 
single- and a multiple- case study. Multiple-case study results in more compelling 
evidence and a robust overall study compared to the single-case one (Yin, 2003, 46).  
In order to identify the phases that Born Global software firms pass as they grow and 
understand how various factors affect growth and survival of these firms, a multiple-
case study methodology will be used, following the principles of data collection 
established by Yin (2003). In-depth interviews with CEOs, founders, and other core 
employees of the case firms will be complemented with secondary information obtained 
from industry publications, press releases, and the media. 
3.3 Research Design 
The research design of this study is based on the literatures on case study methodology 
by Yin (2003) and Eisenhardt (1989). According to Yin (2003, p. 20), a research design 
is “the logical sequence that connects empirical data to a study’s initial research 
questions and, ultimately, to its conclusions”. It can be considered as a “blueprint” of 
research, dealing with at least four problems: what questions to study, what data are 
relevant, what data to collect, and how to analyze the results (Ibid., p. 21). In the 
following, this study’s research design including the data collection and analysis 
process as well as the unit of analysis are described.  
3.3.1 Data Collection and Analysis Process 
Figure 8 depicts the research design and protocol followed in this study.  
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Figure 8. Case study protocol  
 
1. Literature on internationalization theories, Born Global phenomenon, growth 
models of firms, and software business were reviewed.  
2. Based on the literature review, preliminary conceptual frameworks attempting to 
explain the growth phases of Born Global software firms as well as factors that 
influence growth and survival of such firms were proposed.  
3. The preliminary list of potential case firms was developed by interviewing 
several industry specialists, and searching through member and participant lists 
of industry associations in the software business sector.  
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4. Four case firms were selected for this study. The selection process was rather 
purposive than random. As one of the focus is on investigating the growth 
progression of these firms, the criteria for the selection was set as follows:  
• The firm’s foreign sales have reached 25% within three years of 
establishment. 
• The firm’s sales from outside the home continent have reached 25% 
within six years of establishment. 
• The firm should be SMEs which has a global vision or strategic intent 
from its inception. 
• The firm was established no later than year 2000.  
• The firm has products that are unique. 
• The firm is an independent firm. 
• The firm’s headquarter is located in Finland.  
• The firm operates in the software business.  
When selecting the case firms, literal replication logic was used instead of 
sampling logic. Literal replication logic is used when one has a limited number 
of cases from which similar results are predicted (Yin, 2003, p. 47). The goal 
was to replicate and extend the emergent theory under investigation. The case 
firms were generated based on a number of different characteristics as suggested 
by Eisenhardt (1989), such as firms having different market and product 
characteristics, and having grown and survived or failed during their 
international expansion. The number of cases was selected to fall at the lower 
limit of the ideal number of cases in a multiple-case study due to the time and 
resource constraints of a Master’s Thesis.  
5. As mentioned earlier, this study is explanatory and qualitative in nature. Most of 
the primary data for the analysis was collected from in-depth interviews of the 
CEOs and/or founders or key informants identified by the CEO. These 
respondents were directly involved in decision-making of the high-level 
strategies either in the past or currently. General interview guide were prepared 
by the Research Group and modified by the author to fit to each case firm 
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selected for this Master’s Thesis (see APPENDIX for general interview guide). 
Prior to the interview, each firm was sent one table in electronic form to fill in 
related to the sales revenue growth, employee growth, and distribution of net 
sales by market. The main purpose was to collect the demographic data of the 
case firm beforehand in order to understand how the firm had grown to the 
present day. This helped to make time spent with the interviewees more efficient 
as it was hence possible to proceed straight to the theme interview questions. All 
the interviewees were given a brief explanation of the nature of the empirical 
research and the nature of the study in general prior to the interview either by 
phone or email. Each interviews lasted between one and five hours, depending 
on the availability of the respondents. The interviews were conducted as a semi-
structured discussion and guided by pre-defined themes prepared in the 
interview guide, focusing on longitudinal illustrations and why/how factors 
related to the elements of the preliminary theoretical framework. Sometimes, 
different themes were discussed more thoroughly with different interviewees 
from the same firm. The interviews were recorded and transcripts and database 
were created for each interview following the case study protocol to ensure 
validity of the research.  
6. Individual case descriptions were written and sent to each interviewee for review 
and approval. Multiple sources of evidence, including interview transcripts, 
documents from websites and media, and other archival records, were used. 
Only the written content was included in the analysis and taken into 
consideration, i.e. the tone of voice or other similar verbal or non-verbal factors 
were omitted.  
7. A cross-case analysis was written based on the four case firms by comparing the 
elements of the preliminary conceptual framework.  
8. The conceptual framework was revised based on the evidence derived from the 
empirical analysis and some managerial implications were reported.  
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Common to many other comprehensive research studies, this study also encountered 
some issues along the way. First, from the many software firms operating in Finland, it 
was extremely difficult to screen out just those that fit to the Born Global criteria, 
namely, “the firm’s foreign sales have reached 25% within three years of establishment” 
and “the firm’s sales from outside the home continent have reached 25% within six 
years of establishment”. Most of the software firms are relatively small in size and 
young in age, and typically do not publish any official annual reports, unless they are 
listed in the NASDAQ OMX Helsinki. The registration center for firms 
(rekisterihallitus) did not have any systematic way of screening such firms either. The 
author overcame this issue by using network of people she knew from working in a 
software firm herself. Various informants from potential case firms investigated for the 
author beforehand whether their firms would fit to the Born Global criteria. Secondly, 
even if potential Born Global software firms were found, many busy executives 
unfortunately declined to take the interviews, as the general interview guide was 
estimating the interview to take roughly two hours. The author had to, in those cases, 
give up pursuing those firms and focus on searching for new ones.  
3.3.2 Unit of Analysis 
As suggested by Yin (2003, p.22-26), the unit of analysis (the cases) will be defined via 
general definition, the persons included, the geographic area, and the time boundaries. 
General definition: The unit of analysis in the four cases is Tectia Corporation (formerly 
known as SSH Communications Security Corp), Remedy Entertainment Oy, Smartner 
Information Systems Oy (now SEVEN Networks International Oy), and Add2Phone Oy 
(now More Mobile Relations) respectively. The definition of the unit of analysis (the 
cases) is related to the way the initial research questions have been defined and as such, 
all the key factors related to firms’ growth and survival as well as the firms’ holistic 
growth phases will be considered as the subjects of the case study.  
Persons included: Since the research questions call for understanding of the longitudinal 
development of the case firms’ growth phases and factors related to growth and 
survival, the most appropriate persons to be included in the interview were either 
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founders or CEOs. For this study, nine interviews were conducted all together. From 
Tectia Corporation, the founder and the current CEO were interviewed. In addition, the 
person who was the CEO between 2002-2008 was interviewed. This is because the 
current CEO only joined after 2008 and the founder had not been involved heavily in 
the daily operations of the firm since 2003. From Remedy Entertainment, the founder 
and the current CFO were interviewed. The CEO was not available for one- to two- 
months timeframe due to traveling abroad preparing for their new game launch at the 
time. From Smartner Information Systems, one of the founders was interviewed. In 
addition, one person who had worked in Smartner and continued working after being 
acquired by SEVEN Networks International was interviewed. From Add2Phone, one of 
the founders (who currently is also the managing director after being acquired by More 
Mobile Relations) and the CTO at that time were interviewed. The in-depth and rather 
long interviews by at least two persons from the same firm guaranteed the collection of 
high-quality data. (See References for list of interviewees)  
Geographic area: Since the growth phases and factors related to growth and survival of 
the case firms were studied, there were no limitations set on the geographic focus.  
Time boundaries: Each case begins from the founding of the firm to March 2010 when 
the interviews were conducted and case reports written.   
3.4 Validity and Reliability of Research 
This study follows Yin’s (2003, p.33-39) criteria for judging the quality of research 
designs. The test for construct validity is about “establishing correct operational 
measures for the concepts being studied” (Yin, 2003, p. 34) and involves using multiple 
sources of evidence such as in-depth interviews, press releases, annual reports if 
available, newspaper articles, and websites, getting the key informants to review the 
draft case study report, and maintaining a chain of evidence. Internal validity is about 
“establishing a causal relationship, whereby certain conditions are shown to lead to 
other conditions, as distinguished from spurious relationships” (Ibid.) and is ensured by 
pattern matching between the preliminary conceptual framework and the empirical 
results. To assist pattern matching, relevant charts, figures, and matrix techniques can 
 66 
be used. External validity is about “establishing the domain to which a study’s findings 
can be generalized” (Ibid.) and can be done by utilizing the literal replication logic for 
the four case firms. Finally, reliability is about “demonstrating that the operations of a 
study – such as the data collection procedures – can be repeated, with the same results” 
(Ibid.). The goal of reliability is naturally to minimize errors and biases in the study 
(Yin, 2003, p. 37). In a case study, an absolute reliability can rarely be reached as the 
actors (researchers, respondents, and the phenomenon) often change. To reach as high 
reliability as possible in this particular study, case study protocol was used and case 
study database created as suggested by Yin (2003).  
3.5 Limitations 
This study is limited in a number of ways that should be considered when evaluating its 
merits.  
First limitation is the narrow focus of this study on case firms only in the software 
business in Finland. The purpose of the narrow focus was to be able to do a thorough 
and in-depth analysis of the business area in question, thus minimizing the impact of 
inter-industry differences. Also, resource and time constraints limited the case firms to 
only four. 
Second, the author has been working for one of the case firms Tectia for the past 10 
years, providing more detailed information of the firm than others. As such, there may 
be some biased views included, although the author has done her best to be as objective 
as possible.   
Third, the interviewees were asked about events that happened over the course of its 
history, sometimes dating back to 15 years ago. It is challenging to accurately recreate 
all the relevant details and sequences of events relying on individual interviewees’ 
memories. In addition, interviewees may not have been willing to fully disclose all 
information and opinion on the topics discussed. This study has tried to minimize the 
risk of bias by utilizing considerable amount of information verifiable from other 
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secondary sources, for example, firms’ official documentation such as annual reports, 
online press releases, and past master’s theses investigating the same case firms.  
Last but not least, it is important to once again acknowledge that this research was part 
of a bigger research project. In order to ensure comparability of findings with other 
researchers and students, this thesis partly built on a shared conceptual foundation and 
structure. Although the author has contributed to the research project by adding new and 
deeper insights specifically from software business, the start of the research itself could 
have been influenced with the already available conceptual framework.  
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4. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS – Individual Case Descriptions 
 
4.1 Tectia Corporation  
4.1.1 Firm Background and Characteristics 
Tectia Corporation (Tectia), formerly known as SSH Communications Security Corp.,  
was established in December 1995 and is the market maker in real-time information 
security software for modern, networked organizations. They create an invaluable Circle 
of Trust for their customers and their stakeholders by securing, automating, and 
governing confidential information with their Tectia solutions in fixed, mobile, and 
cloud environments. Tectia operates in the Americas, Europe, and APAC regions, with 
headquarters located in Helsinki, Finland. Their shares are quoted on the NASDAQ-
OMX Helsinki exchange, under the trading code of SSH1V since 2000.  
The size of the firm in sales revenues as well as numbers of employees grew rapidly 
from year 1995 to 2001. At its peak in 2001, there were 181 employees with 19.9 
million euro in revenue. After 2001, due to various strategic changes, the amount of 
employees as well as net sales decreased, with some fluctuations. At the end of 2009, 
the firm had 64 employees with 8.8 million euro in revenue (see figure 9 and 10). 
 
Figure 9. Tectia Corporation’s employee growth  
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Figure 10. Tectia Corporation’s sales revenue growth 
The founder of Tectia, Tatu Ylönen, states, “before founding” as when it became 
obvious to him that this new firm was seeking to globalize. Since the first product 
SSH® Secure Shell™ had already been released as a free version via the Internet during 
the summer of 1995, there were many users all over the world before the actual 
establishment of the firm.  
Concerning the share of foreign sales, at the end of March 1999, three years after 
establishment, the internationalization degree was 56.25% and the globalization degree 
was 37.50%. At the end of 2001, six years after establishment, the internationalization 
degree was 78.40% and the globalization degree was 62.50% (see figure 11). Thus, 
Tectia adheres to the Born Global criteria. 
 
Figure 11. Tectia’s internationalization and globalization degree 
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4.1.2 The Development of Tectia in Phases 
Tectia has gone through the first three phases 1) introductory, 2) commercial 
breakthrough & foreign growth, and 3) global breakthrough and expansion rather 
quickly, and stayed in the fourth stage 4) global rationalization and maturity for a 
relatively long period. Figure 12 provides an illustration of organizational development 
in terms of growth and foreign expansion. 
 
Figure 12. Main path and phases of the growth of Tectia 
The Introductory Phase: 1995-1996 
The business idea was born in March 1995 when someone broke into the central 
computer system at one of the facilities in Otaniemi and installed a monitoring system. 
As a consequence, large numbers of passwords were stolen and changed, and Ylönen, 
who was studying and working at the Helsinki University of Technology (now Aalto 
University School of Science and Technology) at the time, came up with an idea to 
develop software that would enable protection of internet-based communication. 
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Ylönen then published the free version of this software in July of the same year. As 
Ylönen recalls “I wasn’t planning to make it a business at that point, however, by the 
end of the year, I was getting 150 emails per day from people wanting support... I also 
started getting inquiries from people who wanted to start selling it. And so I decided to 
start the company.”  
Ylönen registered the firm on December 31, 1995. Ylönen was working as a researcher 
for Academia Finland at that time but resigned his position there, rented a room, and 
started working alone in this new start-up firm in March 1996. Altogether, five people 
were working at the end of May 1996. Since the first product SSH Secure Shell had 
already been released as a free version via the Internet during the summer of previous 
year, it can be said that it was ready for sales when the firm was established.  
In March 1996, an exclusive distribution agreement for the SSH Secure Shell product 
family (now called Tectia Solution) was made with F-Secure Oyj (former Data Fellows 
Oy). As such, F-Secure can be considered as the first customer. Although the 
relationship with F-Secure turned out to be a problematic one later on, it was a natural 
step for Tectia to make at that time, as they were lacking the business expertise to sell 
and market their products. An alternative approach would have been to quickly acquire 
the needed expertise in international business, sales, and marketing, but the environment 
was moving so quickly and before being able to plan anything, F-Secure had 
approached them with an opportunity that seemed the correct one to take at that time.  
The introductory phase was a rapid growth to about 10 people during 1996-1997. That 
was a difficult time for Ylönen; “I had never had that many people working for me, and 
I had to learn ways of managing the team. I found it somewhat stressful and difficult, 
and we were busy with all the projects and needed to get groups organized and get 
things running smoothly.”, - Ylönen. He had a strong technical background but lacked 
formal training in international business and management. The crisis here can be said 
that Ylönen not only needed someone who knew how to manage the business and 
people but also was “highly stressed and needed some relief”, -Ylönen. 
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Commercial Breakthrough and Foreign Growth Phase: 1997-1999 
Ylönen then hired Jani Hursti as the CEO, who grew the firm from micro to small firm, 
to about 35 people in terms of amount of employees.  
Commercial breakthrough happened between 1997 and 1999. At this time, Tectia was 
selling both SSH Secure Shell and SSH IPSec Express Toolkit, which were quite 
different products. SSH Secure Shell was an end-user product sold directly to enterprise 
customers via F-Secure (at that time) that allowed data to be exchanged using a secure 
channel between networked devices. On the other hand, SSH IPSec Express Toolkit 
was sold to device manufacturers such as VPN (Virtual Private Network) manufacturers 
to integrate security feature (IPSec=Internet Protocol Security) into the devices. For 
SSH IPSec Express Toolkit product, the breakthrough was in 1999 when they closed 
major deals with Sun Microsystems, Compaq, and other similar large firms in the USA 
in April of that year. For the SSH Secure Shell product, the commercial breakthrough 
was already during 1996-1997, starting from being a free software via the Internet to 
being sold via F-Secure. When Tectia started to sell the product directly to end 
customers in 2000, major deals made with UBS in Switzerland and CommerzBank in 
Germany were significant to the firm. It can be said that commercial breakthrough 
happened simultaneously as the global expansion. As Ylönen recalls; “We never 
focused very much on Finnish customers.” 
Jani Hursti resigned from the CEO post in early 1999 so Ylönen assumed the role of 
CEO again. Tectia continued growing rapidly and established a firm position in the US 
market with the help of US office, which was established the previous year.  
As Tectia continued to expand and grow, Ylönen again faced challenges of a rapidly 
growing firm. They clearly needed to implement processes and have a leader who 
understood both technology and international business.  
Global Breakthrough and Expansion Phase: 1998-2001 
The true global breakthrough happened from 1998 when they opened their own sales 
subsidiary in the Silicon Valley in the US, where half of their potential business was 
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located. This was a critical decision-making point for Tectia, as it opened up the IPSec 
market and created a presence for them there.   
In 2000, they opened a sales subsidiary in Japan. The reason for this was because there 
were many data communication firms to sell the SSH IPSec Express Toolkit product to 
and the complex nature of the IPSec products made it a necessity to do direct sales, 
instead of sales through channel partners. However, even before establishing these 
offices in the US and Japan, Tectia either directly or indirectly (via F-Secure) sold 
IPSec and Secure Shell products in those countries.  
Tectia then continued expanding globally by opening sales offices in Germany in 2001 
and in UK in 2002 to serve their existing customers, as they were major markets in 
Europe. In 2001, representative offices in South Korea and Taiwan were opened to 
support direct sales for SSH IPSec Express Toolkit product to data communication 
device manufacturers, as well as in Sweden (2002) to support sales.  
Many new products were also introduced during this time. So a new CEO Markku 
Kangas was hired in early 2000 to control the growing firm.  
During this global expansion phase in 1998-2002, Tectia grew from being a small to 
medium-sized firm in terms of both sales revenue and the amount of employees and 
various crises occurred, including too rapid growth of the firm in terms of size, product 
variations, and lack of focus. They were selling too many different products to too many 
different types of customers and eventually making losses. “2000, 2001–2002 time 
certainly can be described as a crisis. If a company makes more than 50 percent of its 
revenues in losses, it’s certainly a crisis.” - Ylönen. 
Global Rationalization and Maturity Phase: 2002-2008 
Tectia was clearly entering the global rationalization and maturity phase sometime 
between years 2001-2003 when they realized that they had to start focusing their 
business in the core competence area. After Kangas resigned as CEO, Ylönen assumed 
the role again for about one year. Finally Arto Vainio, a new CEO was hired in July 
2002 to steer the firm into a different direction. He had a strong vision of focusing the 
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firm from what seemed to be a too-diversified entity. “The big decision point was 
eventually to start downsizing the company and start focusing. And that basically went 
on until 2005–6, after which we’ve stayed in approximately the same size.” – Ylönen. 
In 2003, Tectia made a critical decision of selling away the OEM products such as SSH 
IPSec Toolkit to Safenet, Inc., a US based network security firm, for $14 million and 17 
employees were transferred to Safenet Finland and three were laid off. Instead of having 
both OEM and end-user business model, they decided to focus on the end-user business 
with the SSH Secure Shell product, as the IPSec market was starting to mature.  
Tectia also decided to sell away the VPN (virtual private network) hardware business as 
they were way behind their competitors in terms of technology, pricing, and speed. PKI 
(public key infrastructure) related products such as SSH Certifier were also sold away.   
While trying to change the firm from being extremely diversified to a focused one, 
Tectia had to reorganize the organizational structure to fit with the new end-user 
business approach. Many people were laid off and new sales and marketing processes 
were put into place during 2003. These were very difficult times for the firm. Tectia 
then focused on selling Secure Shell-based products to large enterprises and 
concentrated on differentiating themselves from open-source OpenSSH. Some of the 
offices were also closed to move to a more channel-oriented approach.  
With the focused approach, Tectia survived the serious crisis and gradually improved its 
business results so that year 2007 became financially the best ever in Secure Shell based 
products and enterprise market segment. During the years 2003-2007, Tectia had to 
invest a lot to renew and enhance the Tectia Solution to the needs of the new very large 
enterprise customers, and as a result Tectia won a series of largest ever contracts from 
Fortune 500 customers. However, a relatively narrow focus also meant a limited niche 
in the changing markets, especially when considering longer-term scenarios. The firm 
was also facing some stagnation. In November 2008, a new CEO Jari Mielonen was 
hired to change the situation. He started to expand the product portfolio, but in a 
different way than in the earlier years. “We have been so focused in such a small 
market, that we nearly killed ourselves.”, -Mielonen. Instead of having various products 
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sold to different types of customers, like it was in the earlier years, they are now adding 
new products, which can be sold to the same enterprise customers. It can be said that 
Tectia is now starting fresh, and heading for rapid growth.  
New Growth Phase: 2009- 
During 2009, Tectia restructured the organization and implemented new global 
processes to align various operations to be more efficient and effective. Management 
team members were also changed, bringing in new fresh air into the firm.  
Overall, Tectia is a Born Global that went through all the four phases, retreated 
backwards in terms of size, but has now started a new phase of growth with 
internationalization and globalization degree at a very high level.  
Survival Crises and Other Challenges 
Tectia was very close to running out of cash at around late 1998. However, the firm was 
able to turn around the situation by closing successful deals with their IPSec product. 
Otherwise, the firm has never been at a risk of going out of business financially. “I 
don’t think that we were ever in a place that we would have been at risk of going out of 
business…. We were on a very solid basis with our own technology, and had very good 
funding from the stock listing...”, -Vainio. 
However, Tectia has faced serious challenges during its growth, one of them being the 
difficult relationship with F-Secure in the form of exclusive distribution agreement. As 
Ylönen recalls “signing the F-Secure deal in early 1996 spring” as being one of the 
most critical decisions he has made, they ended up in arbitration at court in year 2000. 
Court found that both parties had breached the agreement and Tectia eventually had to 
start paying royalties to F-Secure for their own Secure Shell products that they would 
sell directly to end customers in the future. Tectia not only lost the control of the market 
while they could not directly sell between 1996 and 2000 but the loss in arbitration also 
de-motivated and affected the spirit of Tectia employees. The difficult relationship with 
F-Secure ended in 2003 and Tectia had a lot to learn from this case, how they can 
manage relationships better. “They were rather difficult times …”, -Ylönen. 
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Another serious crisis Tectia faced is when they expanded their product portfolio too 
much and started selling so many types of products to different types of customers. 
Their commercial success with the Secure Shell and IPSec OEM products made them 
confident to take enormous risks in entering the related VPN hardware business. 
However, the IT bubble burst in 2000 and the loss of focus within the firm reflected to 
its huge losses in revenues. This huge risk-taking in diversifying the products and 
eventually closing it down, did not destroy the firm as such, but had an enormous 
impact on Tectia’s spirits and management style for a couple of years.  
This crisis during the global breakthrough and expansion phase was influenced by too 
rapid growth of the firm in terms of size and product variations, and lack of focus, 
international management, and control mechanisms. Tectia grew from being a small 
firm to medium-sized firm in terms of both sales revenue and the amount of employees. 
At the end of year 1999, there were only 55 employees, but increased to 172 at the end 
of 2000 and 181 in 2001. “We had grown uncontrollably. The internal management and 
control mechanisms were largely lacking, or not functioning sufficiently. We had too 
many people, we were doing too many things on too many markets. We had too many 
technologies.”, -Ylönen. 
Table 4 summarizes Tectia’s developments to date. 
 
Table 4. Summary table of growth phases of Tectia 
Phase  1. 
Introductory 
(1995-1996) 
2. Commercial 
breakthrough 
and foreign 
growth (1997-
1999) 
3. Global 
breakthrough 
and expansion 
(1998-2001) 
(2009-) 
4. Global 
rationalization 
and maturity 
(2002-2008) 
Key strategy  Development of 
commercially 
acceptable 
products, 
securing 
finance, 
developing 
market, and 
receiving first 
sales revenues.  
Selling products in 
large volumes. 
Entering the IPSec 
OEM market, 
building direct 
sales team and 
penetrating the US 
market by 
establishing an 
office. 
Expansion to new 
continents and 
penetration to 
countries in which 
presence has been 
established to 
leverage 
economies of 
scope.  
Alignment of 
global operations 
and marketing 
across countries to 
benefit from global 
synergies. Focus 
becomes the key.  
Growth of the Sales: increased 
from 0 to 0.17 
Sales: increased to 
1.6 MEur. 
Sales: increased to 
19.9 MEur. 
Sales: big 
fluctuations 
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size of the 
firm (sales, 
employees)  
MEur. 
Employees: 
grew from 1 to 
10. Still 
categorized as 
micro-sized 
firm.  
Employees: grew 
to 28.  
Growing from 
micro to small-
sized firm.  
Employees: grew 
to 181. Growth to 
medium-sized 
firm.  
-------------------- 
2009-: Sales 8.8 
MEur, Employees 
64.  
between the range 
of 8 MEur and 17 
MEur.  
Employees: 
decreased 
gradually to 73.  
Global 
expansion 
(markets, 
share) 
Immediately 
global. 
(Precise details 
unknown due to 
all sales done by 
F-Secure) 
In March 1999, 
Internationalization 
degree: 56.25%, 
Globalization 
degree: 37.50%. 
At the end of 2001, 
Internationalization 
degree: 78.40%, 
Globalization 
degree: 62.50%. 
Sales in at least 3 
continents.  
At the end of 2008, 
Internationalization 
degree: 95.30%, 
Globalization 
degree: 77.50%. 
Sales in all major 
continents.  
Operation 
mode and 
networks 
Selling via F-
Secure, 
distributor.  
Selling via F-
Secure, distributor. 
Active 
participation in 
IETF.  
US subsidiary 
established to sell 
IPSec.  
Sales subsidiaries 
opened in US (98), 
Japan (2000), 
Germany (2001), 
UK (2002). Rep 
offices in South 
Korea and Taiwan 
(2001). Sales 
through channel 
networks as well.  
Sales subsidiaries 
in USA, Germany, 
and Hong Kong 
(2010).  
Sales through 
channel networks 
as well.  
Various strategic 
partnerships.  
Products Focused product 
offering. SSH 
Secure Shell 
only. (Product, 
Services) 
Diversifies product 
offering and goes 
into OEM market 
with IPSec in 
1998. 
SSH Secure Shell 
achieves 
commercial 
breakthrough in 
1997, IPSec 
Toolkits in 1999. 
(Product, Know-
how, Services) 
Diversifies product 
offering further 
with PKI related 
products and VPN 
hardware business. 
Support Services 
also grows. 
(Product, services, 
know-how, 
systems) 
2009-: Growth by 
product 
development.   
Back to focused 
strategy by cutting 
away the PKI and 
VPN hardware 
(systems) business.  
Focus on product, 
services, and 
know-how. 
Organizational 
structure 
Systems, 
structures, and 
formality are 
almost non-
existent with 
informal 
communication.  
Founder remains 
central to decision-
making and 
structures and 
communication are 
still relatively 
informal.  
1998-2001: Adopts 
more functional, 
formal structures. 
2009-: Global 
processes in place. 
Centralization and 
decentralization 
balanced.  
Formal structure 
and processes 
introduced. 
Emphasis on 
improving 
software 
development 
processes.  
Survival crisis 
in end of 
phase  
In need of 
managerial 
expertise and 
the founder 
nearing burnout. 
Again in need of 
managerial 
expertise and 
change towards 
more professional 
management and 
structures.  
Lack of focus, too 
rapid growth of 
employee size and 
product portfolio. 
Failure to align 
activities.  
2008: Stagnated 
growth level, in 
need of new 
growth strategy.  
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4.1.3 Factors Influencing the Growth and Survival of Tectia 
Industry Development Since Establishment 
During the introductory phase, network security was still a niche market. Tectia was a 
pioneer in the encryption products for IT security and they had the first-mover 
advantage, allowing them to grow fast. Then during the 15 years of their existence, 
awareness of network security and the need for it increased. This is a positive growth 
factor for Tectia as the need from enterprises increased dramatically. However, it can 
also be a negative factor, since network security moved from niche to mainstream 
market, thereby giving birth to many competitors.  
The industry growth rate for Tectia’s secure infrastructure market with the Secure Shell-
based solution has been about 5-10% per annum in average during the past 10 years, 
although after the IT bubble burst, the growth rate was rather low, even shrinking. The 
new MFT market where Tectia is entering now is expected to grow at plus 21% per 
annum. During the global expansion phase, the bursting of the dot.com bubble had an 
enormous effect on the growth and survival of the firm. “It was something that affected 
us tremendously.”, -Ylönen. 
Although customer needs have differed depending on the size of the customers’ 
operations, they have been quite similar across countries. Yet, since US market has 
always been more advanced in terms of awareness of enterprise security issues, Tectia 
has grown rapidly in the US. Europe and Asia are still in the early stages of adopting IT 
security so there is a lot of potential from those markets in the future.  
There has been some consolidation in the IT security market, but this has not had much 
affect on Tectia’s growth. The competition in the industry has been quite diversified and 
tough for the firm. For IPSec, some of the large global competitors were RSA Security 
(USA), Kame (Japan), Hifn (USA), and FreeBSD (open source). For Secure Shell based 
products, F-Secure (later Attachmate (USA), as F-Secure sold the product to them) and 
Vandyke (USA) were large commercial competitors, but various open source free 
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versions such as OpenSSH and Putty also competed against Tectia rather heavily. Large 
system integrators such as IBM and HP were also sometimes considered as competitors 
due to the fact that they were selling total solutions, which had security embedded in 
them. For the file transfer security market, Sterling Commerce (USA), 
Axway/Tumbleweed (USA), and Globalscape (USA) have been major competitors.  
Although there has been a need to obtain export licenses from Finland for their products 
on a per country basis, they have not faced any trade barriers throughout their history.  
Development of Most Critical Resources and Capabilities Since Establishment 
Resource Amount 
The fundamental innovation with Secure Shell with great technology and human 
resources (engineers) boosted Tectia to grow at the beginning. Tectia was able to recruit 
many talented engineers straight out of school. “If you look at the early stages, we had 
very good technology and we had very good engineers. And it was a hot technology, a 
hot company, the best engineers wanted to work there…”, -Ylönen. However, limitation 
in the knowledge and resources in the VPN hardware business affected negatively on 
Tectia. “The company had extremely limited knowledge and resources and execution 
capability in the hardware business.”, -Vainio. 
On the financial resource side, Tectia has almost never had problems. During the first 
two phases, revenue/funding received through Ylönen’s other firm ACR was very 
important, as it supported Tectia to get into the business. During the global 
breakthrough phase, Tectia was offered many types of funding from various firms 
including other Finnish enterprises and banks. Although most of the financial offers 
were not taken by Tectia, knowing that funding is available encouraged them to take 
more risks. In December 2000, Tectia conducted an IPO (Initial Public Offering), 
bringing in to the firm around 40 million euros in new capital. The funding and IPO 
enabled Tectia to survive the IT depression and product portfolio changes in early 2000. 
“Without those financial resources, had we been where we were in late 2001, we would 
certainly not have survived.”, -Ylönen. 
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Managerial and International Experience 
One of the internal factors limiting growth throughout different phases has been the lack 
of management skills and experience needed for firms doing global business. There 
seemed to have been a shortage of skilled managers in Finland who can run various 
functions compared to, for example, an US firm. Ylönen also regrets not getting in a 
business manager earlier at the point of establishment as that could have avoided some 
earlier issues with F-Secure partnerships and other direct sales cases.  
Capabilities (Substantive, dynamic, and networking) 
Substantive Capabilities 
Amongst the substantive capabilities, technological capabilities have been, without 
doubt, the most important for Tectia. Their differentiator in the market has been 
primarily technological, allowing them to create solutions that satisfy customers’ needs. 
However, eventually as the firm grew, their technological expertise in Secure Shell 
seemed to have also ended up being a limitation for further growth, as they were not 
able to pull out from being a just one protocol-based firm. Sales and marketing has not 
been as good as their competence in technology. They have been successful in 
marketing to the world’s largest banks and retailers but the efforts have been too 
expensive and painful. They were not able to find good partners to take part of the load 
in sales and marketing efforts, thus the firm has often had to do everything on their own. 
Particularly in the product management function, a combination of technical and 
marketing understanding was needed to handle the high-tech and complex software 
products. Understanding the customer’s need, matching it with the technology that 
Tectia can provide, and extracting the relevant technical information to an 
understandable form for both own sales people and customers was often difficult for the 
employees, and was limiting the growth. Shortage in sales skills as well as people who 
understand a certain industry was also a limiting factor for global growth. On the other 
hand, their managerial capabilities in focusing their product and customer strategies 
helped the firm to survive it’s most difficult times during the global rationalization and 
maturity phase.  
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Dynamic Capabilities 
In general, it can be said that Tectia has been able to adapt to the rapid changes in their 
environment and renew their resources and capabilities, and as such, they have been 
surviving as an independent firm now for 15 years. For example, when they started to 
focus on Secure Shell-based solution, they realized that the free OpenSSH had risen to a 
level where they had become a major competitor. Tectia eventually changed their 
business focus, implemented new features that was attractive to enterprise customers, 
and even changed their product and firm names. Also, when Tectia encountered a huge 
crisis with the too diversified product portfolio, their ability to change drastically the 
focus, cut out products, and to reorganize the personnel, certainly contributed to the 
survival of the firm. 
Networking Capabilities 
Networks for Tectia have always been very important. However, the founder Ylönen 
himself was not much of a networker. “I’m too interested in technology and too busy to 
spend very much time networking, which is a shortcoming, but you don’t have time for 
everything.”, -Ylönen. To compensate that, there were other individuals within the firm 
who possessed or acquired valuable network connections.  
With the IPSec toolkit product, Tectia had a direct sales model so they were very close 
and intimate with their customers. The sales and support staff had to be in the customer 
premises to advise and implement the technology. The firm also participated very 
frequently in the IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force) meetings, which created new 
contacts and credibility within the engineering community. This became a door opener 
for many new IPSec customers. For Secure Shell-based solution, after the firm also 
started selling it directly and changed their focus to enterprise markets in 2003, Tectia 
treated customer relationship to be an extremely important part of the process. Being 
intimate with a very few, but large customers, enabled them to get feedback from 
customers to improve their products.  
Government Support 
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Tectia has received funding from TEKES, mostly during the early years, but also in the 
later years. This was helpful for the firm, although even if they had not gotten the 
funding, they would have managed without it as well. “It was important in the very 
early phases….But not something that determines the fate of the company...”, -Ylönen. 
Tectia has also used Finpro as consultants during the earlier phases for understanding 
foreign markets. For example, they used Finpro’s service for getting deeper access to 
the Japanese market.  
Entrepreneurial Orientation and Lateral Rigidity 
Tectia’s entrepreneurial orientation and lateral rigidity has been fluctuating throughout 
its history. The term “entrepreneurial” was illustrative of the organizational culture at 
Tectia, especially during the earlier years between 1995 to 2003, when the firm took 
many kinds of risks with new R&D projects. “So that risk-taking was from all angles, 
enormous...”, -Vainio. New ideas and proactiveness were encouraged. Ylönen became 
an iconic figure and his presence was also important during those days. The low-
conflict, flat, informal organizational structure made Tectia not just a working place, but 
also “a way of life”, where colleagues became friends and enjoyed their time together 
even outside of working hours. “A lot of the people were young and they weren’t just 
working there. It was a way of life.”, -Ylönen. Tectia created new markets for their 
niche products. Since there were not too many formal procedures in place, they were 
always able to react quickly to customer requirements and develop new products. This 
entrepreneurial culture helped Tectia to grow during the early years.  
Between 2003 and 2008, Tectia did not experiment so much with new initiatives. One 
reason was because of the scar that was left on some of the management team members 
from the earlier failures of VPN hardware business, who wanted to focus and 
concentrate on what was on the table instead of experimenting and taking risks. Another 
reason was because the firm was committed to a complete renovation of the Secure 
Shell code base in 2003-2007 and at the same time, also had to implement a lot of new 
features demanded by large customers. All of their resources were totally locked down, 
limiting them from taking new initiatives. “We had to focus on some things…. I actually 
actively discouraged anything that would dilute that focus.”, -Ylönen. Tectia focused on 
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analyzing the current market opportunities and seeing how their products could be 
positioned within the existing market. In addition, in 2002 when various processes were 
introduced to the firm by outside consultants, the atmosphere became a little bit more 
bureaucratic and formalized. They also started becoming rigid, not being able to adapt 
to changing conditions, partly because their large enterprise customers were rigid, 
needing structured commitments and huge resources to continue satisfying them. Also, 
their unwillingness to take risks naturally made them more rigid at that time. Overall, 
during 2003-2008, Tectia stepped backwards in terms of entrepreneurial culture, and 
became less innovative, proactive, or risk-taking, limiting their growth. On the other 
hand, the non-existence of entrepreneurial culture during this time helped them to 
survive the turbulent times of IT depression and other difficulties.  
Since 2009, Tectia is again trying to revive its entrepreneurial culture. “The risk-taking 
is part of the growth… if you don’t want to take risks, so definitely you don’t grow.”, -
Mielonen. They are also trying to take part of the rigidity away by re-organizing the 
organizational structure and processes, product strategy, and changing the culture of the 
firm. It remains to be seen if their entrepreneurial culture will yield rapid growth or 
survival crisis. 
Software Business Specific Factors 
Compatibility with Major Players 
Being compatible with major players in the market is critical to Tectia for both growth 
and survival. “It's just condition to be in the business. It's mandatory.”, - Vainio. One of 
the firm’s strength and core competence has been the capability to deliver their solution 
to almost any kind of operating systems such as Windows, Unix, and mainframes, 
which are used in enterprise networks. For example, being one of the rare firms to be 
able to support IBM z/OS platform, it has opened doors to many new large customers 
who in the end install also the same products to many other platforms, as the customers 
usually want to get all the same products for various platforms from one single vendor. 
However, supporting the vast amount of operating systems used in enterprise networks 
can be extremely resource consuming and expensive as it requires the best resources to 
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test and fix the bugs for the same products on various platforms. As such, this expensive 
procedure has also, in a way, hindered the growth and profitability of Tectia, as it took 
so much of their R&D resources. In order to avoid the negative effect of supporting too 
many platforms, Tectia has needed to make strategic choices of which platforms to 
support and which not, based on how widely those platforms are adopted. For example, 
Apple’s Macintosh and IBM AS 400 have specifically not been supported, even if there 
have been requests from customers for support, due to needing to prioritize their 
resources. Still, Tectia has made some wrong decisions in choosing which platforms to 
support in the past, which has ended up being expensive for the firm, possibly hindering 
growth. For example, SSH Tectia for Linux running on IBM POWER and z series did 
not sell and was eventually pulled out of the market.  
Lock-in Effect 
Lock-in effect is critical to Tectia for both growth and survival, especially during the 
introductory and commercial breakthrough phases, just when you are still the early 
players in the market with niche products. Once the customer has chosen Tectia’s 
product, it is difficult for enterprise customers to change the key infrastructure and 
security vendor frequently. “It’s something that, for a startup that’s early in the market 
it can be very important, that you get to the customer first, you get the customer to use 
your products. It’s much more difficult for someone else to go there after that, to 
replace you.”, -Ylönen.  
Software Development Process 
Mastering the software development process is critical for growth of Tectia but depends 
on different phases of the firm growth. Not mastering the software development process 
does not necessarily ignite survival crisis. Tectia’s software development process in the 
introductory phase was very informal and highly agile, using mostly implicit 
specifications. They considered this agile process to be critical in order for a small firm 
to quickly create a unique and credible product. However, as the firm continued to grow 
and expand their business to enterprise customers, they realized the importance of 
having a stable development process with predictable, systematic procedures, which 
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was then introduced in 2003. Despite this new process, for a couple of years, the firm 
had a challenge of being reliable with their release schedules, maintaining high quality, 
and executing the promised roadmaps. Especially with the release of Tectia version 5.0 
which included a total re-write of the back-end code, there were many bugs after it was 
released, requiring the R&D to fix the bugs, test the software, and do maintenance 
releases many times. This took a lot of valuable resources from the R&D team, which 
was not able to then focus on investing in any new products. Tectia had a lot to learn in 
terms of how to develop products and maintain them for demanding large enterprise 
customers. This hindered growth for Tectia for some years between 2005 and 2007. “I 
think it was not really a survival risk but it really hindered the growth.”, -Vainio.  
Open Source Software 
The existence of open source software, especially OpenSSH, has negatively affected on 
Tectia’s growth related to the Secure Shell-based products, especially during the mid 
years (2000-2008). Tectia encountered situations where prospects preferred to install the 
free version (OpenSSH) instead of their products, which cost money. OpenSSH took 
away an enormous part of their accessible market and Tectia was forced to re-focus 
their target segment and introduce new products and services that catered to the larger 
enterprises. The firm also changed their firm name from SSH Communications Security 
to Tectia in April 2000, to be in line with the new positioning strategy. “We needed to 
decide how to change our positioning, how to change our target group, how to change 
the product so that we can still remain in business if somebody is giving the same thing 
for free.”, -Ylönen. 
In general, Tectia considers existence of open source software to be a global 
phenomenon that no one can hinder, and as such, businesses should taken advantage 
and seek opportunities in utilizing open source software. In retrospect then, Tectia 
should have probably handled the rise of OpenSSH differently in the earlier phases. 
OpenSSH was built based on the original freeware release of Secure Shell by Ylönen in 
1995. Controlling that community and building Tectia’s business solution on top of that 
may have yielded different growth opportunities for the firm.   
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Now, Tectia does not consider OpenSSH as their competitor but as part of their 
ecosystem. Tectia has now accepted the fact that OpenSSH’s penetration and 
installation base is extremely high on a global basis, and that there is no point in treating 
them as enemies but to take advantage of their installed base and even build on top of 
that. “OpenSSH is actually our best colleague in future...”, -Mielonen. 
Software Business Model and Growth Strategies 
In the software product business, cost of goods sold is very low, allowing firms to 
achieve higher margins and speed up growth. It also allows firms to go global on the 
spot, or sometimes it is even needed if you are a software start-up in Finland, due to the 
small home market size. “… software business can be global on spot so it doesn’t need 
physical channels, such much or it can be also distributed in very fast way...”, -
Mielonen. By selling software products, Tectia usually received a one-time license fee, 
and with larger enterprise customers, also annual maintenance fees for providing 
support services. These incurring maintenance revenues enabled the firm to have some 
predictability of future income flow. However, quite often, the firm was dependent on 
trying to close a bigger deal at the end of each quarter to receive those big one-time 
license revenues. In order to have more growth opportunities, Tectia will charge for 
consulting fee as a third element in their revenue stream, which is often required from 
large enterprises. In this way, Tectia is not only selling software products but also 
software know-how.  
Although their software products have been developed to be a standardized product, 
there has been too much customization done for big key accounts that requested 
additional features. The R&D team has often been locked into trying to serve these 
bigger accounts that other new product development work was neglected. There was 
just not enough resource for that. In the future, Tectia is trying to limit customization as 
much as possible. Their opinion is that software products cannot be multiplied for 
economy of scale if you keep on customizing. The core product should not be touched. 
However, since they cannot avoid getting special requests from big key accounts, they 
 87 
are trying to make some of the products as simple as possible, with parameters, so that 
customization level would be decreased.  
4.2 Remedy Entertainment 
4.2.1 Firm Background and Characteristics 
Remedy Entertainment Oy (Remedy) was established in 1995 and is a privately held 
developer of state-of-the-art action games, game franchises and cutting edge 3D game 
technology. Remedy’s mission is to be among the very best action game and game 
technology development firms in the world by developing and producing world-leading 
game-based intellectual properties. The firm has focused on this mission utilizing 
innovative ideas, quality content, state-of-the-art technology and – most importantly – 
the right team of people to put it all together. Their headquarters is located in Espoo, 
Finland.  
Their highly acclaimed games include “Death Rally” (PC, 1996), “Max Payne” 
(PC/Xbox/PS2, 2001), “Max Payne 2: The Fall of Max Payne” (PC/Xbox/PS2, 2003), 
and “Alan Wake” (Xbox360, 2010). Despite having released only four games in 15 
years, the firm does fine as all of their titles have been received very well. Remedy is 
also responsible for the popular benchmark application 3DMark. Initially created as 
“Final Reality” in 1997, Remedy soon established another firm Futuremark to handle it.  
Remedy’s direct customers are publishers who fund the development of games and 
handle the marketing, PR, manufacturing of the actual physical product, packaging, and 
distribution channels of the games. However, their final end customers are the actual 
players of their games.  
There has been quite a fluctuation in the development of sales revenue due to the hit-
based nature of the gaming industry. The peak for sales was in 2003 with 6.57 million 
euro and 24 employees, thanks to the “Max Payne 2: The Fall of Max Payne” release. 
2004 revenue was from royalties from “Max Payne 2: The Fall of Max Payne” game 
sales. The revenue from 2005 onwards has been mostly from Microsoft Games Studio 
in the US. They have been funding the development of “Alan Wake” game. The reason 
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that there is no revenue in 2008 is because Remedy failed to reach certain milestones 
during that year that were set in the publishing contract. With regards to the number of 
employees, Remedy has pursued a slow growth path of increasing their headcount. At 
the end of 2009, there were 46 employees working full-time for the firm (see figure 13 
and 14).  
 
Figure 13. Remedy’s employee growth  
 
 
Figure 14. Remedy’s sales revenue growth  
It was obvious to Remedy even before founding the firm that they are seeking to 
globalize. In order to succeed in the gaming industry, one must have big hits for their 
games and US has traditionally been the biggest market for games, especially back in 
1995 when the firm was founded. As such, it was natural for them to target the US 
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market. Also, the fact that they are based in Finland with such a small market has 
pushed them to think global from the start. 
Concerning the share of foreign sales, due to the fact that Remedy sells their games to 
publishers in the US, both their internationalization degree and globalization degree has 
been roughly 99% since the establishment of the firm (see figure 15). They do have 
some small income generated within Finland by providing IT services to, for example, 
Futuremark. Thus, Remedy adheres to the Born Global criteria.    
 
Figure 15. Remedy’s internationalization and globalization degree 
4.2.2 The Development of Remedy in Phases 
Due to the fact that Remedy has focused on producing game products and also due to 
the nature of the gaming industry, the firm does not follow the 4-step phases under 
investigation in this research. There is 1) introductory phase, but 2) commercial 
breakthrough and foreign growth and 3) global breakthrough and expansion phases 
seemed to be combined. Figure 16 provides an illustration of organizational 
development in terms of growth and foreign expansion.  
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Figure 16. Main path and phases of the growth of Remedy 
 
The Introductory Phase: 1995-1996 
Markus Mäki, Sami Vanhatalo, and some others were friends from the demo scene 
group Future Crew during their studying times. They were all computer enthusiasts who 
were looking for something fun to do after their studies. The business idea for the firm 
was born six months before the establishment, during the summer 1995, when they did 
concepts and prototypes from a few games. Remedy was registered as a firm on August 
31, 1995.  
In the gaming industry, there are no pilot sales done, as such. Remedy showed the demo 
version of “Death Rally” to an US firm called 3D Realms, who liked it and decided to 
become their publisher for the game. 3D Realms then worked with GT Interactive to get 
the games distributed to end customers all over the world. “Death Rally” was ready for 
sales and released in October 1996.  
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Commercial Breakthrough and Foreign Growth & Global Breakthrough and 
Expansion Phases: 1996- 
“Death Rally” sold roughly 100,000 copies in 1996 and was considered a large volume 
back then. Since the publisher, 3D Realms, did the actual sales and distribution, 
Remedy has no recollection of which countries the game was actually sold in. It is 
assumed that the game was sold at least in the US and Europe.  
During the commercial breakthrough and global breakthrough phases that continues to 
date, there were three critical decision-making points that changed the direction of the 
firm. First of all, Remedy developed a benchmark product “Final Reality” in 1997 and 
spun-off a new firm Futuremark to handle the business. While Final Reality was an 
unbelievable success, it did not fit into Remedy’s focus of creating action-packed 
games. “That was all part of the focus mantra…. you don’t want to do tires and mobile 
in the same company. So it’s just basic rule of business, focus, and Remedy is focused 
on making games.”, -Mäki.  
Second, the sale of “Max Payne” IP ownership to Take-Two Interactive Software (US 
firm) in May 2002 was very critical to the firm. Remedy and 3D Realms shared the 
ownership 50:50 of the “Max Payne” IP but the sale to Take-Two Interactive Software 
for US$10 million and 969,932 shares of stock allowed Remedy to take the whole year 
of 2004 into brainstorming and coming up with new ideas and new technology that 
eventually led to the development of “Alan Wake” game launched in 2010. “Money 
wise, that’s easily the biggest decision that we’ve ever made.”, -Reini. 
Third, signing of an exclusive agreement with Microsoft for the development of “Alan 
Wake” in 2005 steered the firm into one definitive direction. More details can be found 
in section 4.2.3 under “Compatibility with Major Players”.  
Last but not least, various big decisions related to the development of “Alan Wake” 
game during 2007-2008 were critical to the success of the firm. After Remedy started 
developing the “Alan Wake” game in 2005, they made some important changes in their 
vision during 2007 and 2008 so that they started to pursue a different direction for the 
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game than what they had initially planned. This was a turning point for the production 
of the game so that it would proceed towards getting it completed.  
During these phases, Remedy experienced crises, as funding was short from publishers 
in 2001 and 2008, requiring them to look for external financing to survive.  
Global rationalization and maturity 
“Global rationalization and maturity” phase under investigation in this research does not 
seem to be applicable to Remedy due to the fact that they do not operate in any other 
parts of the world and their growth and development fluctuates according to the product 
development cycles.  
 
Rationalization Phase : 2008- 
 
However, they realize the need to rationalize their operations constantly as requirements 
for high-end games and technology change rapidly and they need to keep their costs and 
expenses of development in check. Especially when they are producing one game at a 
time, it makes more sense to outsource or freelance some parts of the work instead of 
having internal full-time headcounts. Although their full-time employee amount has 
been increasing slowly over the years, they used a network of freelancers even more for 
the recent “Alan Wake” development.  
Survival Crises and Other Challenges 
Remedy has been at a risk of going out of business a couple of times in the past when 
funding was stopped from the publisher’s side. About one year before “Max Payne” 
game was released, Take-Two Interactive Software stopped the funding of the project, 
which put Remedy at a difficult situation. “I do remember times just before Max Payne 
1 game came out, we were always counting how much money we have left for like, 
whether it’s 4 weeks or 2 weeks money left, and we were always on the brink of 
disaster.”, -Reini. However, they were lucky to have their producer 3D Realms who 
believed in the project and decided to fund the project so that Remedy could finish 
developing the game.   
 93 
Since Remedy closed the publishing deal with Microsoft Games Studio in 2005, they 
have been mostly funding Remedy to develop the “Alan Wake” game. Although 
Remedy had enough cash from the “Max Payne” IP sales, towards the end of 2008, they 
realized that the development was going to take much longer than planned and 
Microsoft stopped funding because Remedy could not reach their milestones. Remedy 
had to apply for external funding sources in order to survive.  
Table 5 summarizes Remedy’s development to date.  
Table 5. Summary table of growth phases of Remedy.  
Phase  1. Introductory 
(1995-1996) 
2. Commercial breakthrough 
and foreign growth  
3. Global breakthrough and 
expansion (1996-) 
4. Rationalization 
(2008-) 
Key strategy  Development of 
commercially 
acceptable products, 
securing adequate 
finance.  
Selling products in large volumes to 
reach economies of scale. Inventing 
new IPs such as “Max Payne” and 
“Alan Wake”.  
Developing “Alan Wake”. 
Rationalizing operations to 
avoid further delays in 
release schedules, 
managing costs.  
Growth of the 
size of the firm 
(sales, 
employees)  
Sales: almost none, 
dependent on funding 
from publisher.  
 
Employees: grew 
from 4 to 9. Still 
categorized as micro-
sized firm.  
Sales: major fluctuations due to the 
hit-based nature of the gaming 
industry. The peak in 2003 with 6.57 
million euro thanks to the “Max 
Payne 2: The Fall of Max Payne”. 
The revenue from 2005 mostly from 
Microsoft Games Studio.  
Employees: growth to 37 in 2008 and 
from micro to small-sized firm.  
Sales: close to none for 
2008 due to development 
delays. 2010 revenue 
expected to jump up from 
the release of “Alan 
Wake”. 
Employees: growth to 46 
in 2009. Still categorized 
as small-sized firm.  
Global 
expansion 
(markets, 
share) 
This phase was only 
about developing the 
product, no global 
expansion yet.  
Internationalization and globalization 
degree at 99% due to the fact that all 
their income came from game 
publishers in the US. Games sold in 
at least 3 continents.  
Same as the earlier phase.  
Operation 
mode and 
networks 
Building networks 
with publishers. 
Export (NIMOS) to publishers in the 
US. Creating a huge network of 
freelancers.  
Same as the earlier phase. 
Products Focused on “Death 
Rally” product.  
Focused product offering. Expansion 
of the product offering by introducing 
new products to current and new 
customers. “Death Rally” in 1996, 
“Final Reality” in 1997. “Max 
Payne” in 2001, “Max Payne 2” in 
2003, and “Alan Wake” in 2010 
including localization for major 
markets.  
Focused on “Alan Wake” 
product. Search for new 
growth opportunities by 
becoming a producer of 
game-based intellectual 
properties and 
licensing/franchising the 
IPs.  
Organizational 
Structure 
Systems, structures, 
and formality are 
Slowly adopting more functional, 
formal structures. Decentralized 
Bureaucratic principles, 
formal structure with 
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almost non-existent 
with informal 
communication.  
structure, more responsibility given 
to the managers in each field, with 
greater authority and incentive. 
Formal communication and business 
processes supported by IT systems.  
standardized rules and 
procedures. Centralization 
and decentralization 
balanced. Emphasis on 
improving software 
development processes.  
Survival crisis 
in end of phase  
None.  Funding issues from publishers in 
2001. 
Funding issues from 
publishers in 2008, need 
for external financing to 
survive.  
 
4.2.3 Factors Influencing the Growth and Survival of Remedy 
Industry Development Since Establishment 
The gaming industry has been enjoying a very high growth rate over the years, which 
has been a positive influence on Remedy’s growth and survival. According to 
PricewaterhouseCoopers’ Global Entertainment and Media Outlook report for 2008, the 
projected compound annual growth rate for the gaming industry is 10.3%, which easily 
tops the growth in the majority of other entertainment sectors. Console games have the 
highest sales with an expected growth of 6.9% from $24.9 billion in 2007 to $34.7 
billion in 2012 (Ars Technica, 2010).  
Also, the rise of console market has contributed to their growth and survival. Max 
Payne was initially developed only for the PC but while it was being developed, the 
console market grew and grew, convincing publishers to also have the game for the 
consoles. Max Payne series’ unexpected huge success can be attributed to the sudden 
and quick rise of the console market.  
However, during the last few years, the situation has not been so good for the 
independent game developers. Because most of the large publishers are publicly listed 
firms, they are under pressure to make their goals and manage their risks. This leads to 
the fact that large publishers are avoiding taking risks in funding new IP titles or an 
external firm and rather funding their internal development teams since they would have 
more control over what happens within the internal environment. Even if they would 
decide to fund an external developer for new IP titles, they have such a huge bargaining 
power over the smaller developers that they may require the independent developers to 
develop the game but claim for the IP ownership or fund less with strict schedules. The 
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powerful publishers can also terminate the publishing deal at any time and once that is 
terminated, independent game developers usually have difficulty in retaining any 
employees anymore, leading to lay-offs or bankruptcy. This situation has not had such a 
big impact on Remedy due to the fact that they already have a publishing deal for “Alan 
Wake” development thanks to their past record of releasing successful games.  
There seems to be some cultural differences in how a game is preferred by different 
nationalities/markets. For example, US is likely to prefer more fighting games, whereas 
Europeans like racing games and Japanese likes role-paying games (Reuters, 2004). 
There are also cultural sensitivities that game developers should take into account. 
Remedy has been trying to create their games in a Hollywood-entertainment style 
aiming for the wider audience group, but primarily the US and European markets. Thus, 
their 46 employees consist of nine different nationalities in order to understand the wide 
audiences’ preferences and cultural differences.  
Competition in the gaming industry can be divided into three levels. First, Remedy 
competes with other independent game developers to get publishing deals. Major 
competitors include Bungie, Epic Games, and Valve Software, all based in the US. 
Then, once the game products are out in the market, they compete with other game 
products that are available in the store at the same time. Finally, the game industry as a 
whole competes with other forms of entertainment, such as movies and short weekend 
holiday trips to win the free time that consumer has. The intensity of competition does 
influence their growth and survival to some extent. 
Remedy has not experienced any trade barriers and even if there were such barriers, 
those usually exist in unimportant market area or then are handled by the publishers.  
Development of Most Critical Resources and Capabilities Since Establishment 
Resource Amount 
One of the most important intangible resources that have been critical to the firm has 
been the people they employ. As a creative business, the value is in the people who are 
creative and productive. Then these people together create a brand, which gives birth to 
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a value of its own. The brand and IP can then be utilized in further business without the 
people who originally created the brand. So the people, the firm brand “Remedy” and 
IP/brand such as “Max Payne” and “Alan Wake” have been extremely important 
resources for the firm. The knowledge of the gaming industry, which the firm has 
acquired and accumulated over the years, also make them more unique and successful.  
External financial resources have also been extremely critical for Remedy, as the 
publishers usually fund their game developments. If funding from the publishers is 
stopped due to not reaching milestones, it can affect both their growth and survival. 
Remedy has been in such position where they had to also apply for other external 
financing such as from banks and insurance companies. Their internal savings from the 
past IP sales of “Max Payne” has also helped them survive during the past couple of 
years while developing “Alan Wake”.  
Managerial and International Experience 
Markus Mäki (founder/top management team member) established Remedy and also 
was part of establishing Futuremark, their spin-off firm, but did not have prior 
international business experience. With regards to the other three management team 
members, only Lasse Seppänen had some experience with another start-up firm, but 
Mika Reini and Matias Myllyrinne did not. Thus, as entrepreneurs, as of 2010, Mäki has 
about 15 years and Seppänen about three years, totaling 18 years. 
With regards to international business experience, the top management team members 
did not have a lot of experience prior to joining Remedy except for Matias Myllyrinne 
from working in the hotel industry earlier in the UK. Experience in gaming industry 
totaled to 44 years (Mäki 15, Myllyrinne 11, Reini 10, and Seppänen eight years), 
compensating for the lack of international experience.  
Capabilities (Substantive, dynamic, and networking) 
Substantive Capabilities 
Remedy considers that technological competence needs to be competitive in their games 
but focuses in trying to be the best in certain technical features and be just “good” in 
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some other technical areas, so not to end up taking forever to develop a product. On the 
other hand, Remedy considers marketing competence to be extremely important 
especially when it comes to understanding brands and differentiating the products. One 
of the most important capabilities for Remedy related to marketing is the capability to 
create sustainable IP and brand (Myllyrinne, 2009). The artistic competence required in 
defining the graphic look to games done by Art Directors and other artists within the 
firm is also important. Preparing for presentation and demos of the game before it is 
released, what they say, how they say it, and how they show it, are something Remedy 
puts a lot of efforts into. “There are many levels of marketing as such that needs to be 
really understood.”, -Reini. 
Management capability is something Remedy has been developing and improving over 
the past few years and considers it also very critical. They have been hiring experienced 
managers who know already how to manage people and tasks to lead positions. “It’s 
great having a team of extrovert artists with great ideas but you also need to be able to 
manage them, Management is a key role – 10-15% head count.” (Myllyrinne, 2009) 
Dynamic Capabilities 
Remedy has been able to adapt to the rapid changes in the environment and can be said 
that they possess dynamic capabilities. For example, they used to be developing games 
solely for the PC market, but as they saw the rise of console markets, they switched 
their technology and invested in new resources to start creating games for consoles 
during 2004-2005. They have also changed the management structure during the last 
few years so that the Board of Directors can focus on strategic issues while Top 
Management Team handles the operational decisions.  
Networking Capabilities 
Remedy has been putting efforts on building networks and connections as they consider 
them critical for their growth. As individuals are the ones who build the connections, 
they have traditionally sent their employees to different tradeshows and events related 
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to gaming industry every year so that they get new influences, meet new people, and 
thereby build connections to the outside world.   
Different phases of game development often require specialized expert talents that may 
not be relevant throughout a game's entire development cycle. If they would have every 
specialist in-house, they would need to grow faster and develop products much faster in 
order to support the massive overheads. Thus, over the years, Remedy has employed 
freelance artists, animators, motion capture actors, casting agents, movie 
producers/directors, audio designers, and so on. They have a dedicated person handling 
outsourcing issues and retain network of freelancers who they have worked with in the 
past. Through the network of various partners that they trust, a small firm such as 
Remedy can develop a game like the recent “Alan Wake”. “Freelancing and 
outsourcing is definitely a trend that’s growing and becoming more and more important 
for us and for the whole industry.”, -Reini.  
Government Support 
Remedy received a start-up loan from Kera, nowadays called Finnvera1, during the 
introductory phase. Remedy has also received funding from TEKES in every major 
project that they have done. For example during 1997-1998, Remedy joined TEKES-
funded project such as “Computer games’ development environment” and 
“Applicability report for new processor technology to game development environment” 
(Remedy Entertainment, 1999). They have even received funding from TEKES recently 
in 2009. Altogether, Remedy has received in total of about 2.1 million euro of support 
from TEKES (Ahlroth, 2010).  
 
Entrepreneurial Orientation and Lateral Rigidity 
Remedy’s entrepreneurial orientation and lateral rigidity has changed during its history. 
The firm took more risks in the earlier phases when there were almost no structures and 
                                                           
1 Owned entirely by the Finnish State, Finnvera was formed by merging the activities of Kera 
Corporation and the Finnish Guarantee Board (FGB) on January 1, 1999. Finnvera's domestic 
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processes in place. Everything was very flexible and agile with almost no bureaucracy 
and hierarchy. It was more like friends working together, having fun as if it was their 
hobby. “ …the company didn’t start even paying regular salary until 97.”, -Reini. 
Since 2000, they have been embracing “focus” as the key strategy, thus limiting 
experimentation on new initiatives. However, in general, the gaming business is a risky 
business. Especially during the past five years, Remedy has bet everything on just one 
product, the “Alan Wake” game. As such, they are not afraid of taking risks. However, 
they still try to avoid taking risks where they can, so that they do not try everything new 
at the same time. If they do take smaller risks here and there and they fail in those, they 
are a “forgiving” firm in a sense that they do not personify the failures and consider it as 
a collective learning experience for the firm. Failures are “the only hope as an 
organization to keep learning.”, -Reini. They have also tried to analyze the risks so that 
it would be a minimal risk and that there would be a very good chance that they have 
made the right choice. “We are and have been embracing focus a long time, for the last 
10 years or so, it does limit the wacky ideas that people get. So people might voice out 
their ideas but the focus then sort of kills those ideas at the same time.”, -Reini. 
Remedy is aware of the emerging opportunities in the market but has consciously made 
decisions not to pursue new initiatives. For example, there has been emerging 
opportunities in the Internet, social, and mobile gaming but they have analyzed that the 
key success factors that have supported them in the past are not in those new areas and 
that they should rather focus on what they are good at, instead of taking the risks in 
pursuing those new opportunities. In one sense, they have been conservative, in another 
sense; they have been focused in becoming the best at what they do.  
Since 1999 onwards after the current CEO Matias Myllyrinne and CFO Mika Reini 
came on board with their business backgrounds, structures and some processes were put 
into place little by little so that business would be conducted in a bit more organized 
way. Also, as their firm grew in size of employees, they have put efforts in making sure 
that information flows in both formal and informal ways so that every employee have 
                                                                                                                                                                              
development and financing solutions are particularly geared towards small and medium- sized companies, 
and thus Finnvera also helps to promote the government's regional- policy objectives. 
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enough information to be productive at their work. “I’d say we are a more rigid 
company than we were.”, -Reini. However, as a creative firm, they realize the need to 
also have some chaos that empowers employees to do things in a creative manner. Thus 
they are trying to have a balance between a flexible, chaotic atmosphere and an 
organized, structured processes.  
Software Business Specific Factors 
Compatibility with Major Players 
Being compatible with major players in the market and making the decisions which 
platform to support is critical to Remedy for both growth and survival. Game products 
can be developed for, for example, PC, various consoles, mobile phones, and the 
Internet for social interaction games. Remedy has traditionally focused on developing 
their products for the PC and their publishers have done the porting to other consoles. 
“Max Payne” was released in 2001 for Microsoft Windows, in 2002 for Xbox, 
PlayStation 2, and Apple Macintosh, and in 2003 for Game Boy Advance. The more 
compatible their game is to different platforms, the more revenue and growth for 
Remedy. “… how compatible, what platforms you run on defines your potential market 
for buyers instantly. So if you only have Xbox 360, you have about 30 million. If you 
also add PS3, you would add 25 more million...”, -Mäki. 
However, for the very recent “Alan Wake” game, they have made a conscious decision 
to support only the XBox 360 console with an exclusive publishing deal with Microsoft 
Games Studio. This does limit the opportunity to sell more in terms of units, as the 
game cannot be played on other platforms such as Play Station 3. However, their 
“focus” strategy came into play again back in 2005 when they made the decision, so 
that they would focus on developing the product well for one console, instead of trying 
to do it for various platforms. Since they had been developing games earlier for only the 
PC version, they had to put resources into learning how to develop games for consoles, 
and focusing on only one platform decreased their risks in technology investments. The 
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exclusive deal with Microsoft also brought them other benefits, such as better funding 
and marketing power for the product.  
At the time of making the decision to develop only for the XBox 360 platform, they, in 
a way, gambled and took risks in choosing the platform, as at that time, they did not 
know yet whether the new console XBox 360 would have enough installed base when 
the game would be released to the market.  
Lock-in Effect 
Lock-in effect does not usually exist for game software.  
Software Development Process 
In the earlier phases of Remedy’s history, a structured software development process 
did not exist and the process was more in the minds of the employees. That made the 
firm very agile. After 1999, some processes were introduced. However, it took more 
than five years to develop the recent “Alan Wake” game. Some of the reasons why it 
took so long is because they have had to switch their technical expertise from 
supporting PC platforms to consoles, and also had to come up with new ideas/IP of the 
game. But another reason is because of some wrong decisions that were made during 
the R&D phase and difficulties in keeping schedules with all the milestones. 
Developing a game is not just about hard-core engineering work but contains a lot of 
elements of creativity, and creativity is not something that can be produced with a strict 
schedule. “If it’s a new game with untested ideas, it’s very difficult to make a schedule 
that we can stick to at every point in time.”, -Reini. 
The lack of proper software development process during the initial phase of Alan Wake 
development has hindered the growth and may have influenced negatively on the 
survival of the firm. If they had been able to develop this game quicker, they could have 
already been developing the sequel now, contributing to more growth. The lengthening 
of the development process could have also damaged Remedy’s reputation as a firm, 
influencing negatively to the survival rate of the firm, because if publishers perceive 
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Remedy as not being a reliable firm, they may not wish to do deals with Remedy again 
even if they would produce successful games.  
As such, Remedy views having a “correct” software development process in place are 
critical for both growth and survival and they have introduced new processes, or what 
they call “organized way of doing things”, during the last five years. However, during 
the earlier phases of a new project, the process should not be so rigid and too structured. 
There should be room for freedom, flexibility, and creativity, allowing exploration time. 
As the project progresses, the process should become more and more rigid, allowing 
more predictability in meeting milestones and release schedules.  
Open Source Software 
Remedy so far does not consider the existence of open source software as a threat to 
their business. This is because open source teams are not able to produce games that are 
similar to Remedy’s games, due to the limitation in budgets. They are basically 
competing in different types of game market.  
Software Business Model and Growth Strategies 
There is a limit to growth for Remedy as a firm selling only software products and also 
operating in a hit-based industry. Also, if they fail with one game that they have been 
developing for several years, it affects their survival rate negatively. What’s even worse 
is that in the current gaming business model, retail chains take “used games” in and sell 
them onwards, but the original independent game developers do not get royalties for 
those sales. The unique nature of software being “electronic and digital” and being easy 
to distribute does not yet apply to gaming industry, since selling a game product in 
physical box is still the norm. If distribution of games digitally would be adopted some 
day, this can contribute to the growth of Remedy, since one cannot sell an electronic 
version back to the store. Also, many new business models can be explored, such as 
selling only parts of the game at a time.   
Since Remedy is aware that there are limits to growth as a product firm, they are now in 
the middle of coming up with a new strategy for further growth. One of them is that 
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they will become “creators of a game-based intellectual properties”. The IPs that they 
create can then be used outside of the games arena by franchising and licensing the right 
to use their IPs, such as for movies, books, and other entertainment goods. Being 
owners of such IPs and licensing the rights to use it in other areas connect directly to 
further growth for Remedy. Another idea is to start the pre-production of another new 
project while still working on the current one. In that way, there would not be idle time 
for different parts of the production team. Also, they could start creating games based 
on somebody else’s IPs, such as a game based on some hit movie, by licensing that IP.  
They are not entering the software service model as such, which is common in many 
other software product firms but whatever of these growth strategies they pursue, they 
are aware of their growth limits if they stay only in the software product business.  
4.3 Smartner Information Systems Oy 
4.3.1 Firm Background and Characteristics 
Smartner Information Systems Oy (Smartner) was established in September 1999 and 
was a privately held leading developer of mobile software solutions, especially mobile 
push email software for consumers, enterprises, device manufacturers, and telecom 
operators. Their headquarters was located in Helsinki, Finland.  
In April 2005, Smartner was acquired by SEVEN Networks (SEVEN), a US-based 
provider of software solutions that enabled mobile operators to offer their subscribers 
secure, low-cost, real-time access to critical information including business and 
personal email and applications. SEVEN’s presence in the US and Japan, and 
Smartner’s presence in Europe and Asia Pacific made them a perfect fit to become the 
truly global leading firm in the industry. SEVEN is now the world’s leading provider of 
integrated mobile platform for wireless operators and device manufacturers that allows 
them to simplify the delivery of mobile data, applications, and services to a broad 
portfolio of devices. The original Smartner and SEVEN’s integrated, unique push 
technology makes it easy for consumers and enterprises to gain real-time access to 
information such as business and personal email, calendar, corporate directories, 
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personal contacts, and documents. To date, more than 130 operators worldwide have 
adopted their solution.  
There has been quite a fluctuation in sales revenue, between 0-2 MEur until 2005, when 
the sales jumped up to 6.5 MEur, the same year as the acquisition by SEVEN. With 
regards to the number of employees, Smartner started off with four employees during 
the establishment year and grew to 53 in 2001. After some downsizing, there were 41 at 
the end of 2005 when they were acquired. At the end of 2008, there were 86 employees 
working full-time for SEVEN in Finland with 8.74 MEur in sales (see figure 17 and 18). 
 
Figure 17. Smartner/SEVEN’s sales revenue growth  
 
Figure 18. Smartner/SEVEN’s employee growth  
 105 
It was obvious to Smartner even before founding the firm that they are seeking to 
globalize. They wanted to establish a software product firm to be able to scale, and in 
order to really scale, they knew that they would have to go global immediately.  
 
 
Figure 19. Smartner’s internationalization and globalization degree 
Concerning the share of foreign sales, at the end of 2002, three years after 
establishment, the internationalization degree was 90% (of net sales, 10% was from 
Finland and 90% from other European countries). The globalization degree was 0%. At 
the end of 2005, six years after establishment, the internationalization degree was 98% 
(of net sales, 2% was from Finland, 60% from other European countries, 38% from 
outside of Europe) and the globalization degree was 38% (see figure 19). Thus, 
Smartner adheres to the Born Global criteria.  
4.3.2 The Development of Smartner in Phases 
Smartner has gone through the first three phases 1) introductory, 2) commercial 
breakthrough & foreign growth, and 3) global breakthrough and expansion as an 
independent firm, and entered 4) global rationalization and maturity phase when it was 
acquired by SEVEN. Figure 20 provides an illustration of organizational development 
in terms of growth and foreign expansion.  
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Figure 20. Main path and phases of the growth of Smartner/SEVEN 
The Introductory Phase: 1999-2001 
Jussi Räisänen, then a third year student at the Helsinki University of Technology (now 
Aalto University School of Science and Technology) and Mika Uusitalo, a fresh 
graduate from the same university, were friends from the same student club as well as 
from working together at Digia. In July 1999, Uusitalo started to think of starting his 
own business and asked Räisänen if he would be interested in joining. Together during 
the summer, they brainstormed what the business could be, and eventually in August, 
settled with the idea of creating a mobile platform that interfaced with the Internet. The 
firm was registered on September 14, 1999. Uusitalo took the role of looking at the 
technical side while Räisänen, the sales, marketing, and business development side.  
Soon after, Räisänen and Uusitalo both acknowledged the fact that they were both 
junior and were inexperienced in running a firm on their own. They wanted to have 
experienced experts in managing the business and financial aspects as soon as possible. 
A friend of both Räisänen and Uusitalo, Ari Backholm joined as CFO, bringing in his 
financial management experience from Sedecon and McKinsey&Company, right after 
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the firm was registered. By late 1999, Robert Rasmus, an experienced manager from 
Sonera joined as CEO, completing what they called the four “entrepreneurs”.  
The first half a year was spent on fine-tuning their business plan. After getting the first 
round of funding, the firm realized that the original business plan was not something 
they wanted to pursue. In the summer of 2000, Smartner made a critical decision in 
changing their product and channel strategy. Instead of continuing to try to sell a 
platform for mobile enterprise services that ran various applications, they would 
concentrate only on mobile office that brought email and calendar functionalities to the 
mobile phone, and use only operators as the channel. Their first commercial product 
Always-On-Mail (“MoMail”, or “Smartner Email Extender” and “Smartner Calendar 
Extender” at the time) was ready for sales by early fall of 2000. Very soon, the firm 
started closing deals in Finland; DNA in December 2000 and Radiolinja (currently 
known as Elisa) in spring 2001. Despite the success in closing deals with these Finnish 
operators, the firm started to feel the effect of the burst of the IT bubble. It was getting 
difficult to get the needed funding for further growth. Also, “all the way until 2002, 
people just weren’t really ready for these kinds of solutions.”, -Räisänen. 
Finally, Smartner was able to get the second round of funding but the amount was 
smaller than expected, and the firm faced a challenge of needing to grow further with 
limited resources. Smartner had to change their business plan. Instead of setting up 
offices abroad, they downsized the firm and restructured the organization. Closing the 
first international customer became the number one priority. The firm also saw the need 
to focus on “customer adoption”. Even if these Finnish operators bought the mobile 
email product from Smartner, unless the mobile operators’ end customers would adopt 
or start using mobile email functionality, they would eventually drop the product. In 
order to have a commercial breakthrough with their product, Smartner had to figure out 
a way in which the end users would actually really start using their product.  
Commercial Breakthrough and Foreign Growth Phase: 2001-2004 
With clear priority on closing international deals, four Smartner sales personnel divided 
the European continent into regions, and started to aggressively contact all the mobile 
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operators. They focused on Europe first, due to limited resources. A small pilot project 
was delivered to Wind in Italy in July 2001. Then the first major foreign deal was 
closed at the end of 2001 with the Italian operator Blu. Smartner’s foreign expansion 
continued by utilizing contacts received from partnerships with IBM and Nokia. They 
closed deals in Switzerland with Swisscom in the spring of 2002 and in Ireland with 
Eircell (currently known as Vodafone Ireland) in the summer of the same year.  
During 2002, a Canadian firm Research in Motion (RIM) entered Europe with their 
BlackBerry mobile email solution, which triggered Smartner to update their product 
strategy. In order to provide a truly real-time email delivery to the handsets with better 
user experience, they made a critical decision in early 2003 to acquire Commtag, a UK 
firm who possessed synchronization or “push” technology for mobile emails. At the 
same time, Smartner secured EUR 5,000,000 funding commitment from leading 
European venture capital firms Amadeus Capital Partners, Eqvitec Partners, IT 
Provider, and Sitra. The funding round was led by Amadeus Capital Partners, the 
previous investor in Commtag. (Smartner, May 22, 2003). This additional funding was 
critical for Smartner to accelerate their product development in push mobile email.  
The new “push” mobile email product Smartner Duality was launched in October 2003. 
At the same time, another critical decision was made to hire a new CEO Paul Hedman, 
moving the entire firm into a very aggressive sales mode to address the increasing 
demand in the operator market. Soon, the new improved product found additional 
customers, O2 in UK in the end of 2003, Telefonica Mobile in Spain and Vodafone in 
Italy in 2004. “I joined at the same time Smartner had changed their CEO and that was 
a significant change from what it was in the past and the new CEO was very sales-
driven, very hunter-category salesperson instead of trying to be a farmer.”, -Salorinne. 
While achieving foreign growth, the firm also realized the need to have a commercial 
breakthrough, which meant that there should be growing numbers of end users adopting 
to use their product. The more users there would be, the more recurring revenue it 
would bring to the firm, in addition to the initial license revenue from the operators. 
Thus, Smartner was in close relationships with their operator customers to get the 
product adopted by end users. Commercial breakthrough happened in Finland already in 
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the earlier years in 2001-2002, and after the push mobile email was launched in 2003 to 
the market, more and more end users started to adopt the product throughout Europe.  
Even though initially, the firm had plans to enter the US and Asian markets as fast as 
possible, the firm just did not have the bandwidth to penetrate other continents outside 
of Europe during this phase. They needed to focus on Europe, but once they got their 
breakthrough in the European continent, their new challenge was to take on the US and 
Asian markets.  
Global Breakthrough and Expansion Phase: 2004-2005 
Global breakthrough happened in 2004 when Smartner met Starhub, an operator in 
Singapore, at an event organized by Nokia. Closing a deal with Starhub in Singapore 
activated Smartner to start pursuing and penetrating other countries in Asia. Smartner 
hired a local representative in Singapore, who then was able to close many deals quickly 
in various countries including Thailand, Indonesia, India, and Bangladesh, during the 
following years. They also penetrated the Middle East. Both of these regions were 
practically untapped by mobile email providers prior to Smartner’s entry. Smartner was 
the pioneer there.  
Despite their global expansion in the Asia Pacific region, they did not enter the US 
market. The firm had the view that it would be very expensive and the US market was 
different from others in a sense that there were only a few operators there who wanted 
different types of solutions than other markets. In addition, most of Smartner’s 
competitors originated from the US, giving them an advantage in their own home 
market.  
By mid 2004, Smartner had about 20 mobile operator customers in Europe, Asia 
Pacific, and the Middle East. They also had permanent employees based in eight 
different countries, Finland, UK, Sweden, France, Germany, Spain, Italy, and 
Singapore.  
At this point, Smartner realized that they need to grow as fast as they can, in terms of 
resources, in order to support these 20 mobile operators. Revenue from the operators 
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usually came in in delays, but they still needed resources to work on the customer 
adoption. The growth rate was so high in the industry that they needed to think of ways 
how to support their growth. One option was to get additional funding from the venture 
capitalists but there was clearly no money available in the market at that time. The other 
option was to merge with another firm and gain access to more resources for 
accelerating the growth. At the same time, the firm was also pondering ways how to 
enter the US market. “We knew from the start that there is the option that the company 
is sold at some point. It wasn't our plan to sort of knowingly target selling it at any 
given point….it started to become an option…within 2004 or so… What we wanted to 
do was to grow something really big, and it could take many paths.” , -Räisänen. 
Global Rationalization and Maturity: Acquisition by SEVEN Networks, 2005- 
By the end of 2004, both Smartner and SEVEN had reached a similar level of maturity, 
and market conditions were very favorable (Smartner, April 11, 2005). Smartner and 
SEVEN were, in a way, competitors with similar products, but being dominant in 
different markets. SEVEN’s presence in the US and Japan, and Smartner’s presence in 
Europe and Asia Pacific made them a perfect fit to become the truly global firm in the 
industry. Their strengths in their products were also in different areas, providing them 
possibilities to then develop the best, leading products in the world. According to 
Salorinne, “SEVEN was a much larger firm compared to Smartner. They had the 
needed funds as well as human resources…The funding that they had was several 10s of 
times bigger….”, thus providing Smartner with possibilities for rapid growth. 
In April 2005, Smartner was acquired by SEVEN. As a result of the acquisition, the 
firm was not downsized nor Smartner employees laid off. At this point, the new SEVEN 
employed 160 employees globally. Immediately after the acquisition, the new firm 
started integrating the original Smartner and SEVEN products and developing a new 
generation platform “System 7 Version 7” based on the original Smartner product. The 
new platform was ready for sales in late 2007. The headquarter was moved to 
California, US, and those offices such as Sweden and France, which had only single 
sales person with no significant revenue coming in, were closed down.  
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In 2008, as SEVEN continued to globally align their operations after the acquisition, 
they closed the UK office. SEVEN originally had its own Japan office and offices in 
China in 2007 and Russia in 2008 were opened. To summarize, SEVEN has its 
headquarter now in California, US, with regional offices in Japan, China, Finland, Italy, 
Spain, UK, and Russia.  
SEVEN Finland is now responsible for sales only in the EMEA region as well as part of 
the R&D, which is split between US, Finland, and China. Although initially, it felt like 
a loss for the Smartner employees, who could have taken the world independently, as of 
2010, the original Smartner and SEVEN has been fully integrated, and there is no split 
between the two original firms. Integrating the firm culture is often raised as a critical 
issue in mergers and acquisitions, but in the SEVEN and Smartner case, it seemed to 
have went well. “There is no Smartner anymore so, in the last five years, it is fully 
integrated. There is just SEVEN.”, -Salorinne. 
Survival Crises and Other Challenges 
Smartner has never been really that close to going out of business, but there has been 
some times when the firm had to change their plans to avoid any crisis situation due to 
limited funding and resources.  
For example, in 2001, when there was some difficulty in getting additional funding and 
the IT bubble burst, affecting the whole mobile operator market as well, the firm 
downsized the operation temporarily, changed their plans of opening offices abroad, and 
focused all their efforts on closing international deals. “If you just looked at the cash in 
bank and what’s happening, you might have felt concerned because sometimes you 
don’t see like … a year ahead, you don’t know what the situation is going to be. But 
that’s just the way that these companies are…”, -Räisänen. 
Like with any start-up firms, if something would have gone wrong, like not getting 
additional funding, not being able to close deals, losing key personnel, etc, the firm may 
have faced the threat of going out of business. However, the firm was able to find a 
solution for every challenge they faced, the last one being, acquisition by SEVEN.  
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Table 6 summarizes Smartner/SEVEN’s development to date.  
 
Table 6. Summary table of growth phases of Smartner/SEVEN 
Phase  1. 
Introductory 
(1999-2001) 
2. Commercial 
breakthrough 
and foreign 
growth (2001-
2004) 
3. Global 
breakthrough 
and expansion 
(2004-2005) 
4. Global 
rationalization 
and maturity 
(acquisition by 
SEVEN 
Networks, 2005-) 
Key strategy  Development of 
commercially 
acceptable 
products, securing 
adequate finance, 
developing 
market, and 
receiving first 
sales revenues. 
Selling products in 
large volumes to reach 
economies of scale, 
focusing on “customer 
adoption”. Closing 
international deals in 
Europe. Acquiring 
new technology to 
improve products.  
Expanding to Asia 
and Middle East. 
Trying to secure 
resources for 
accelerated 
growth.  
To be the world’s 
leading provider of 
integrated mobile 
platform for wireless 
operators and device 
manufacturers. 
Integrating Smartner 
and SEVEN. 
Growth of 
the size of 
the firm 
(sales, 
employees)  
Sales: 0.41 MEur. 
Sales-wise, 
categorized as 
micro firm.  
 
Employees: grew 
from 4 to 53. 
Employee-wise,  
categorized as 
medium firm.  
Sales: Peak in 2002 
with 1.59 MEur and in 
2004, 1.37 MEur.  
Sales-wise, micro 
firm.  
Employees: 
Decreased from 53 to 
34. Employee-wise, 
small firm.  
Sales: 1.37 MEur 
in 2004, 6.5 MEur 
in 2005, moved 
from micro to 
small firm.  
 
Employees: 41, 
categorized as 
small firm.  
Part of SEVEN.    
The Finnish office 
employed 86 
employees and sales 
revenue was 8.74 
MEur in 2008. Sales-
wise, categorized as 
small firm, employee-
wise, categorized as 
medium firm.  
Global 
expansion 
(markets, 
share) 
Concentrated on 
Finland for first 2 
years and 
internationalizatio
n degree 70% in 
2001.     
Internationalization 
degree: 45-90%. 
Closing deals in Italy, 
Switzerland, Ireland, 
UK, and Spain.  
Globalization degree: 
0%. 
Internationalizatio
n degree: 98%. 
Globalization 
degree: 38%. 
As part of SEVEN, 
the Finnish office is 
responsible now only 
for EMEA.   
Operation 
mode and 
networks 
Agent hired in 
Spain, later a 
larger sales 
subsidiary, mainly 
operating in 
NIMOS mode.  
Some partnerships 
s with system 
integrators and 
software/hardware 
vendors starts.  
UK office, sales 
subsidiary in France, 
temp reps in 
Germany, Sweden, 
and Taiwan.   
Strategic partnerships 
and distribution 
cooperation with 
various partners 
including Nokia, IBM, 
HP, and Ericsson.  
Additional office 
opened in 
Singapore in 2005.   
 
Other offices and 
cooperation 
continue from the 
previous phase.  
The Finnish office is a 
subsidiary of SEVEN, 
headquartered in 
California, US.  
Offices in France, 
Sweden, Taiwan, and 
UK closed.   
SEVEN now has 
regional offices in 
Japan, China, Finland, 
Italy, Spain, UK, and 
Russia.  
Products Changed product 
concept several 
times until 
eventually 
Acquisition of “push” 
technology and 
focusing on push 
mobile email, 
Focus on push 
mobile email and 
providing know-
how to operators 
Focusing on 
integrating Smartner 
and SEVEN products. 
Sells systems, 
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focusing on 
mobile email 
product.  
Smartner Duality.  for customer 
adoption.   
products, know-how, 
and services.    
Organization
al Structure 
Systems, 
structures, and 
formality are 
almost non-
existent with 
informal 
communication.  
Slowly adopting more 
functional, formal 
structures. Formal 
communication and 
business processes 
supported by IT 
systems.  
Formal structure 
and processes in 
place with good 
software 
development 
processes. 
Bureaucratic 
principles, formal 
structure with 
standardized rules and 
procedures according 
to SEVEN’s 
guidelines.  
Survival 
crisis in end 
of phase  
The 2nd financing 
round smaller and 
industry growth 
slower than 
expected, thus 
needed to 
downsize the 
organization and 
re-focus their 
priorities.  
There was no crisis as 
such but just saw the 
need to expand to 
other continents.  
In need of more 
resources to 
maintain the 
growth.  
None (Out of the 
scope of this study).   
 
 
4.3.3 Factors Influencing the Growth and Survival of Smartner 
Industry Development Since Establishment 
At the time of Smartner’s establishment in the late 1990’s, the mobile industry was 
starting to emerge with the support for WAP2 for the first mobile phones in 1999. At 
that time, Finland already had a 63% penetration rate of mobile phones (Statistics 
Finland, 2008) but the value-added services offered by operators were still extremely 
immature, providing abundant opportunities for new technology firms to develop 
various applications for enterprise mobile users. Smartner was entering a niche market, 
where there was very little competition. “We were early in the market.”, -Räisänen. 
It is difficult to say exactly what has been the industry growth rate over the years due to 
the way the market reports are compiled but it was slower than expected in the earlier 
years, which played in advantage to Smartner, as they then had the time to develop new 
products and move on from being just a “push mobile email provider”. During the past 
few years, the industry has been growing almost 100% per year, making the push email 
commoditized as a basic feature in almost any type of handsets.  
                                                           
2  Wireless Application Protocol 
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The bursting of the IT bubble had a major effect on the growth and survival of the firm. 
After 2001, venture capitalists were not investing anymore into risky new mobile 
businesses and the whole mobile business went down. In a way though, this quiet time 
also had a positive effect for the firm. While operators were not buying, they 
concentrated on improving their product by acquiring Commtag who had the “push” 
mobile email technology, and prepared for the time when operators would start buying 
again. This time period also helped Smartner by shaking out some weaker competitors 
from the market, who were not able to survive the cold economical climate.  
Consumer needs across countries have been relatively similar throughout the years,. 
Within the developed countries in North America, Europe, and Asia, consumers have 
wanted to communicate more and more with their mobile handsets, and as long as the 
consumers were educated and had the money for such services, the needs and wants of 
those consumers were the same – being able to communicate easily through email with 
handsets. When looking at Smartner’s direct customers who were usually the operators, 
the US market was different, especially from Europe.  
In the earlier years, there were a couple of competitors including LPG Innovation in 
Finland, which closed their business in 2002. Microsoft and IBM, who were also 
developing their own mobile email products were also considered as competitors at that 
time. During the commercial breakthrough and foreign expansion phase, the Canadian 
firm Research in Motion (RIM) had a huge influence on Smartner. After 2003, with the 
“push” mobile email product, Smartner started seeing active competition. The biggest 
competitors were SEVEN (although the markets were not overlapping) and Visto (US, 
nowadays called Good Technology). There were also many other smaller competitors 
but the industry had started seeing active consolidation since 2003 at the same time as 
when Smartner acquired Commtag. As such, there are only a handful of firms that 
Smartner/SEVEN considers as serious competitors now.  
Smartner/SEVEN did not experience any trade barriers. 
Development of Most Critical Resources and Capabilities Since Establishment 
Resource Amount 
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The most important resource for Smartner has been its people, and having the “right”, 
and “skilled” people. During the introductory and commercial breakthrough phases, it 
was extremely important to have skilled engineers developing their products. The 
engineering team was able to develop a new, unique product at the beginning, which 
attracted initial operator customers, but then when they acquired Commtag, the same 
engineers were able to quickly integrate the acquired technology into their existing 
products. Skilled and “smart” people were also important when it came to selling the 
product. “What we really need is skillful people….. expertise, getting the right 
persons……Skilled people in technology and skilled people in farming the operators. 
That’s basically it…”, -Salorinne. 
The accumulated knowledge and experience of the people at Smartner/SEVEN has also 
been extremely important. Many of the employees still working for SEVEN has seen 
the mobile phones since 1999 and understand how all the mobile phones work and how 
their products work against that. This accumulated knowledge and experience is 
something that is irreplaceable.  
Financial resources have also been extremely important for Smartner. One of the 
problems was that revenue always came in delays, and the firm still had to continue 
with product development and somehow cover all the costs. Thus, getting external 
funding has obviously helped Smartner to grow and survive but quite often, it has been 
limited, which has caused the growth to slow down at times, also affecting survival. The 
effect of the limitation in financial resources is most evident in 2005 when Smartner 
made a decision to sell their firm to SEVEN. Smartner needed additional funding to 
grow and survive, but venture capitalists and governmental organizations such as 
TEKES were not helping. Their option then was to grow by working together with 
another firm that had the vast financial resources and access to the US market where 
they had not entered yet. “We were starting to be really tight on resources…because we 
were growing all the time in 2004 and 2005 so I mean, we wouldn’t have been able to 
support that operation very well with those resources.”, -Räisänen. 
In 2005, SEVEN Finland’s (original Smartner) revenue jumps up. In hindsight, they 
could have grown without being acquired by SEVEN if only they had gotten external 
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funding, as the sales figure does not come from additional sales in US but mainly from 
Europe and Asia Pacific, which has been the focus of Smartner. 
Managerial and International Experience 
The two main founders, Räisänen and Uusitalo, had worked abroad as a trainee for a 
couple of months for other firms while they were still studying, but did not have any 
earlier experience as an entrepreneur or in international business. The two additional 
members they immediately hired during the establishment year, Ari Backholm (CFO) 
and Robert Rasmus (CEO), did not have so much international experience either, 
although they were experienced professional in their field of specialties.  
Capabilities (Substantive, dynamic, and networking) 
Substantive Capabilities 
Amongst the substantive capabilities, technological capabilities have been the most 
important for Smartner. From the beginning, they were representing a new, leading edge 
technology in the market, and their technical excellence has been a differentiating factor 
from their competing solutions. Also, it allowed them to merge Smartner’s and 
Commtag’s products into one new product within just a couple of months after 
Smartner acquired Commtag in 2003 (Räisänen, 2009).  
Although the importance of marketing varied from time to time, Smartner’s capability 
in PR and marketing was also important, especially during the earlier phases of the firm 
growth. Even though they had such limited resources, they were successful in 
increasing awareness of their products and getting on the radar of important players in 
the market, such as industry analysts and the media. Smartner/SEVEN did not need a 
big team of marketing professionals, as they were in the B-to-B business, but it was 
important to be able to reach specific people in the operators to make them understand 
the value of their offering.  
Smartner’s capability in management was close to non-existent in the earlier years but 
after they hired experienced managers into the firm, they believe they excelled in it. The 
core management team was able to often assess the changes in the market environment 
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and swiftly make critical decisions. “I think the founding team plus especially the Head 
of Engineering, I think that core management team, the way that we made the decisions 
in the early years, that was probably the most important thing.”, -Räisänen. 
Dynamic Capabilities 
Smartner has been able to adapt to the rapid changes in the environment and as such, 
possessed dynamic capabilities. For example, when the IT bubble burst and the firm had 
a difficulty closing financing rounds, they were able to quickly make a decision to 
change their plans of opening new offices abroad. They were able to react quickly 
enough to the situation where there were lower-than-expected customer demand and 
limited financing. “One capability is the ability to change the organization and change 
resource combinations according to the situation so that’s clearly something we did 
pretty well.”, -Räisänen.  
Networking Capabilities 
Smartner considered networking capabilities to be extremely important for both growth 
and survival. From the beginning, they relied on their personal connection and network. 
Since the two original founders were inexperienced when it came to business 
experience, they asked advice from various contacts on how to start a firm and other 
general issues regarding the software industry. Since the firm also acknowledged the 
importance of skilled human resources, they leveraged their broad personal network of 
engineering students at the Aalto University School of Science and Technology to hire 
those newly graduates who already had gained some work experience (Räisänen, 2009).  
Smartner also actively partnered with other firms in various forms. For example, 
partnering with firms such as HP, Nokia, and IBM not only gave cheaper marketing 
opportunities for Smartner, but it also gave them access to their operator contacts in 
local markets. Partnership with IBM was especially important during the introductory 
and commercial breakthrough phase when they provided Smartner their local workforce 
and it was also easier to close deals with new customers thanks to IBM’s respected 
brand. Partnerships with resellers such as Fujitsu and Ericsson were also extremely 
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important as they brought in significant amount of new customers. Partnerships with 
handset manufacturers were critical after 2003 when they were selling the “push” 
mobile email product because they needed to install a client software onto the handsets. 
For example, strategic partnership with Nokia allowed Smartner to have access to their 
handsets in order to have in-depth understanding of how mobile phones work. These 
types of partnerships allowed Smartner to develop their product in sync with the release 
schedules of new handsets, so that operators would have working “push” email client 
available immediately when the handsets were launched in the operator’s market.  
Maintaining a close relationship with key operator customers was critical for Smartner’s 
growth, since the recurring revenue would come from operators being successful in 
selling Smartner products to the actual end users, and not just from selling the 
platform/product license to the operators. “One of our challenges was … how to have 
enough resources to handle the relationships with customers.”, -Räisänen. 
Government Support 
Smartner received funding from TEKES for their product development in 2000, 1 
million FIM (approx. 168.000 EUR) as a grant and 1 million FIM as a capital loan 
(Smartner, November 13, 2000). Smartner has also received funding from Sitra3, the 
Finnish National Fund for Research and Development, in 2000 (Smartner, April 26, 
2000), 2001 (Smartner, September 5, 2001), and 2003 (Smartner, May 22, 2003). 
Entrepreneurial Orientation and Lateral Rigidity 
Smartner’s entrepreneurial orientation and lateral rigidity has been rather consistent 
during its existence, experimenting with new initiatives and taking quite a lot of risks 
throughout. That was the only thing that could do, to be spontaneous and try everything 
out, as they were so inexperienced in most of the business issues, even after getting 
                                                           
3 Finnish National Fund for Research and Development, is a leading governmental fund dedicated to 
promising early stage technology investments. Sitra is a shareholder in about one hundred different 
technology enterprises. Sitra invests primarily in the Finnish start-ups but also to international venture-
capital funds concentrating on the high-tech field. 
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professional managers on board. Instead of merely trying to meet customer requests and 
expectations, the key staff often questions whether their requests are smart, and whether 
there could be other ways of implementing things and improving the products. 
“Questioning… is the beginning of the innovation process.”, -Salorinne. They have also 
had an attitude of tolerating failures really well and wanted to learn from their mistakes, 
if there would have been any.  
Smartner has at times been alert to emerging opportunities and aggressively pursued 
those new initiatives. However, they often did not have enough financial and human 
resources to pursue them. They had to prioritize which opportunities are worth taking 
and focus on those activities.  
In the earlier years, Smartner actually created a new market for mobile email products. 
They had in-depth discussions with operators, system integrators, and other important 
players in the mobile market, and analyzed what would be an attractive new product for 
them and started educating the market what their products could bring to their handsets. 
In the later years since 2003, Smartner/SEVEN constantly analyzed the current market 
opportunities and tried to predict the future development.  
After the acquisition by SEVEN in 2005, the original Smartner office in Finland has 
become more conservative due to less leeway in trying new initiatives spontaneously. 
This is quite natural, given that the headquarter is now in the US and the chain of 
command to get acceptance to try new things is bigger than before. However, the 
current SEVEN believes that unless the firm takes risks and do new things, their growth 
would be limited and lose to competitors. So as SEVEN as a whole, they are still 
constantly trying new things and taking risks. “It’s a mandatory thing…you need to be 
aggressive and constantly take risk. Otherwise, you’re too slow and you get either too 
far behind...”, -Salorinne. 
Regarding the firm culture, as a start-up firm during the earlier years, there were no 
standard operating procedures for selling internationally, and hierarchy was very flat, 
allowing informal communication and entrepreneurial atmosphere. Everyone knew each 
other well because it was a small team. After the acquisition, the decision-making 
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function has moved to the US headquarter and since the firm is much bigger than 
earlier, there are more hierarchy and bureaucracy that comes with being a large firm. 
However, within the Finnish office, which used to be “Smartner”, it is still a flat 
organization and as little bureaucracy as possible. One challenge that the firm has faced 
after the acquisition is for the firm to culturally merge, in terms of how the business is 
done in different markets. It has sometimes been difficult for the Finnish office to make 
the headquarter US office to understand how business is done in Europe and Russia.  
 
Software Business Specific Factors 
Compatibility with Major Players 
Being compatible with major players in the market and making the decisions which 
platform to support is critical to Smartner/SEVEN for both growth and survival, but at 
times could negatively impact their growth. Compatibility became especially important 
after 2003 when they started to do “push” mobile email product, which came with a 
client software that needed to be installed on the end users’ mobile handsets. The client 
software has to be compatible with the many different kinds of handsets that are 
available in the market; otherwise, operators would not be interested in supporting this 
kind of service.  
Smartner/SEVEN has sometimes needed to make conscious decisions on which 
handsets and mobile OS to support, as there are hundreds of different variants in the 
market. But in general, the firm has tried to support most of what is available. “One of 
our key strengths towards the operators is that we are not locked into specific vendor so 
that we would only work on Nokia handsets or only work on Samsung handsets...”, -
Salorinne. However, trying to support so many handsets becomes extremely expensive 
for the firm, needing to test and adjust the product to make it work. Most of their cost 
comes from developing different client software that supports different versions of the 
mobile OSes such as Symbian, Windows Mobile, Android, Maemo, and so on. As such, 
being compatible with major players is a condition for their business, but it may hinder 
 121 
growth, as they have to spend a lot of time and resources into making sure that their 
product is compatible.  
Lock-in Effect 
Lock-in effect is critical for Smarter/SEVEN for both growth and survival, especially 
during the introductory and commercial breakthrough phases, just when you are still the 
early players in the market with niche products. Once an operator customer has chosen 
their system and have integrated it into their sales and have gotten enough end-user 
customers, they would rather buy add-ons from the same vendor than switch to another 
vendor.  
However, lock-in effect does not necessarily happen just by getting the products sold to 
the operator customers. Unique value offering compared to competitors and extensive 
after-sales service are what guarantees whether there would be any lock-in effect. The 
firm must cultivate their relationship with the operators over time, and train and work 
with them so that the product will actually get adopted and used by the end user 
customers. The firm also stressed that the customers should not feel that they are being 
tied down too much and lock-in should be subtle, seemingly leaving options for the 
customers to change vendors in order to create trust. “I think the lock-in effects becomes 
automatically if you are successful since then switching your end customers from one 
system to another becomes quite painful.”, -Salorinne. 
Software Development Process 
Smartner had considered software development process to be an important element 
from the beginning and as such, put efforts into having a proper software processes 
from the introductory phase. “The processes is important maybe first and foremost 
because it enables you to do new stuff so that you actually don’t get stuck into 
maintaining stuff that is done in a stupid way and end up using your resources with that. 
So that's maybe one of the most important things of having a proper software process.”, 
-Salorinne. 
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The software development process during the introductory phase was rather agile and 
flexible, allowing various changes to be done to their product strategy. Sometime after 
2003 during their commercial breakthrough phase, it became even more important that 
they have a process, which was strict and timely to support hundreds of phones that 
were in the market. The marketing of new handsets happens at the beginning when the 
new handset is launched, thus for Smartner, it was extremely important that they meet 
the schedules of how the handsets were being marketed.  
After the acquisition by SEVEN, the firm put extra efforts into integrating and creating 
one single R&D unit by, for example, sending a couple of Finnish engineering directors 
to the US office. However, it still took very long time for the newly integrated firm to 
develop the integrated product that consisted of the original Smartner and SEVEN’s 
products. During that time, the firm had to put resources to three different product lines, 
one for Smartner products, one for SEVEN products, and another one for the integrated 
new product, that it has eaten up many years of the firm’s resources, hindering growth. 
This may be because their software development process had to be integrated at the 
same time as actually trying to develop new products, causing delays and possible 
chaos. Now, SEVEN has a fully functional software development process in place 
where they are supporting approximately 100 operators. Their software development 
process is not a limiting factor for growth anymore.  
Open Source Software 
Smartner/SEVEN has used open source software in their own products to speed up the 
development. The existence of open source software has helped the firm, in a way, to 
grow faster.  
There is one open source software that could be considered as a competitor for SEVEN, 
providing price pressure. However, the firm does not consider them to be a threat to 
their business because the open source only provides the vertical solution of “push 
email” and nothing else. SEVEN’s value as a business comes from being able to 
provide to operators a whole platform, on which various types of “push” application can 
be integrated, as well as services.  
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Software Business Model and Growth Strategies 
At the beginning, Smartner consciously made a decision to build a software product 
firm because they wanted to scale and grow fast in the global market. Over the years, 
Smartner/SEVEN has had three different growth strategies. One was to enter new 
countries and continents. They expanded gradually from Finland to Europe to Asia. By 
merging with SEVEN, they were then able to expand to the US as well. There are still 
growth opportunities with the same products in other unconquered markets such as 
China and Africa. The second has been to add and sell new products that would run on 
the same platform to the existing customers. On top of the platform “System 7 Version 
7” (systems), operators can now choose to install different products, such as Mobile 
Email, Mobile IM (instant messaging), and Ping Services. In addition, SEVEN offers 
services of hosting the platform for some of their operators. The third growth strategy 
was to provide know-how to operators in getting customer adoption of the products. It 
was critical for Smartner/SEVEN to train the operators in getting the products pushed 
out to the actual end users as the recurring revenue that came from the end-users who 
subscribed to the services such as push email enabled further growth for them.  
To summarize, the firm’s revenue and growth came from selling one-time license fees 
to the operators, from providing services and maintenance, and recurring revenue from 
all the end-users who would actively use the services. The “recurring revenue model” 
typically used in Software as a Service business is something that all software firms 
crave for, and as such, even though Smartner started by providing only “software 
products”, they have entered the service arena, making them more of a hybrid firm.  
4.4 Add2Phone 
4.4.1 Firm Background and Characteristics 
Add2Phone Oy was established in 2000 and was Europe's leading technology firm in 
the mobile marketing, mCRM applications, and advertising market. They specialized in 
interactive mobile marketing, mobile customer relationship management, and mobile 
advertising solutions. They provided advanced and revenue-generating mobile 
marketing and advertising technology for mobile operators and media firms. In addition, 
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they provided turnkey mobile campaign design and implementation services for 
advertisers and brands. Their headquarter was located in Helsinki, Finland. 
In August 2008, Add2Phone was acquired by More Mobile Relations (More), 
Scandinavia’s fastest-growing mobile marketing firm owned by Telenor, the world’s 
7th largest mobile operator with operations in 12 countries. More acquired three firms 
earlier that year, Active Loop Marketing in Norway, N’volve in Denmark and 12snap-
Lokomobil in Sweden. The takeover of Add2Phone in Finland completed More’s 
Nordic constellation, allowing the firm to offer a wide range of mobile solutions for 
various customer segments throughout Scandinavia. 
Add2Phone’s sales revenue peaked in 2002 with 1.19 million euro but after that, it has 
been, on average, about 0.7 million euro per year. With regards to the number of 
employees, already during the establishment year in 2000, employee count rose from 
the initial 10 founding members to 49 at the end of the year. These 49 employees were 
divided into 27 in Helsinki, 10 in Lappeenranta, 4 in USA, 7 in Canada, and 1 in 
Germany (Add2Phone, 2001). However, during 2001 and 2002, they had to close down 
some offices including layoffs and at the end of 2002, they had 21 employees in Finland 
and 1 in Germany left. Since 2003, the employee count has been on average about 10 
(see figure 21 and 22).  
 
 
Figure 21. Add2Phone’s sales revenue growth  
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Figure 22. Add2Phone’s employee growth  
 
It was obvious to Add2Phone even before founding the firm that they were seeking to 
globalize. The reason was because most of the key founding members had been in 
international business earlier and it was their personal ambitions to make something big 
and global.   
Concerning the share of foreign sales, since Add2Phone’s first and only customer in 
2000 was Europolitan in Sweden, the internationalization degree was already 100% that 
year but has, on average, been at 60%. At the end of 2002, three years after 
establishment, the internationalization degree was 65% (of net sales, 35% was from 
Finland and 65% from other European countries). The globalization degree was 0%. At 
the end of 2005, six years after establishment, the internationalization degree was 60% 
(of net sales, 40% was from Finland, 50% from other European countries, 10% from 
outside of Europe) and the globalization degree was 10% (see figure 23).   
Although the firm had a strong global vision and strategy from inception, they did not 
fulfill the criteria of more than 25% globalization degree six years after establishment. 
Thus, Add2Phone is considered as a “Born International” firm in this study.  
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Figure 23. Add2Phone’s internationalization and globalization degree 
4.4.2 The Development of Add2Phone in Phases 
Add2Phone has gone through the first two phases 1) introductory and 2) commercial 
breakthrough & foreign growth, after which they entered a hibernation phase until More 
finally acquired them. Figure 24 provides an illustration of organizational development 
in terms of growth and foreign expansion.  
The Introductory Phase: 2000 
Jari Anttonen, who worked in Germany, and Risto Laaksonen, who worked in US were 
friends. Vesa-Matti Paananen, who worked in Finland, and Laaksonen were friends. 
These three people then came up with the idea to start some business in mobile 
advertising in September 1999.   
Soon, they involved seven more people who possessed various expertise and experience 
in all important fields such as technology, management, and international experience. 
Their strategy was to start operating globally from day one. “… that was the critical, 
that we had from day one, international operations and people in various market.”, -
Anttonen. The founding team with 10 people consisted of a person located in the US, 
Germany, Canada, and Finland, looking after sales, and others specialized in managing 
firms, running R&D, advertisement, and financing. The firm’s official activities started 
on February 8, 2000. 
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Figure 24. Main path and phases of the growth of Add2Phone 
 
The pilot sales of the firm’s first product, Smart Mobile Advertisement Server 
(SMASH), already started during 2000. The first customer was Europolitan in Sweden, 
which they got from personal contacts that the founding team had from their previous 
experiences in selling software to operators.  
During this introductory phase in 2000, the employee count rose from 10 to 49 at the 
end of the year. There was no clear crisis point while transitioning from the introductory 
phase to the next commercial breakthrough and foreign growth phase. 
Commercial Breakthrough and Foreign Growth Phase: 2001-2005 
The commercial breakthrough and foreign growth for Add2Phone started in 2001-2002 
when they sold their product in large volumes to different European countries such as 
Poland and Latvia. The first major foreign deal was done with Latvian Telecom in 
2002. They also got customers, in varying sizes, from UK, Germany, Italy, Spain, 
Lithuania, Switzerland, and Austria (Laanti, 2004). The firm also had Asian customers, 
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but they were deals made by the firm’s domestic customer Zed Oy, which had 
operations in Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines. In 2004, Add2Phone closed a 
deal with Turkcell, a mobile operator in Turkey. In 2005, they also got customers from 
United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.  
Despite their growth in the European continent, their sales in the US did not take off as 
expected. They had minor deals in the US in 2001, but not anymore in 2002. They were 
not able to be a “global” firm as they sought out at the beginning. Eventually, towards 
the end of 2002, Add2Phone had to make a critical decision of shutting down their US 
and Canadian operations and changing their business plan completely from what it was 
originally. “In 2000, July, August, September, we kind of started to fly, and then we 
realized that it's not going to fly. And very quickly, we were able to do a decision to shut 
down North America. And still …. the costs were millions.”, -Paananen. 
As such, Add2Phone did not reach the “global breakthrough and expansion” and 
“global rationalization and maturity” phases suggested in Gabrielsson & Gabrielsson 
(2009)’s theoretical framework. Instead, they entered a hibernation phase around 2003.  
Hibernation Phase: 2003-2008 
When Add2Phone realized that they were too early in the market, they started to 
hibernate in 2003. Instead of proactively looking for new customers, they became 
reactive, mainly concentrating on taking good care of the existing customers. This was 
needed to survive through the times when the mobile marketing industry was still 
immature and not developing as fast as expected.  
Acquisition by More Mobile Relations: 2008- 
In 2007, Telenor, the world’s 7th largest mobile operator decided to start a mobile 
marketing business firm “More Mobile Relations” and acquired three firms in Norway, 
Denmark, and Sweden. The firm they acquired in Sweden was 12snap-Lokomobil who 
happened to be a customer of Add2Phone. 12snap-Lokomobil gave tips to Telenor 
about Add2Phone as they were looking for a good technology firm. Telenor contacted 
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Add2Phone to start a discussion during autumn 2007 which led to the acquisition in 
August 2008.  
The contact for possible acquisition from Telenor couldn’t have come at a better timing. 
Add2Phone was looking to start fresh again, in proactive and aggressive mode. And for 
that, they needed funding. However, venture capitalists were not eager to invest into 
Add2Phone, as they had made losses from earlier investments. The firm also preferred 
to look for another type of new owner, who not only brings in the money, but also 
expertise and knowledge related to the mobile marketing industry. In that sense, Telenor 
was a perfect fit for Add2Phone’s future.   
For a couple of years after the acquisition, Add2Phone’s brand was kept alive, as it still 
generated some traffic and contacts. All of Add2Phone’s products still exist today under 
the “MORE” umbrella brand, so the “MORE Platform” consists of Add2Phone’s 
SMASH, mCMS, and MAMA modules.  
More is now the fastest-growing mobile marketing firm and targets to be the market 
leader in Scandinavia. Although Add2Phone’s original vision was to be a global leader, 
they are now starting fresh again as part of More, trying to build a strong foothold 
within the Scandinavian market.  
Survival Crises and Other Challenges 
Add2Phone has been at a risk of going out of business back in 2001. The market was 
not growing as fast as it was expected and venture capitalists were not investing 
anymore, but the firm still had a lot of overhead in foreign countries that needed to be 
covered. The burn rate was clearly too high and the revenue it was generating was too 
low to cover it. “The burn rate was so huge.…. if you have people cost, and your 
revenue not coming in, you don't have to be a mathematician to understand this 
equation. So, burn rate, that was the biggest burden.”, -Paananen. 
In the face of survival crisis, Add2Phone management made a fast decision to close 
down all operations in foreign countries. By reducing the burn rate quickly, the firm 
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was able to continue its core business from Helsinki with the income that they were still 
getting from existing customers.  
Table 7 summarizes Add2Phone’s development to date.  
Table 7. Summary table of growth phases of Add2Phone. 
Phase  1. Introductory 
(2000) 
2. Commercial 
breakthrough and 
foreign growth 
(2001-2005) 
3. Hibernation 
Phase (2003-
2008) 
4. Acquisition 
by More 
Mobile 
Relations 
(2008-) 
Key strategy  Development of 
commercially 
acceptable products, 
securing adequate 
finance, developing 
market, and 
receiving first sales 
revenues. 
Selling products in large 
volumes to reach 
economies of scale. 
Eventually, re-
strategizing and closing 
down offices to survive 
the turbulent times in 
the market.  
Maintaining existing 
relationships with 
current customers 
but being reactive 
and conservative to 
survive. Still, trying 
to innovate with new 
offerings.  
To be the leader in 
providing mobile 
marketing services 
within the Nordic 
region as part of 
More Mobile 
Relations.  
Growth of the 
size of the firm 
(sales, 
employees)  
Sales: 0.04 MEur. 
Sales-wise, 
categorized as micro 
firm.  
Employees: grew 
from 10 to 49. 
Employee-wise,  
categorized as small 
firm.  
Sales: Peak in 2002 
with 1.19 MEur. Sales-
wise, categorized as 
micro firm.  
Employees: Decreased 
from 50 to 10. 
Employee-wise, 
categorized as small 
firm.  
Sales: Fluctuating 
between 0.5 and 0.9 
MEur. Sales-wise, 
categorized as micro 
firm.  
 
Employees: 10, 
categorized as small 
firm.  
Part of More 
Mobile Relations.   
 
The whole More 
Mobile Relations 
group employs 45 
people in 2009.  
Global 
expansion 
(markets, 
share) 
The intention was 
immediately global, 
but reality was 
100% international, 
with sales revenue 
from Sweden.    
Internationalization 
degree: between 50 –
65%. 
Globalization degree: 
10%. 
Internationalization 
degree: 60%. 
Globalization 
degree: 10%. 
Focused in Nordic 
region.  
Operation 
mode and 
networks 
Sales subsidiaries  
opened in US and 
Germany, and R&D 
unit in Canada 
(DIMOS).   
Rep office opened in 
UK in 2001. In 2003, all 
offices in US, Germany, 
Canada, and UK closed.  
Strategic partnerships 
and distribution 
cooperation with 
various partners. 
Mainly NIMOS and 
cooperating with 
partners, similar to 
the end of the 
previous phase.  
Working together 
with other offices 
in the More group, 
including 
Denmark, Sweden, 
and Norway.  
Still utilizing 
partnerships.  
Products Focused on one 
product. Also used 
Software as a 
Service (SaaS) 
model for the first 
customer in order to 
test the pilot product 
themselves.  
New product Presence 
Gate released. More or 
less focused on selling 
standardized software 
products.  
Expanding to SaaS 
model, which 
requires more 
knowledge of the 
local market for 
advertising content 
creation. Releases 2 
new products.  
Focused on SaaS, 
providing mobile 
marketing services 
within the Nordic 
region.   
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Organizational 
Structure 
Systems, structures, 
and formality are 
almost non-existent 
with informal 
communication.  
Slowly adopting more 
functional, formal 
structures. 
Decentralized structure, 
more responsibility 
given to the managers in 
each field. Formal 
communication and 
business processes 
supported by IT 
systems.  
Formal structure and 
processes in place 
with good software 
development 
processes. 
Bureaucratic 
principles, formal 
structure with 
standardized rules 
and procedures 
according to 
More’s guidelines. 
Centralization and 
decentralization 
balanced.  
Survival crisis 
in end of phase  
None.  The firm realized that 
the market is not 
growing as fast as 
expected, and needed to 
close down operations 
in foreign countries to 
survive.   
In need of funding 
in order to get back 
to the growth path.  
N/A   
 
4.4.3 Factors Influencing the Growth and Survival of Add2Phone 
Industry Development Since Establishment 
The mobile marketing industry was so new that nobody knew what was the growth rate 
in the earlier years of Add2Phone’s existence. It was assumed that it would grow 
rapidly but the growth was very moderate, about 10% per year. Finally, during the last 
two years, the market has been growing very rapidly, close to 50% per year, as usage of 
mobile Internet has been increasing.  
The bursting of the IT bubble had a major effect on the growth and survival of the firm. 
After 2001, venture capitalists were not investing anymore into risky new mobile 
businesses and the whole mobile business went down. “It went so bad, the situation, 
that the existence of the company was in question.”, -Anttonen. The mobile marketing 
business was not picking up as fast as expected either. Europe was slowly starting to 
mature but US was very slow. The firm was in a new market five to six years too early.  
One reason that the mobile marketing business did not pick up as fast as expected was 
because within the whole mobile business, Add2Phone was in the “mobile marketing” 
niche, which meant that they had to deal with advertising and media agencies. The firm 
underestimated how these advertising agencies can be lagers and not pioneers when it 
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came to adopting anything “new”. It took some time for these agencies and operators to 
finally understand that mobile marketing can be the next hype for their business. 
Customers’ basic needs across countries, from the technical aspect, have been relatively 
similar. However, there has been a need to, for example, adapt to local language for the 
marketing content.  
The competition in the industry has been growing during the last couple of years when 
the mobile marketing business started to get adopted. For example, Admob owned by 
Google in the US and Yoc in Germany are their bigger competitors. The competition 
from the US is especially tough since they have the advantage of getting the critical 
mass in their big home market, which makes it easier for them to expand their business 
globally. The competition is also consolidating to few big players, such as the case 
where Google acquired Admob in November 2009. There have also been similar 
acquisitions by AOL, Microsoft, Yahoo, and Apple (Google, 2009).  
There has not been any trade barriers in the industry.  
Development of Most Critical Resources and Capabilities Since Establishment 
Resource Amount 
One of the most important intangible resources was the experience of the people the 
firm employed. Especially the experience in international business and sales as well as 
excellent engineering skills that their employee possessed were essential. As Paananen 
put it, “We had a real dream team.”, “Software business is very people driven business. 
So the talent.. One coder, if you have one good coder, he can beat easily 10 to 20 
guys.”, -Paananen. 
Another important resource for the firm has been financial resources and the capability 
to actually find and secure the funding. The original business plan was so extensive and 
aggressive that they really needed the funding to kick-start the business. The firm even 
had one dedicated founding member to take care of funding issues. Venture capital has 
been the most important funding source for the firm since the beginning. For example, 
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Trident Capital in the US not only brought in the needed funding but also provided 
information and knowledge when it came to various strategic options for the firm. Other 
funding sources have been Sitra, Stratos Ventures, Danske Capital, Tapiola Group, 
Head New Technologies, ABB Pension Fund, and Fides New Media (Laanti, 2004). 
One of the limitations the firm had with regards to growth was lack of knowledge and 
skill sets in the media business. Once they moved from selling their technology to 
operators, to selling solutions/services to media and advertising agencies, they lacked 
the right contacts and skill sets, and required local presence for selling their services.  
Managerial and International Experience 
Most of the ten founders had many years of experience in international business and in 
the telecommunications industry. They reported in their original business plan that the 
founding team had about 100 years of international experience altogether.  
Capabilities (Substantive, dynamic, and networking) 
Substantive Capabilities 
Amongst the substantive capabilities, Add2Phone considered technological capability to 
be important from the sense that technical engineers would be capable of adapting the 
products quickly to what the customers needed and wanted. In that sense, the firm did 
have a high competence level in technology. However, what was more important for 
them was the capability in management, which they believe they excelled in. Especially 
the CEO they got on board from the beginning had a background in running traditional 
firms as well as in finance. Being able to run the business, calculating the risks and 
costs, and making important decisions, such as closing down foreign offices early 
enough, was extremely critical for Add2Phone’s survival. “Management skills, of 
course … were critical, that we were able to see that something must be changed before 
we run out of the money.”, -Anttonen. 
On the other hand, Add2Phone did not consider marketing competence to be important 
for them. Rather, direct sales capability was emphasized as the factor for growth. The 
firm believed that sales is everything, because if you do not get sales, then the firm 
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cannot exist. Technical capabilities could somehow be solved later on, but as a start-up 
firm, they emphasized the role of sales and getting customers.  
Dynamic Capabilities 
Add2Phone has been able to adapt to the rapid changes in the environment and as such, 
possessed dynamic capabilities. When the IT bubble burst and there were no venture 
capitalists investing into the firm anymore, they quickly were able to change their 
strategic plan and shut down the foreign offices to decrease the burn rate. Being able to 
make those critical decisions and change how the firm operated enabled them to survive 
the difficult times. “We’ve gone through major changes in circumstances and the proof 
of that is that we survived and we have found our new growth plan”, -Anttonen. 
Networking Capabilities 
Add2Phone possessed an excellent networking capability and considered it extremely 
important. One of the reasons was because the founding team members were all 
experienced business managers who had a lot of working experience in other software 
and operator businesses. They brought in a vast network of connections. Many of the 
initial deals that were closed were thanks to their personal contacts and network, for 
example, as was the case with Europolitan in Sweden.  
Add2Phone also actively participated in networking opportunities, such as Hewlett-
Packard’s (HP) Bazaar program in 2003 and Nokia’s Forum Nokia Pro in 2004. HP and 
Add2Phone put together the HP MMS Bazaar Bundle, a complete set of applications 
and content from HP’s Mobile Bazaar program designed to enable mobile operators to 
launch innovative MMS end-user services easily and cost-effectively. These types of 
partnerships with major players in the market brought in new contacts to the firm and 
also helped in closing deals, as was the case with Turkcell in Turkey with HP. Since 
Add2Phone did not have local presence anymore, HP’s local presence in various 
countries helped the firm close deals faster and more reliably.  
Add2Phone also put efforts into building distribution channels so that even if they did 
not have an office of their own, their partners would be able to sell their products and 
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services locally. For example, the deal with Latvian Telecom was through a partner in 
Latvia. “We had a very strong partner network that we were building. That was our 
target, partner partner partner…..relationships are always important.”, -Paananen. 
During 2003-2007, when the firm was hibernating, they took special care in maintaining 
the relationships with their existing customers. They did not have resources to do 
proactive sales to new customers, so they made sure that their existing customers were 
well taken care of, ensuring at least some revenue from those customers during the 
difficult times.  
Government Support 
Add2Phone has received funding from TEKES over the years. For example, already 
during the first year in 2000, TEKES granted Add2Phone with financial support of 
134.550 euro for product development and 67.275 euro of loan (Add2Phone, 2001) and 
more in 2001. They were also receiving small amount of funding during 2006 and 2007.   
Entrepreneurial Orientation and Lateral Rigidity 
Add2Phone’s entrepreneurial orientation and lateral rigidity has changed during its 
history. At the very beginning when the firm came up with the business plan for the new 
start-up, they were extremely bold, risk-taking, and proactive, already having 10 
members as the founding team and hiring up to 50 employees within the same year.  
They were not necessarily aggressive in pursuing initiatives ever since 2003. When the 
IT bubble burst, and the mobile market did not grow as fast as expected, the firm had to 
become conservative and reactive, mainly concentrating on surviving the difficult times 
by getting enough income to cover the basic costs, until the market would recover. 
However, within the limited framework even during the hibernating phase, Add2Phone 
encouraged themselves to innovate, and came up with new products such as the MAMA 
(Mobile Advertisement Management for Agencies). They did not lose the 
entrepreneurial spirit and pushed themselves to come up with new ideas and had a very 
opportunistic attitude.  
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At the beginning of Add2Phone’s history, the firm certainly tried to create a new market 
whereby sending marketing messages and advertisements to mobile phones would 
become a new trend. However, the mobile market and the operator environment did not 
grow as fast as expected and so the firm had started too early in an extremely immature 
market. From 2003 onwards, the firm tried to predict future development by analyzing 
current market opportunities instead of taking risks and doing something entirely new, 
as they just did not have the time nor resources for that.  
Add2Phone had a very flat organization at the beginning but as the firm started rapid 
growth during the establishment year, they had to quickly create some formal 
procedures and processes. They experienced some growing pain during that time, as 
fundamental changes were implemented to grow from a 10 person firm to 50 person 
firm, needing more formal communication channels. Since 2003 as the employee count 
decreased, it became a more flat firm with very little hierarchy. There has been a good 
mixture of formal and informal communication, facilitating cooperation amongst co-
workers. 
In one way, Add2Phone can be considered an agile firm, since they were able to make 
drastic changes in their business strategy and operation modes with their dynamic 
capabilities. However, from another perspective, the firm considers that they may have 
been a little bit rigid as well. When they realized that the mobile marketing industry was 
not growing as fast as expected, they could have completely changed their direction by 
dropping the product they were focused on, and instead developing something totally 
different. However, the firm stuck to and focused on doing mobile marketing business, 
waiting every year that the industry growth would pick up. This rigidity may have 
hindered the growth of the firm.  
Software Business Specific Factors 
Compatibility with Major Players 
Being compatible with major players in the market was critical to Add2Phone for both 
growth and survival. It was a condition for business. Unless their software was able to 
interface with various things, they would not have been able to stay in business. As long 
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as the target mobile phone was used within the GSM network and was able to receive 
SMS or MMS, their products worked. 
Lock-in Effect 
Lock-in effect is critical to Add2Phone for both growth and survival, especially during 
the introductory and commercial breakthrough phases, just when you are still the early 
players in the market with niche products. Once the customer has chosen Add2Phone’s 
product, it is difficult for customers to change to another vendor. It can also mean that if 
the potential customer has chosen another vendor over you already, it is difficult to get 
that potential customer to be your own customer.  
However, lock-in effect does not necessarily happen just by getting the products sold to 
the customers nor from technical restrictions. Unique value offering compared to 
competitors, long-term customer relationship management, and extensive after-sales 
service is what guarantees whether there would be any lock-in effect. The firm also 
stressed that the customers should not feel that they are being tied down too much and 
lock-in should be subtle, seemingly leaving options for the customers to change vendors 
in order to create trust. “… it has to be transparent also…. if customers think that you're 
fooling around with them, it will turn back to you.”, -Paananen. 
Software Development Process 
Add2Phone had considered software development process to be an important element 
from the beginning and as such, had already one person looking after the R&D 
processes from day one of the firm, even if it was not yet clearly written down as a 
process. At the very beginning of the introductory phase, when there were only a few 
engineers working, communication paths were as short as possible, and freedom and 
informal communication made it possible for them to develop products in a very fast 
and agile way. However, as the firm rapidly grew, they felt the pain of a growing firm 
and needed to implement more formal processes. “Company growing from, let's say, 
from 12 people to 40, 50 people, that's the most challenging. When you are bigger than 
50, 40, you don't know all the people….. you have to have processes.”, -Paananen. 
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Add2Phone believes that their software development process was good, especially since 
they had hired a dedicated person for that from the very beginning. Having a good 
process enabled the firm to minimize their risks with product development, quality, and 
delivery schedules. Having a good software development process in place helped the 
firm to prepare themselves for growth and survival.  
Open Source Software 
In the past, Add2Phone has used open source software in its own products to speed up 
the development. Also, Add2Phone was so early in the niche market that there were no 
competitors developing the same products with open source software. Even if there was, 
operators would not have adopted free software in their data centers, so it would not 
have been a threat to the firm’s business.  
In the future, even if there would be an open source software providing similar offering 
as their software products, the firm does not believe that they would be a threat to their 
business, because usually, free versions are limited in features. In addition, the firm now 
puts more efforts into selling services on top of the software products, and that will be 
where the revenue would be coming more in the future. Instead of treating open source 
free software as a threat, they are ready to use that free software even within their own 
software if it would help in speeding up their own software development.  
Software Business Model and Growth Strategies 
When selling software, the only way to scale is by selling software products. That is 
why Add2Phone started out as a software product firm. However, there was a limit to 
growth for Add2Phone if they would have just continued selling only software products. 
In order for them to grow, they would have had to come up with new products 
constantly. “… typical shrinkwrap product, you sell it once ….. you provide maybe 12 
months upgrade and so on…..shrinkwrap software, naturally then your options are 
maybe more limited.”, -Paananen. 
Eventually, the firm started selling solutions and services on top of the products they 
developed. So instead of just having a business model of delivering the ready-made 
mobile marketing software to customers’ premises, they used those products in their 
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own premises and ran the mobile marketing campaign services on behalf of customers. 
In this way, they were able to receive recurring revenue from the services instead of 
one-time revenue by selling the products.  
The tricky part, however, in being in the software service business is that you cannot 
scale so easily, you need to understand your customer’s market, and act more locally. At 
the time when Add2Phone changed their strategy from being a software product firm to 
a software service firm, they had no other offices in other foreign countries. As such, 
they could not act on their initial global vision anymore, since it would be difficult to 
provide services to distant markets. The firm could have better prepared for themselves 
in changing their business model by finding more partners who could work with them 
locally in other countries. Eventually, through some of their partners, especially in 
Europe, they were able to provide services. “Everybody knows that if you are in service 
business it's hard to scale and it's more local, so you have to focus, focus, focus more. 
But with the services business we managed to survive.”, -Paananen. 
Since the acquisition of Add2Phone, More is focused in providing mobile marketing 
services to advertisers within the Scandinavian region. Their mission is to be the service 
leader in Nordic countries, and to sell three service packages to more new customers. 
Add2Phone was initially targeting to be a global firm in software products but now has 
changed dramatically to providing software services focused in the Nordic region as 
part of the More Mobile Relations group.  
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5. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 
In the following section, cross-case analysis of the case firms’ individual case 
descriptions is presented. The cross-case analysis helps to make generalization about the 
cases. The information gathered from the interviews and literature review is compared 
after which a revised theoretical framework is presented.  
5.1 Cross-Case Analysis  
5.1.1 Born Global Characteristics 
All of the firms studied had a global vision from the outset, which is one of the 
characteristics of being a Born Global firm. Also, all firms except for Remedy had 
classified themselves as niche players operating on a global scale. The fact that they 
concentrated their efforts on a small segment has given them opportunities to become 
world leaders in their given field of business. This is in line with Laanti, et al. (2006) 
who argued that the way for small firms to grow globally is to compete in the area 
where the segment is too small for MNEs and is a new niche business area.  
Table 8. Comparison of internationalization and globalization degrees 
  Internationalization Degree 
  Tectia  Remedy Smartner Add2Phone 
3rd year 56.25% 99.00% 90.00% 65.00% 
6th year 78.40% 99.00% 98.00% 60.00% 
  
  Globalization Degree 
  Tectia  Remedy Smartner Add2Phone 
3rd year 37.50% 99.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
6th year 62.50% 99.00% 38.00% 10.00% 
 
Furthermore, three out of the four case firms adhered strictly to the Born Global firm 
criteria whereby foreign sales reached 25% within three years and sales from outside the 
home continent reached 25% within six years of establishment. Unfortunately, 
Add2Phone ended up being classified as a Born International firm due to not reaching 
the globalization degree of 25% within six years but was decided to be included in this 
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study anyway, since the firm had a strong global vision at inception. Table 8 
summarizes the case firms’ internationalization and globalization degrees. 
5.1.2 Development Phases 
All four case firms entered the introductory phase at the start of its business, which 
lasted between one to two years. The introductory phase was typically quite short, since 
Born Global firms tend to aggressively pursue foreign growth from inception. After the 
introductory phase, all four case firms followed a path that was unique to its own 
history.  
Tectia and Remedy are the firms that still exist as individual business entities at the time 
of this study. Tectia went through all four phases as defined by Gabrielsson and 
Gabrielsson’s (2009b) framework but after the fourth phase, stepped back again into the 
third phase global breakthrough and expansion. On the other hand, Remedy 
Entertainment did not go through distinct phases after the introductory phase. 
Commercial breakthrough, foreign expansion, and global breakthrough happened all at 
the same time for this case firm, since the target market for their direct sales was in the 
United States. Selling in large volumes to the United States meant that the firm went 
through all those phases at once.  
Smartner and Add2Phone ended their independent history by being acquired by other 
firms. Smartner went through all the four distinct phases but when entering the maturity 
phase, SEVEN acquired them. Being a Born International firm, Add2Phone did not 
enter the third phase of global breakthrough and expansion phase and instead entered 
the hibernation phase, and was eventually acquired by More Mobile Relations. What 
both firms have in common is that they were in crisis with regards to funding and 
needed new ways to grow. At least for these firms, acquisition seemed to have been the 
answer to future growth. This is in line with Delmar, et al.’s (2003) argument that 
acquisition growth is more likely in older and larger firms, and in mature industries. 
Figure 25 compares the growth patterns of the case firms.  
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Figure 25. Growth paths of case firms 
Out of the four case firms, Tectia was the only firm that met with a crisis, which 
triggered it to proceed to the next developmental phase. Other firms did not necessarily 
always have a crisis point when transitioning from one phase to the other. Tectia was 
the only case firm that clearly had crisis points related to managerial issues, such as the 
founder facing burn out or not having competent management team members. All other 
crisis points faced by the case firms were related to limited funding and financial 
burden.  
Regarding the foreign operation mode development, all four case firms started 
immediately exporting their products abroad (NIMOS4). Due to the nature of software 
products, firms can sell their products easily, whether in the form of technology or as 
licenses. Only Add2Phone skipped the NIMOS stage, since they had offices in various 
                                                           
4 NIMOS= Non-direct Investment Marketing Operations 
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countries already from the start of their business. Table 9 shows the development of 
foreign operation mode for each case firm.  
Table 9. Foreign operation mode development 
Traditional NIMOS -> DIMOS5 -> NIPOS -> DIPOS6 
    
Tectia NIMOS -> DIMOS 
Remedy NIMOS 
Smartner NIMOS -> DIMOS 
Add2Phone DIMOS 
 
Tectia and Smartner continued their development by establishing sales subsidiaries in 
other countries whereas Remedy did not. This was clearly because their offerings had 
expanded to include services, which needed to be provided locally. For all three firms 
who had sales subsidiaries abroad at some point (Tectia, Smartner, and Add2Phone), 
de-internationalization was seen, whereby they had to close down foreign offices due to 
changes in strategy or crises.  
The lack of any production operation, whether direct or non-direct, can be explained by 
the fact that the need for manufacturing facilities in software business is quite rare. 
Traditional manufacturing concept could be equivalent to product development in 
software firms, which usually reside in the R&D unit in the headquarters. R&D 
activities are typically kept in Finland since capabilities in technology is one of the most 
important success factors driving these software firms to global markets.  
Regarding the development of the product offering, all four case firms were focused in 
developing a software product during the introductory phase. However, soon after, with 
the exception of Remedy, all other case firms started providing services along side their 
products. Tectia and Smartner even went into systems and eventually providing high-
tech know-how to customers. Table 10 shows the development of product offering for 
each case firm.  
                                                           
5 DIMOS= Direct Investment Marketing Operations 
6 DIPOS= Direct Investment Production Operations 
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Table 10. Development of product offering 
Tectia Products and Services -> + systems -> + know-how 
Remedy Products -> + intellectual properties 
Smartner Products -> + systems -> + services + know-how 
Add2Phone Products and Services -> Services 
 
5.1.3 Factors Influencing the Growth and Survival of Case Firms 
Industry Development Since Establishment 
The industry growth rate of the niche market where the case firms have operated in, 
have affected both the growth and survival of all the firms. Tectia grew rapidly during 
the first few phases of its history when network security was still a new trend and 
growing rapidly. The gaming industry enjoyed a very high growth rate over the years, 
which had a positive influence on Remedy’s growth and survival. For Remedy, the side 
growth in the console market also contributed to their growth and survival. On the other 
hand, for case firms Smarter and Add2Phone, which were dealing with products in the 
mobile market, the slower than expected growth of the market hindered their growth 
and also sometimes to a point where their survival was questioned. This empirical 
evidence suggests that industry growth does affect firm’s growth positively, as indicated 
by Oviatt and McDougall (1994) and Mudambi and Zahra (2007).  
In some studies, it has been found that because software plays such a key role at various 
levels of economic activity, software sales are less susceptible to economic fluctuations 
than other products (BSA, 2002). However, the IT bubble bursting back in year 2000 
had an enormous negative impact on the survival of the case firms in the B-to-B 
software business, namely to Tectia, Smartner, and Add2Phone. Many customers 
slowed down with their IT purchases and venture capitalists were not investing anymore 
into risky new businesses. On the other hand, the burst of neither the IT bubble nor the 
typical economic downturn affected Remedy, since it is believed that customers 
continue spending on entertainment especially during the gloomy depressive times. The 
generic economic downturn may affect publishers to tighten their wallets so not to 
invest into new IP titles, but since Remedy already has had publishers on their side for 
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developing new game products, this did not affect them either. Table 11 summarizes the 
industry growth of case firms.  
Table 11. Industry growth of case firms 
Company 1. Introductory 
2. Commercial 
breakthrough and 
foreign growth 
3. Global 
breakthrough 
and expansion 
4. Global 
rationalization 
and maturity 
Tectia Medium High High Low 
Remedy High High High Medium 
Smartner Low Low High Medium 
Add2Phone Low Low N/A Medium 
 
Scale: Low -> Medium -> High, based primarily on qualitative analysis 
 
Although some researchers have argued that it is better to go later into the market than 
too soon (Christensen, et al., 1998; Shepherd, 1999), some software firms seemed to 
have gained competitive advantage by being the “first one” in the given niche market. 
For a while until competitors caught up, Tectia was able to enjoy good profit by being 
the single provider of a solution. This is in line with the study by Shepherd (1999) of 
venture capitalists assessment criteria of new venture survivals. Despite the issues of 
uncertainty and lack of legitimacy facing a pioneer, venture capitalists believe the 
advantages of being early typically outweigh these initial disadvantages (Shepherd, 
1999). After the network security moved from a niche to mainstream market, Tectia 
faced tough competition, jeopardizing their leadership and affecting growth and 
survival. On the other hand, for case firms Smarter and Add2Phone, which were dealing 
with products in the mobile market, it can be said that they had entered the new market 
a little bit too early. Educating the customers and market took too much time, costs, and 
efforts, affecting the growth and survival. After the mobile business market picked up, 
the rise of competition had big impact on both Smartner and Add2Phone. Especially for 
Add2Phone, major competitions coming from the US clearly hindered their growth. 
This empirical finding is in line with Mudambi and Zahra (2007).   
One interesting finding that is worth noting is that although Smartner considered 
Blackberry’s entry into the European market initially a threat, it influenced Smartner’s 
 146 
product strategies to be changed. Blackberry played an important role in pushing and 
evolving the mobile email market forward and influenced Smartner to change their 
offerings, which contributed to the growth and survival of the firm. Thus, competition is 
not necessarily always just a threat, but can act as a catalyst to better your firm 
strategies and product offerings.  
Remedy is a case firm that is a little off from the other case examples, since they did not 
enter a niche market – rather a gaming market that was already full of competition. 
Also, they face three levels of competition; independent game developers competing for 
publishing deals, other game products in the market, and other types of entertainment 
forms. Gaming industry is indeed an extremely competitive environment and in order 
for Remedy, or any other independent game developers for that matter, to survive, they 
need to have a unique asset that makes them stand out from the rest.  
Finally, none of the case firms faced any major trade barriers. Also, for Tectia, 
Smartner, and Add2Phone, which mainly operates in the B-to-B software business, 
customer needs across countries have been relatively similar, reducing the need to 
customize their software products. Remedy, operating in B-to-C, has had to be careful 
of the cultural differences and preferences that arise from different countries, but they 
have developed only one standard game (with some local languages). Thus, the 
homogenous customer needs across countries (industry globalization drivers) seem to 
affect firms positively on growth and this can also be evidenced from Tectia whose 
growth was at times limited, due to needing to put all their R&D resources into 
customizing their products and solutions depending on the size of the customers’ 
operations.  
Development of Most Critical Resources and Capabilities Since Establishment 
Resource Amount 
The type of resource that was considered important throughout all the four case firms 
was the amount and quality of skilled human resources. This is in line with the finding 
of Cusumano (2004) and Rönkkö, et al. (2008) who suggested that competitive 
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advantage in a knowledge-intensive industry like the software business often arise from 
the skills and know-how of personnel than from other resources the firm possesses. 
Tectia’s growth, especially at the beginning of their journey, was greatly influenced by 
the existence and the amount of engineers who were capable of developing incredible 
technical products. The same can be said for Remedy, Smartner, and Add2Phone. 
Smartner’s growth and survival was positively affected by the abundance of the 
“right”, “smart”, and “skilled” people that they employed. The accumulated 
knowledge and experience of people in the company also made the human resource 
valuable and rare, being experts of how mobile phones work. Add2Phone also had a 
“dream team” that consisted of people with experience in international business and 
sales and excellent engineering skills that made it possible for them to think global from 
the start and develop unique products. Remedy considered that as a creative business, 
the value is in the people who are creative and productive. Without these people, they 
are not able to create a brand and IP to sustain their growth and survival.  
In some cases, the lack of knowledge and resources clearly affected negatively on the 
firms. For example, the lack of knowledge and resources in the VPN hardware business 
at Tectia and the lack of knowledge of the media industry at Add2Phone affected the 
firms to an extent that it hindered their growth, sometimes to a point that it questioned 
the survival of the firms.   
Another common resource that was an important factor for growth and survival for all 
case firms was financial resource. For Remedy, Smartner, and Add2Phone, financial 
resources provided (or not provided) to them by publishers or venture capitalists steered 
the direction of the firm. All three case firms have been in situation where if funding 
was cut, their survival would be at stake. Remedy did face a situation where one of the 
publishers cut funding due to delay in Remedy’s deliver schedules and so in order to 
survive, they had to run around collecting loans from banks. Add2Phone and Smarter 
actually eventually had to be acquired by other firms in order to sustain growth and 
survive when there was no funding available in the market. Tectia also considered 
financial resources to be extremely important but they were different from other case 
firms in a sense that they were almost never in trouble with shortage of cash. During the 
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earlier phases, mainly the founder Ylönen’s other firm ACR funded Tectia’s activities. 
During the growth in second and third phases before the IT bubble burst, Tectia was 
offered many types of funding from various firms including other Finnish enterprises 
and banks. Although most of the financial offers were not taken by Tectia, knowing that 
funding is available encouraged them to take more risks. Finally in December 2000, 
Tectia conducted an IPO which brought about 40 million Euros in new capital to the 
firm, securing financial resources for the upcoming years. Being the only public firm 
within the four case firms, Tectia clearly was more stable financially than others, but 
without these financial resources, the firm would not have survived through its crisis 
period in year 2001-2002.  
Managerial and International Experience 
The existence or non-existence of managerial and international experience was clearly a 
factor for growth and survival of case firms. With the exception of Add2Phone, the 
founders of other case firms did not have much previous managerial and international 
business experience. This finding supports Luostarinen and Gabrielsson’s (2006) study 
where it was found that managers of Born Global firms are young and inexperienced in 
business management and international business.  
Tatu Ylönen, the founder of Tectia, did not have any international business experience 
before establishing the firm although he had conducted research at the Helsinki 
University of Technology and had established a couple of other smaller start-up firms. 
The lack of managerial and international experience prompted Ylönen to recruit 
business managers early on. However, he regrets not hiring early enough at the point of 
establishment of the firm, as having experienced business managers on board quickly 
may have helped avoid some earlier issues with F-Secure partnerships and other 
organizational growing pains that are inherent in rapidly growing firms. The founders at 
Remedy and Smartner also did not have prior international business or managerial 
experience. In Smartner’s case, they hired two additional members immediately during 
the establishment year to compensate for the missing business experience. Although 
these two additional members (CEO and CFO) did not have extensive international 
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experience either, their prior business experience still helped the firm to avoid any 
mistakes and expand their business rapidly. Remedy was also low on stock and variety 
similar to Tectia and Smartner in terms of managerial and international experience but 
they compensated this by learning themselves extremely rapidly, thereby putting 
emphasis on the stream. 
Add2Phone was the only firm, which had all stock, variety, and stream (Reuber & 
Fischer, 1999) of managerial and international experience at the start of the firm. 
Despite the market conditions being unfavorable to them, the firm was able to survive 
through its turbulent times thanks to these managerial experiences. This finding is in 
line with Shepherd, et al’s (2000) study that survival probability of Born Globals is 
higher especially at the early growth stages if the entrepreneurs have previous 
experience, thus being able to cope with uncertainty, conflict, and confusion that tends 
to reside in growing small organizations. If the stock and variety were low, firms 
compensated by learning or by hiring already experienced managers in order to avoid 
negative impact on growth and survival. Table 12 summarizes the level of stock and 
variety of managerial and international experience that the case firms possessed during 
the introductory phase. As firms progressed through the growth phases, their experience 
accumulated, increasing the stream.  
Table 12. Comparison of managerial and international experience 
Company Stock Variety 
Tectia Low Low 
Remedy Low Low 
Smartner Medium Medium 
Add2Phone High High 
 
Scale: Low -> Medium -> High, based primarily on qualitative analysis 
 
Capabilities (Substantive, dynamic, and networking) 
 Substantive Capabilities 
All case firms possessed some type of substantive capabilities that contributed to their 
growth and survival. For Tectia and Smartner, the existence of technological 
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capabilities was the most important, contributing to their growth. Tectia’s technical 
capability to develop the world’s de facto standard Secure Shell protocol and 
Smartner’s technical capability to develop leading edge technology as well as to merge 
its own products with Commtag’s products were essential to the firms. This is in line 
with Knight and Cavusgil’s (2005) finding that technological leadership is essential for 
growth.  
Although Remedy and Add2Phone acknowledged that their technological capabilities 
was important and was contributing to their growth, they emphasized more of the 
management capabilities. Add2Phone was able to survive through its turbulent times 
thanks to their management capabilities in being able to run the business, calculating the 
risks and costs, and making important decisions quickly. Management capabilities at 
Remedy, Smartner, and Tectia were not as high level as Add2Phone, but these firms 
constantly learned and recruited people who possessed the capability.  
All case firms except Add2Phone also considered marketing capabilities to be essential 
for growth and survival. Remedy was able to create sustainable IP and brand and design 
artistic graphics that would grab the attention of game players. Also, despite limited 
resources, Smartner was able to increase awareness of their products and get on the 
radar of important players in the market, such as industry analysts and the media, via 
effective PR and marketing. For Tectia, the shortage of marketing capabilities hindered 
their growth. During the earlier phases of their development, Tectia focused too much 
on technological aspects and neglected the importance of marketing. Later on, even 
though Tectia acknowledged the importance of marketing capabilities, shortage of 
skilled marketing and sales personnel who understood both technical and marketing 
aspects clearly hindered their growth. This is in line with the national software survey 
conducted in Finland by Hietala, et al. (2004). According to the study, the most 
common problem areas in finding capable personnel were in sales and marketing, 
especially for the international markets. Also, quite often, some technical knowledge is 
required from sales and marketing personnel in software business. However, this also 
seemed to be lacking.  
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All in all, each case firm possessed some type of substantive capabilities that influenced 
them to grow and thrive, summarized in table 13.   
Table 13. Levels of different substantive capabilities. 
Company Technological Managerial Marketing 
Tectia High Medium Low 
Remedy Medium High High 
Smartner High Medium Medium 
Add2Phone Medium High Low 
 
Scale: Low -> Medium -> High, based primarily on qualitative analysis 
 
 Dynamic Capabilities 
As Born Global or Born International firms, the cases studied in this research was often 
limited in the amount of resources and at times in essential substantive capabilities 
compared to more established competitors or bigger enterprises. However, they all 
seemed to have possessed dynamic capabilities (Zott, 2003) or what some others call 
resource fungibility (Sapienza, et al., 2006) in order to grow and survive in the turbulent 
and constantly changing software business environment. Both Tectia and Remedy were 
able to reconfigure their substantive capabilities and adapt their product strategies and 
organizational structure in response to external dynamics. Without the dynamic 
capability and/or resource fungibility, they may not have been able to survive as 
independent firms during the last 15 years.  
Smartner and Add2Phone also possessed dynamic capabilities. This can be seen in both 
cases in a similar manner. First, when the IT bubble burst and there were no venture 
capitalists investing in risky businesses, they were both able to quickly change their 
strategic plans to survive the difficult times. Otherwise, they both could have easily 
gone bankrupt. Second, both made critical decisions to merge and get acquired by other 
firms in order to sustain growth for the future. Without the capability to quickly re-
strategize and adapt to the changing environment, their businesses could have stopped at 
any time.  
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Networking Capabilities 
Networking capability has been important for all case firms. For example, Tectia, 
Smartner, and Add2Phone all utilized networks and their contacts from previous work 
experience to connect with new customers. They also often utilized multiple partner 
networks to reach out to customers since conventional single channel strategy does not 
work effectively for Born Globals. This is because indirect channel middlemen are often 
reluctant to invest enough into marketing new and often unknown products of Born 
Globals (Luostarinen & Gabrielsson, 2006).  
For example, Tectia signed a reseller agreement with F-Secure at an extremely early 
stage to compensate for the missing competence in sales and marketing. This type of 
marketing and reseller agreement with an existing and larger firm reduces the “novelty 
to market”, which is concerned with the degree to which the customers are uncertain 
about the new firm and products (Shepherd, et al., 2000). This type of relationship 
provides a reduction in the financial risk associated with educating the market, and 
provides legitimacy to the customers much quicker than trying to market on your own 
(Shepherd, et al., 2000). However, as could be seen in Tectia case, relying on MNCs for 
distributing products can sometimes lead to conflicts, similarly seen in Stonesoft and 
Checkpoint case studied by Gabrielsson and Kirpalani (2004), thus extreme caution is 
needed.  
Although networking capabilities are found to be essential for all types of Born Global 
software firms, they are found especially important for software service firms, targeting 
enterprise customers, such as Tectia, Smartner, and Add2Phone. Erramilli (1990) points 
out that inseparability of production and consumption inherent in service business 
requires service firms to enter foreign markets in the form of foreign direct investment. 
Because Born Global firms tend to be limited with resources, and in order to avoid risk, 
software service firms may partner with local firms or follow domestic customers 
abroad (Coviello & Munro, 1997). Also, for mission-critical services that affects the 
basic IT infrastructure of firms, prospects will not make a deal with an unknown firm 
lacking any kind of credibility. In order to overcome the liability of newness (Zahra, 
2005), service firms may network with established MNCs. Reuber and Fischer (2005) 
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also emphasizes that in a complex business, high-status customer, who is large, 
established, and internationally recognized by name is of most importance, whereas in 
less complex business, it is not that relevant. Thus, although networking capability is 
important for all case firms, it seems it was more important for firms that entered the 
service business that is complex and targeted to enterprise customers, such as Tectia, 
Smartner, and Add2Phone, than Remedy, who simply developed game products 
targeted to individual game players as one-time sales. Table 14 summarizes the type of 
networking that was important for case firms during each phase. As can be seen, 
networking capability was important in every phase for all firms.  
Table 14. Networking in case firm growth phases.  
Company 1. Introductory 
2. Commercial 
breakthrough and 
foreign growth 
3. Global 
breakthrough and 
expansion 
4. Global 
rationalization and 
maturity 
Tectia - Distributors 
- Recruitment 
- Distributors 
- Industry 
organizations 
 - Distributors, 
resellers, VARs 
 
- Strategic 
partnerships 
 - Distributors, 
resellers, VARs 
 
- Strategic 
partnerships 
Remedy  - Publishers - Publishers 
- Freelancers 
- Publishers  
- Freelancers 
Smartner - System 
Integrators 
- Recruitment 
- Distributors 
- Strategic 
partnerships 
- Distributors 
- Strategic 
partnerships 
- Distributors 
- Strategic 
partnerships 
Add2Phone - Recruitment - Distributors 
- Strategic 
partnerships 
N/A - Distributors 
- Strategic 
partnerships 
 
Government Support 
All four case firms have received governmental support, either in the form of financial 
support or consulting and business advice. All firms received financial support from 
TEKES at least during the introductory phase, but also in the later phases. Tectia also 
received consulting services from FINPRO when entering new foreign markets. In 
addition to TEKES, Remedy received funding from Kera (nowadays Finnvera) and 
Smartner from Sitra.  
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Entrepreneurial Orientation and Lateral Rigidity 
During the earlier phases of their history, all case firms possessed high levels of 
entrepreneurial orientation, whereas as the firm continued to grow and stabilize, they all 
tended to become more conservative and less risk-taking. This is in line with the 
findings by Kuivalainen, et al. (2007) who stated that younger and smaller firms at the 
beginning of rapidly internationalizing phase may still be risk taking and proactive 
compared to the more advanced globalized firms.  
With a very high level of entrepreneurial orientation, both Tectia and Add2Phone led an 
extremely rapid growth during the earlier phases. They were proactive and risk-taking 
in various aspects. However, due to too rapid expansion of focus for Tectia and mobile 
market not growing quickly as expected for Add2Phone, both firms faced challenging 
times and survival was sometimes at stake. As they slowed down on their proactiveness, 
their growth stopped, but they were able to avoid bankruptcy. Still, even during these 
reactive times, both firms did not actually stop innovating. For example, the fact that 
Add2Phone was able to come up with new products during this phase showed to 
Telenor that the firm was a good and interesting firm. This may have led to Telenor 
making an offer for acquisition to Add2Phone, leading the firm back to the growth path 
with the new resources.  
Both Smartner and Add2Phone’s entrepreneurial orientation level went down since 
foreign firms have acquired them. This is usually unavoidable when the chain of 
command comes from elsewhere and bureaucratic principles and systems are put in 
place. This lateral rigidity in decision-making process may have slowed down their 
organic rapid growth but helped in being stable and not needing to face survival risks.  
Remedy, on the other hand, can be considered a special case. Remedy has taken the 
conservative approach and not taken new initiatives and not been proactive, at least 
during the last 10 years. If they had been more risk-taking and proactive with new 
business initiatives, it is possible that they could have grown faster. However, it has 
been their conscious decision not to grow too rapidly and to focus on what they are 
good at. On the other hand, because the firm operates in the hit-based gaming industry, 
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focusing and betting on one product at a time, they have a survival risk at any point in 
time. For example, if they put all their resources on Max Payne 1 development and it 
did not sell, they would have most likely faced survival crisis. In order to balance the 
risks, Remedy has focused all their resources on developing the best game, and avoided 
taking risks in any other new business initiatives or proposals that came along. Being 
conservative and not having too much entrepreneurial orientation has helped them to 
avoid survival crisis. Table 15 summarizes the level of entrepreneurial orientation of 
case firm during each growth phases.  
Table 15. Level of entrepreneurial orientation.  
Company 1. Introductory 
2. Commercial 
breakthrough and 
foreign growth 
3. Global 
breakthrough and 
expansion 
4. Global 
rationalization and 
maturity 
Tectia High High High Low -> Medium 
Remedy Medium Medium Low 
Smartner High High Medium Low 
Add2Phone High High Low (hibernation 
phase) 
Low 
 
Scale: Low -> Medium -> High, based primarily on qualitative analysis 
Software Business Specific Factors 
Compatibility with Major Players 
Being compatible with major players in the market is considered to be critical for both 
growth and survival for all case firms, whether the firm is developing software products 
or software services.  
Tectia, Smartner, and Add2Phone, which develop both software products and software 
services, need to be compatible with various computer operating systems as well as, for 
the latter two, with various mobile phones. Remedy, developing only software products, 
also need to be compatible with the platform the game would be running on, for 
example, PC and various consoles. Making the decision of which platforms to support is 
extremely critical for the firms. They cannot afford to support every single platform that 
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is available in the market, as it would cost too much with development and testing, but 
making a mistake in which platforms to support or not to support may also be 
detrimental to the firms. For example, Tectia has made wrong decisions in trying to 
support some platforms such as Symbian. After extensive development and testing 
phase, the product did not sell after all and they had to cancel the product. This 
experience hindered the growth of Tectia at the time, as most of the R&D resources 
were being poured into developing the product for Symbian. Remedy has also chosen to 
develop their newest game “Alan Wake” exclusively for the XBox 360 console. Five 
years ago when they made this decision, it was not yet known how well this console 
would be selling in the future. If, today, Sony Play Station 3 console would be selling 
much more than XBox 360, Remedy’s survival could have been at stake.  
Lock-in Effect 
Lock-in effect is critical for both growth and survival for the case firms doing business 
in both software products and services. Software services are usually targeted at 
enterprise customers, and professional services and customer-tailored software are 
provided on top of the product license sale. As such, once the enterprise customer has 
chosen the case firm’s products and services, it is difficult or expensive for them to 
change to another vendor frequently, securing continuous revenue stream for the case 
firms. This finding is in line with Rönkkö and Pöyry’s (2006) study.  
Although lock-in effect is critical for both growth and survival throughout the various 
phases of Tectia, Smartner, and Add2Phone’s development, it can be assumed that they 
are more critical during the introductory and commercial breakthrough phases, when the 
firms are still the early players in the market with niche products, before the competitors 
start coming in. It can then work as an entry barrier to rising competition. This finding 
is in line with Cusumano’s (2004) view.  
Unlike the case firms that provide both software products and services, Remedy does 
not experience any lock-in effect with their software game products. Game products, 
which are targeted to consumers, are typically used temporarily, until new game 
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products are purchased. As such, the only way independent game developers can create 
a similar effect is to develop sequels of the first version of the game.  
Software Development Process 
All case firms emphasized the importance of software development process and that it is 
critical for growth. Typically, during the introductory phase, all case firms’ software 
development processes were informal and highly agile, using mostly implicit 
specifications. All case firms considered the agile process to be critical in order for a 
small firm to quickly create a unique and credible product. However, as the firms 
continued to grow and expand their business, they realized the importance of stable 
development process with predictable, systematic procedures.  
All case firms have experienced a phase where unstable software development process 
affected and hindered their growth. For example, Tectia faced some challenging times 
of being reliable with their release schedules, maintaining high quality, and executing 
promised roadmaps. At some point, all R&D efforts were being put into fixing bugs and 
testing their software that they were not able to invest time into developing any new 
products. Earlier studies have found that the effectiveness of R&D and innovation 
practices is an important factor for firm survival (Karagozoglu & Lindell, 1998). 
Although Tectia acknowledged the desires and need to develop breakthrough 
technologies for new product development, the firms’ limitation in resources made it 
quite difficult to allocate resources between the existing product development and 
maintenance (bug fixes and adding new features) and new product development. This is 
also in line with some of earlier studies of high-technology based firms (Karagozoglu & 
Lindell, 1998). Since technology advances rapidly in the software industry welcoming 
new entrants constantly, it is important that management is able to allocate resources to 
new product development for long-term survival.   
Remedy also faced challenges with their software development process during their 
recent “Alan Wake” game development and admitted that they may have grown faster if 
they had had more reliable and stable software development process in place. The same 
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was said for Smartner, who faced challenges when trying to integrate their process at 
the time of acquisition by SEVEN.  
Although unstable software development process may affect growth, it was not seen to 
affect survival of the case firms as such.  
Open Source Software 
The findings related to how the existence of open source software affects growth and 
survival on the four case firms were divided. First of all, Remedy did not consider the 
existence of open source software to be a threat to their business because open source 
teams are not able to produce games that are similar to Remedy’s games, due to 
limitations in budgets. They are basically targeting completely different end users.  
Both Smartner and Add2Phone have used various open source software in their own 
products to speed up their own development. As such, the existence of the open source 
community has actually helped these case firms. Both firms do not believe that open 
source software which does similar thing as their products would be a threat to their 
business, since most open source software products would be limited in features and 
capabilities. Their enterprise customers also usually require services on top of the 
extensive features, which open source community is not able to provide reliably.  
Finally, Tectia was a special case where the existence of open source software (namely 
OpenSSH) actually affected their growth to an extreme extent in the past. The free 
version of their products hindered their growth, as many customers preferred to install 
that instead of products that would cost them. For some period of time, OpenSSH took 
away Tectia’s potential business and the firm struggled to re-position itself in the 
market to differentiate themselves from the free version. It is not until recently that the 
firm re-branded themselves, positioned themselves to target enterprise customers who 
also require extensive features and services. In addition, the firm has succeeded in 
developing many new products which the open community is not developing, as of yet.  
Software Business Model and Growth Strategies 
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Software product firms typically have the ability to grow at enormous rates by tapping a 
global mass market for packaged products, as long as they come up with a hit product. 
However, as Cusumano (2004) argues, packaged software products will encounter a 
point when the market is saturated and the growth starts to slow down or competitors 
come up with similar low-priced alternatives. Firms then have to come up with another 
hit product, which is hard to do, or learn how to manage a maturing business by 
entering the service arena for recurring revenue. If firms cannot adapt to this change 
quickly enough, their survival may be at stake.  
This is the case for Remedy who faces a limit to growth selling only software products 
and operating in a hit-based industry. Also, if they fail with one game that they have 
been developing for several years, it may affect their survival negatively. Thus, the firm 
is searching for ways to change their business model so that their growth and survival 
would not be influenced by one software product. One idea they have is to turn their 
firm into a “creator of a game-based intellectual properties” and instead of developing 
only game software, they would be franchising and licensing the right to use their IPs 
that were created for the games software.  
For the rest of the three case firms, they have all realized the growth limit of one-time 
license sales with software products. They are also all common in a way that their target 
customers are enterprise customers, who appreciate support and other consulting 
services provided by the software developers. As such, call case firms have provided 
services and also know-how to enterprise customers in exchange for recurring revenue, 
which guarantees longer-term revenue than one-time license fees. Services are typically 
provided more efficiently locally by local contacts, so all three case firms have either 
had subsidiaries in major markets or have utilized local partners extensively.  
Other Factors 
Based on the extensive interviews, there were some additional factors that were raised 
by the interviewees, which shed light on what influences growth and survival of these 
Born Global software firms. Table 16 lists the additional factors and are explained 
below.  
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Table 16. Additional factors affecting growth and survival.  
  Growth Survival 
Luck + + 
Nature of software industry + - 
Capability to Focus - + 
Low levels of growth aspirations - + 
Internationalization and localization capabilities + + 
Creativity + + 
 
+ means positive effect and – means negative effect.  
Luck 
Something which firms have no control over – “luck” – was identified as one factor that 
may have contributed to the growth and survival of some of the case firms. For 
example, the huge success of “Max Payne” game, which contributed to the growth and 
survival of Remedy may be attributed to “pure luck” and being “in right place at the 
right time”, -Reini. On the other hand, being in the wrong place at the wrong time 
influenced Add2Phone’s growth and survival, as they were in the potentially high-
growth market way too early. This is in line with Autio, et al.’s (2007) remark that high 
growth may result if the firm is simply in the right place at the right time, and the same 
applies to failures so that bad fortune may ruin the growth of a firm and even drive it to 
bankruptcy.  
“We were at the wrong time at the wrong place.”, -Paananen, Add2Phone. 
The Nature of the Software Industry 
The nature of the software industry can be considered as positive growth factor and 
negative survival factor. The low investment needed for software development at the 
beginning compared to manufacturing firms allows software start-ups to emerge easily. 
It is also very easy for software firms to globalize. Especially with software products, it 
is easy to achieve economy of scale, allowing rapid growth. Even when providing 
software services, as long as you have partners in local countries, you can globalize 
your services. However, that also means that it easily increases competition (Hoch, et 
al., 2000), so if the new start-up has all the core resources and capabilities in 
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management, sales, marketing, and funding, and your products do not have any lock-in 
effect, then you are very much threatened. Indeed, both Hoch, et al. (2000) and 
Nambisan (2002) agree that software business is characterized by intense competition, 
and that there is always a threat for new competition. Thus, software firms have to be 
alert all the time regarding the changing environment.   
“It can be globalized quickly and there are lots of advantages but then the competition 
is also a lot harder. It’s a lot tougher field to compete because everybody, the barrier of 
entry to make a software, anybody can do that. One person can do a piece of 
software.”, -Mäki, Remedy Entertainment. 
“Low investment for instance, in equipment or factories makes it easy to enter the field 
and can mean that new competitors can emerge. And with a small, talented team, a 
small new entrant can sometimes do impressive things that may threaten a big 
incumbent.”, -Ylönen, Tectia. 
Capability to Focus 
The capability to focus may be a factor for survival but not necessarily for rapid 
growth. For example, “focus” has been Remedy’s culture all along, as can be seen when 
the firm established another firm Futuremark when 3D benchmarking product “Final 
Reality” became a success because Remedy themselves wanted to focus on developing 
games. Also, Remedy decided to “focus” on developing the recent “Alan Wake” only 
for the Microsoft Xbox360 platform so that they can do it really well for that particular 
platform instead of also developing it for other platforms such as Play Station 3. Thus, 
their “focus” strategy has helped Remedy to create only four games during the past 15 
years but they have all been extremely successful since they have put all their resources 
and skills to developing those games one at a time. In this hit-based gaming industry, 
this has contributed to the survival of the firm. On the other hand, it has not contributed 
to a rapid growth of the firm. It is important to note that they have consciously made the 
decision not to grow rapidly.  
“I would say there are a couple of success factors strategy-wise and I think focus is 
definitely one of them….by focusing, you are, by definition, limiting your options what 
you are doing….because it’s a hit-driven business, we have to focus every bit of skill 
and expertise and knowledge that we have to that one product to even have a chance 
being in the Top 10. “, -Reini, Remedy Entertainment. 
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The same phenomenon can be seen in the Smartner case. The fact that they were limited 
in funding meant that they were sometimes slow in growth or in survival crisis, but it 
also forced the firm to develop as a firm instead of expanding the firm too quickly in 
terms of products and people. At different phases, Smartner focused on specific agenda 
to survive. For example, in 2001 when they were short on funding and downsized the 
organization, they still clearly focused on their internationalization strategy, to close 
international deals in Europe. Their choice in focusing on enterprises services instead of 
also doing consumer services also helped them differentiate themselves from other 
firms. Also, when the firm started to develop the “push” mobile email product, they put 
all their resources into that one product and all other projects and products were put into 
maintenance mode.  
“I think one of the things that we were pretty good was that the ability to keep focused 
on just a few things and try to take them .. not sort of switch focus too quickly, but 
quickly enough.”, -Räisänen, Smartner. 
 
Low Levels of Growth Aspirations 
One of the factors that have limited Remedy’s growth can be considered as an internal 
reasoning whereby they themselves have not wanted to grow so rapidly. This is in line 
with the findings of Rönkkö, et al. (2008) who argued that the reasons why so many 
Finnish software firms remain small is because the founders have low level of growth 
aspirations and are unwilling to grow the business considering the increased level of 
risk associated with it. Remedy realizes that staying small has its benefits such as fast 
iteration and easier communication. However, low level of growth aspirations does 
affect positively on survival rate.  
“I think the only limitation has been sort of internal reasoning that we haven’t wanted 
to grow just because of growth.”, -Mäki, Remedy Entertainment.  
Internationalization and Localization Capabilities 
In order for software product firms to scale, the product must be sold in as many 
markets as possible, pushing them to globalize their business immediately from the 
beginning. This also then meant that the product must be easy to localize for various 
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markets if required from the local customers. Smartner/SEVEN possessed a high level 
of localization capabilities whereby their product was developed so that it was 
extremely easy for them to localize their products into different languages and brands to 
suit various operators and countries. Their capability in internationalization and 
localization affected positively to growth and survival.  
 “What contributed was that we developed one piece of software that was replicable in 
different markets. … the fact is that we could replicate our product in different markets 
with relative ease.”, Räisänen, Smartner. 
Creativity 
The software business in gaming industry differs from the other basic software industry 
in many ways. One being that the gaming software operates in a hit-based industry. To 
be able to sell and succeed financially in this industry, the firm needs to create a game 
that aims in being on the top 10 best titles of the year. Otherwise, the firm ends up 
burning a lot of expenses with little return, affecting the survival of the firm. 
Developing successful game software requires a completely different capability in 
addition to many other capabilities that basic software business needs and that is the 
capability to be creative. The game product must be fun, enjoyable, and entertaining. 
There are some components of entertainment that is very hard to define or produce in a 
structured manner and is dependent on the creativity and innovativeness of the people 
the firm employs. Thus, Remedy’s capability in being creative has had a positive affect 
on both growth and survival.  
“The gaming industry does differ a lot from a basic software industry company. 
Because there is the components of entertainment and that is very hard to define or 
produce in a structural manner. So entertainment is born out of creativity of people so it 
is very hard to confine that or even define that in a “how to make a game fun”. That’s 
the ultimate question for every game developer, how to make a game fun and enjoyable, 
so it’s the.. what I say, usually, is the defining difference between the basic software 
companies such as SSH or any other company.”, -Reini, Remedy Entertainment. 
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5.2 Revised Theoretical Framework  
Based on the case study conducted in this research, a revised theoretical framework 
identifying the growth phases and factors influencing the growth and survival of Finnish 
Born Global software firms can be presented.  
Related to the growth phases, it was expected that Born Global software firms evolve 
through four phases during growth towards large firms:  
1) Introductory,  
2) Commercial breakthrough and foreign growth,  
3) Global breakthrough and expansion, and  
4) Global rationalization and maturity phase.  
Indeed, all case firms passed through the introductory phase at a fast pace after which 
they followed a path that was unique to its own history. Although Gabrielsson & 
Gabrielsson’s (2009b)’s growth phases generally apply to these firms, the following 
notes can be added:  
• Born Global software firms’ introductory phases are extremely short, 
experiencing commercial breakthrough and global breakthrough almost at the 
same time.  
• Acquisition and mergers should also be added as an alternative to organic 
growth, and not necessarily labeled as a failure.  
Before presenting the actual revised framework of factors for growth and survival, 
propositions that were postulated for empirical study are reviewed and revised below.  
Proposition 1a: The commercial and global breakthrough of a born global firm is 
positively related to the industry growth rate, the globalizing enablers in the industry, 
the amount of resources and managerial experience, the existence of substantive and 
dynamic capabilities, and a high level of entrepreneurial orientation in decision-making 
(Gabrielsson & Gabrielsson, 2009b, p13) 
Proposition 1a is mostly supported by the empirical analysis. All of the case firms grew 
rapidly when the industry growth rate (Vernon, 1966) has been high but when it has 
 165 
been slow, the commercial and global breakthrough did not progress. All of the firms 
also benefited from the globalizing enablers in the industry (Yip, 1989) and high levels 
of entrepreneurial orientation in decision-making (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996), except for 
Remedy. Remedy has not had a high level of entrepreneurial orientation in decision-
making, thus their growth has been slow. However, they have successfully gone through 
the phases of commercial and global breakthrough, thus high level of entrepreneurial 
orientation in decision-making is not necessarily always needed. 
The amount of resources (Hannan, 1998) such as skilled human capital and financial 
resources, and managerial experience (Reuber & Fischer, 1999) contributed to growth 
as well. Substantive and dynamic capabilities (Zahra, et al., 2006) were especially seen 
to be instrumental to growth for these Born Globals due to the fact that they were often 
limited on the amount of resources and the nature of their capabilities then defined the 
course of their future growth.  
Proposition 1b: The global rationalization of a born global firm is positively related to 
higher global seller concentration, pressure for resource alignment, and a low level of 
both industry growth rate and entrepreneurial orientation in decision-making. 
(Gabrielsson & Gabrielsson, 2009b, p13) 
Proposition 1b receives support from Tectia and Smartner cases, which have 
experienced the global rationalization phase. As the niche market started to become 
mainstream, the increase in competition and decrease in the growth rate have pushed 
both firms to rationalize and globally align their operations. Furthermore, the level of 
entrepreneurial orientation in decision-making clearly decreased as these firms entered 
the maturity phase and started operating as an established business.  
This proposition was not evaluated for neither Remedy nor Add2Phone as it was not 
applicable to them. Instead of reaching the global rationalization phase, Add2Phone was 
acquired by More Mobile Relations. The industry growth rate has not slowed down 
either, on the contrary, it is a growing industry in the future, thus More Mobile 
Relations is not in the maturity phase either. Global rationalization phase was not 
applicable to Remedy either, since they do not have any other offices in foreign 
countries and they are not in a maturity phase. However, they realize the need to 
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rationalize their operations constantly as requirements for high-end games and 
technology change rapidly and they need to keep their costs and expenses of 
development in check. Remedy does need to rationalize their operations when there is a 
higher global seller concentration in the industry. They have been under pressure to 
align their resources and develop better software development processes. Since the 
industry growth rate has not slowed down in the gaming industry, it cannot be predicted 
how that will influence on Remedy’s growth. However, it can be assumed that if there 
would be a slow down in the gaming industry, Remedy will have to rationalize their 
operations even further.  
Proposition 2: The survival of a born global is positively related to the industry growth 
rate, the amount of resources and managerial experience, the existence of substantive 
and dynamic capabilities, and lower level of entrepreneurial orientation. (Gabrielsson 
& Gabrielsson, 2009b, p13) 
Proposition 2, in a similar manner as proposition 1, was supported fully by the empirical 
analysis. The survival of all case firms benefited from the industry growth rate and 
when there was economic downturn such as the IT bubble bursting, at least Tectia, 
Smartner, and Add2Phone experienced difficult times, even questioning their survival. 
In addition, lack of resources, especially financial resources, often ignited survival 
crises for the firms, which suggests that the amount of resources the firm possesses is 
positively related to its survival. Lack of managerial experience and certain types of 
substantive capabilities certainly had significant effect, for example, on Tectia, pushing 
them to shut down their VPN hardware operations. High level of entrepreneurial 
orientation, which was often seen during the earlier phases of these case firms, 
accompanied high risks, almost igniting survival crises.  
Proposition 3: The commercial breakthrough, global breakthrough, global 
rationalization, and survival of a born global are positively related to high networking 
capabilities (Gabrielsson & Gabrielsson, 2009b, p14).  
Proposition 3 was also supported by the empirical data. All case firms, due to 
constraints in resource and capabilities as small start-up firms, utilized their networking 
capabilities heavily and also invested their time and efforts into enhancing the 
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capability. If these firms were limited in resources and could not obtain them from 
partnering and networking with other firms, their survival would have been at stake.  
Proposition 4a: The growth throughout different phases and survival of a born global 
are positively related to the level of compatibility with dominant players, existence of 
lock-in effects, and choosing the appropriate strategies for growth and business models, 
and are negatively related to the existence of open source software. 
Proposition 4a was supported fully only by Tectia. While the level of compatibility with 
dominant players in the market (Coviello & Munro, 1997; Cusumano, 2004) and the 
appropriate strategies for growth and software business models that firms adopt were 
certainly a major factor for both growth and survival of all case firms, lock-in effects 
and existence of open source software was only partially supported. As for the lock-in 
effects (Cusumano, 2004), while it was a major factor for Tectia, Smartner, and 
Add2Phone, it was just not applicable to Remedy, since the effect simply does not exist 
in the gaming industry. The existence of open source software was thought to affect 
these software Born Globals to an extent that it would slow down their growth and 
affect survival rates but this was only true for Tectia. All other firms considered the 
existence of open source software to actually be a positive trend, as they themselves can 
utilize different free software in their own codes. They also believed that open source 
software products are often limited in functionality, thus not competing directly with 
their own full-blown products, which are targeted to enterprise customers, along with 
services. Tectia, on the other hand, experienced major threats from open source 
software, namely OpenSSH, which had actually originated from their own codes, since 
the founder and inventor Tatu Ylönen had given it out for free in the earlier phases. 
They made a mistake of competing head to head with OpenSSH and it was not until in 
the later phases when they re-positioned themselves by adding more products and 
services to their solutions, to be IT security provider for enterprise customers. 
OpenSSH’s existence hurt Tectia’s growth for quite a long time and it could have also 
affected their survival. As such, it can be concluded that with the exception of Tectia’s 
earlier phases, the existence of open source software does not negatively impact firms’ 
growth and survival.  
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Thus, proposition 4a can be re-formulated as follows:  
Revised Proposition 4a: The growth throughout different phases and survival of a born 
global are positively related to the level of compatibility with dominant players, 
existence of lock-in effects, and choosing the appropriate strategies for growth and 
business models. 
Proposition 4b:The global breakthrough, global rationalization (latter two phases of 
growth) and survival are positively related to mastering the management of software 
development process.  
Proposition 4b was partially supported by all case firms. While all firms had an agile 
and flexible development processes during the earlier phases, which made it possible for 
them to adapt quickly and come up with new products in the emerging new markets, 
they all experienced a phase where unstable software development process affected and 
hindered their growth. However, there was no evidence that not mastering the 
management of software development process would ignite survival crises.  
Thus, proposition 4b can be re-formulated as follows:  
Revised Proposition 4b: The global breakthrough and global rationalization (latter two 
phases of growth) are positively related to mastering the management of software 
development process.  
 
Proposition 4c: Software product firms are expected to grow at a much faster rate than 
software service firms but there may be a limit to growth, thus they are bound to enter 
the service arena, creating more and more hybrid firms, doing both software product 
and service business, in order to increase the chance for survival.  
Proposition 4c was fully supported by all case firms. All case firms acknowledged the 
limits of growth for software product firms and naturally expanded their offerings to the 
service arena, securing recurring revenue for the future. The exception was Remedy, 
who develops game software products and do not provide any services to secure 
recurring revenue. However, they too, see the limit of needing to develop a “hit” 
product every time, and so are looking for different ways to grow and survive in the 
future. 
 Additional Proposition 
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Based on the extensive interviews, the following new propositions can be added. For 
details of the analysis, see section 5.1.3, under “Other Factors”.  
Proposition 5a: Growth and survival of a born global firm is positively related to 
having “pure luck”, internationalization and localization capabilities, and creativity. 
Proposition 5b: Growth of a born global firm is positively related to the nature of the 
software industry (scalability, low investment) while survival is not.  
Proposition 5c: Survival of a born global firm is positively related to the capability to 
focus and low levels of growth aspirations, while growth is not. 
 
Figure 26: Revised framework 
Based on the supported, revised, and added propositions, the framework for the growth 
and survival of Born Global software firms can be presented as in figure 26. The revised 
factors are highlighted in italics and bold font.  
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6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In the following section, the theoretical premises and research findings of the study will 
be summarized. Also, the main contributions of the study to the international business 
literature are presented. Finally, managerial implications and recommendations to 
support organizations are followed by recommendations for further research.  
6.1 Summary 
In order to summarize the findings from this study, it is useful to revisit the original 
research problem, which was:  
How can innovative born globals grow to become truly global firms while also 
surviving, taking into consideration their limited resources to address the global market 
opportunities and required holistic management of the process?  
In light of the research problem, the objective of this study was to identify the 
development phases and factors of growth and survival of Born Global firms. This 
thesis especially concentrated on the growth phases and growth and survival factors of 
Finnish software Born Global firms. Thus, the following research question was set:  
How do born global firms in the software industry become adults and what factors 
impacts their global growth and survival? 
This question was supplemented by three specific sub-questions: 
1) What are the growth phases of these firms? 
2) What are the factors that impact the growth and survival of these firms? 
3) How do differences in the business model (software products, software 
services, and hybrid solutions) affect the different paths that firms should 
take to grow and survive? 
Summary findings for each sub-questions are presented below, which collectively 
answers to the main research question.  
Research question 1: What are the growth phases of these firms? 
 171 
In line with Gabrielsson and Gabrielsson’s (2009b) growth phrase framework, Born 
Global software firms may go through the following four phrases during growth 
towards large firms:  
1) Introductory,  
2) Commercial breakthrough and foreign growth,  
3) Global breakthrough and expansion, and  
4) Global rationalization and maturity phase.  
More specifically, Born Global software firms go through the introductory phase at an 
extremely fast pace after which they follow a path that is unique to its own history. 
Some are likely to have a combined phase where commercial breakthrough and foreign 
growth phase and global breakthrough and expansion phase happen at the same time, 
since it is easy, especially for software product firms, to globalize immediately at 
inception.  
In addition, half of the case firms studied has been acquired by another larger firm, 
which suggests that the fourth phase can be substituted by acquisition or merger as an 
alternative path to growth. Although some may regard “being acquired” as a non-
survival case, the case firms studied did not see it that way; it was just another way for 
the firms to continue growing and surviving in the turbulent software industry.  
Research question 2: What are the factors that impact the growth and survival of 
these firms? 
Of all the different factors that may impact the growth and survival of Born Global 
software firms that are identified in the international business literature, industry factors, 
firm factors such as resources and capabilities, entrepreneurial orientation and lateral 
rigidity, and software business specific factors were investigated in this paper. The 
following summarizes the results.  
Industry factors: High industry growth rate (Vernon, 1966), low industry penetration 
of foreign suppliers, low global seller concentration (Driffield and Munday, 1997), and 
the existence of industry globalization drivers (Yip, 1989) influence Born Global 
software firms’ growth positively. A low industry growth rate in turn affects the firms 
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negatively to an extent that it may cause non-survival (acquisition, in the cases studied 
in this paper). Also, increase in global seller concentration in the industry, decrease in 
the industry growth rate, and pressure for resource alignment pushes the firms to global 
rationalization and maturity phase.  
Firm factors (resources and capabilities): The amount of resources (Laanti, et al., 
2007), managerial and international experience (Reuber and Fischer, 1999), the 
possession of substantive capabilities (Verona, 1999), dynamic capabilities (Zahra, et 
al., 2006), and networking capabilities, resource fungibility (Sapienza, et al., 2006), as 
well as availability of governmental support (Knight & Cavusgil, 2005) positively 
influenced growth as well as survival of Born Global software firms at various phases 
of its growth. It is especially significant to note that the possession of various types of 
substantive capabilities, such as managerial, marketing, and technological capabilities, 
were more important than excelling in one type of capability. Possessing only one or 
two types of capabilities while lacking in others actually hampered case firms growth 
aspirations and affected survival.  
Entrepreneurial orientation and lateral rigidity: The existence of entrepreneurial 
orientation (Knight & Cavusgil, 2005) had a positive impact on Born Global software 
firm’s growth but negative impact on survival. On the other hand, lateral rigidity in 
decision making (Luostarinen, 1979) had a positive impact on their survival with a 
negative impact on growth. Entrepreneurial orientation usually existed during the earlier 
phases of firm growth, fueling growth for the firms, while lateral rigidity increased as 
firms matured.  
Software business specific factors: The level of compatibility with dominant players in 
the market (Coviello & Munro, 1997; Cusumano, 2004), the appropriate strategies for 
growth and software business models that firms adopt, existence of lock-in effects 
(Cusumano, 2004), and existence of proper software development process affects Born 
Global software firms’ growth and survival positively. Mastering the software 
development process was seen especially important during the later phases of its growth 
compared to the earlier phases when firms need to be more agile and responsive to the 
evolving market. In addition, having “pure luck”, internationalization and localization 
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capabilities, and creativity seemed to have positive affects on growth and survival. Also, 
while the nature of the software industry affects positively to growth but negatively to 
survival, the capability to focus and low levels of growth aspirations had positive affect 
on survival while having negative affects on growth.   
Research question 3: How do differences in the business model (software products, 
software services, and hybrid solutions) affect the different paths that firms should 
take to grow and survive?  
The nature of the software industry allows new start-ups to emerge easily, due to the 
fact that they do not have to set up manufacturing facilities and initial investment can be 
low. Especially software products can be exported to global markets easily with the help 
of digital channels and increase in the similarity of customer needs across markets for 
different types of software products. It is easy to achieve economies of scale, allowing 
rapid growth, thus software product firms are expected to grow at a much faster rate 
than software service firms. However, that also means that it easily increases 
competition (Hoch, et al., 2000; Nambisan, 2002). When the times are bad, revenues 
can collapse because customers can simply stop buying new products and is sometimes 
challenging for firms to come up with new products after the “hit product” that made 
the firms grow rapidly in the beginning. The firms most likely to survive the down 
times are those with a solid base of loyal, satisfied customers who pay “recurring” fees 
over long-term contracts for product updates, bug fixes, customization, and other 
services (Cusumano, 2004), thus software product firms are likely to move into the 
software service arena, making them more of a hybrid solution firm. Networking 
capability is also seen more essential for software service firms than software products 
firms during the introductory phase.  
6.2 Theoretical Contributions  
The main contributions of this study to the international business literature are the 
extensive literature review that was conducted related to the growth phases of Born 
Global software firms and also the factors that may impact the growth and survival of 
such firms, in-depth study and empirical analysis of four Finnish software firms, and the 
revised theoretical framework that was then proposed.  
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Although Born Global firms’ internationalization process seems to deviate from the 
traditional view, its growth phases resemble conventional lifecycle models of 
organizational growth. For example, stage-wise organizational growth models (Scott & 
Bruce, 1987) receives some empirical support from this study. However, transitional 
crises or periods of revolution when progressing from one phase to another was not 
necessarily seen every time, although suggested by Gabrielsson and Gabrielsson 
(2009b) and Greiner (1972). This study’s empirical findings suggests that Born Global 
software firms may grow extremely fast throughout various phases without necessarily 
facing any crises, as the growth tends to happen so rapidly.  
Gabrielsson and Gabrielsson’s (2009b) growth phrase framework provides a useful 
blueprint for studying Born Global firm’s growth and survival, and this study 
contributes by adding some additional possibilities of how Born Global software firms 
may grow to become adults. More specifically, based on empirical evidence, Born 
Global software firms may have some of the growth phases combined into one. Also, 
half of the case firms studied has been acquired by another larger firm, which suggests 
that the fourth phase can be substituted by acquisition or merger as an alternative path to 
growth. Although some may regard “being acquired” as a non-survival case, the case 
firms studied did not see it that way; it was just another way for the firms to continue 
growing and surviving in the turbulent software industry.  
There are also some other additional findings from the empirical analysis. Gabrielsson 
and Gabrielsson (2009b) suggested that during the introductory phase, entry to first 
foreign markets starts with below 25% internationalization degree with sales in less than 
six countries. This was not the case, at least for Tectia, Remedy, and Smartner, which 
were categorized as true Born Global case firms. If a software firm is categorized as a 
Born Global firm, then it seems likely that the sales are immediately on a global basis 
already from the introductory phase. In addition, at least Tectia and Add2Phone 
experienced “de-internationalization” phase when both firms had to close down foreign 
sales subsidiaries and either become conservative or hibernate until the bad economic 
times were over. Gabrielsson and Gabrielsson’s (2009b) framework more or less 
suggested incremental growth phases, thus it may be useful to add additional 
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possibilities whereby firms may hibernate or de-internationalize temporarily, which 
does not necessarily mean non-survival.  
Related to the factors that impact growth and survival of Born Global firms, at least the 
ones that were outlined by Gabrielsson and Gabrielsson (2009b), such as industry 
factors, firm factors, and entrepreneurial orientation and lateral rigidity, were mostly 
supported by the present study. The in-depth empirical data also suggested that while all 
other factors have unilateral impact on commercial and global breakthrough as well as 
on the survival, entrepreneurial orientation and lateral rigidity exhibited bilateral 
impacts on the outcomes, affecting commercial and global breakthroughs and survival 
in the opposite way. In other words, entrepreneurial orientation was found to have a 
positive impact on the growth of case firms but a negative impact on survival. Lateral 
rigidity, in turn, had a negative impact on case firms’ growth while having a positive 
impact on survival.  
When looking at some of the specific factors, in line with Gabrielsson and Gabrielsson 
(2009b), networking capabilities were seen as extremely important for both growth and 
survival of Born Global software firms, especially due to the fact that they are rather 
limited in resources from the outset with such ambitious goals as going global from day 
one. Also, good mixture of different types of substantive capabilities is more important 
for the firms than excelling in one or two specific types of those capabilities.  
As indicated earlier, novelty of this particular study was to add software business 
specific factors that may influence growth and survival of Born Global firms. This 
paper was able to shed some light onto factors such as the level of compatibility with 
dominant players, existence of lock-in effects, and choosing the appropriate strategies 
for growth and business models, which influence growth and survival of Born Global 
software firms. Mastering the management of software development process was also 
found to be important when growing during the global breakthrough and global 
rationalization phases. In addition, it was found that having “pure luck”, 
internationalization and localization capabilities, and creativity influence growth and 
survival of the case firms. While these additional factors were seen to have unilateral 
impact on both growth and survival, there were also some factors that were identified 
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from the empirical data that gives bilateral impact. For example, it was found that 
growth of a Born Global software firm is positively related to the nature of the software 
industry while survival is not, and survival of a Born Global software firm is positively 
related to the capability to focus and low levels of growth aspirations, while growth is 
not. 
6.3 Managerial Implications 
Based on the results of this study, following suggestions can be made to entrepreneurs 
and managers of Born Global software firms:  
• Firms should take note that possession of the following factors will contribute to 
growth and survival: abundance of resources such as human capital and 
financial resources, managerial and international experience, substantive, 
dynamic, and networking capabilities, and governmental support.  
• Excelling in one type of substantive capability is not enough; firms should invest 
their efforts to obtain a diversity of substantive capabilities across marketing, 
technological, and management capabilities. Accelerated internationalization 
and demanding software business environment requires business managers to 
be competent in variety of aspects.  
• Born Global firms with limited resources should put particular emphasis on their 
networking capabilities, as it provides a valuable alternative to ownership-
based control of assets. Cooperation with external partners or forming strategic 
alliances in marketing and R & D is one way of acquiring resources otherwise 
lacking from Born Global firms (Luostarinen & Gabrielsson, 2006).  
• If the firm is specialized in software products, there may be limits to growth, so 
the firm should look into expanding into software services, which secures 
recurring revenue or other types of business. However, entering the software 
service field as a Born Global firm may be challenging due to limited 
resources, thus networking with MNCs and local partners in various countries 
is essential for rapid growth.  
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• Firms should balance their strategy in a way that they focus on particular 
products or activities when needed. With limited resources, spreading the 
wings to every direction possible is not the way to go. Focusing all the efforts 
into getting one thing done excellently will contribute to growth and survival, 
although the growth would not be as rapid.  
• Firms should seriously take note that the following software business specific 
factors will contribute to growth and survival; level of compatibility with 
dominant players in the market, existence of lock-in effects, and having the 
appropriate software business models and growth strategies.  
• While agile and flexible software development process during the earlier phases 
of firms’ growth may contribute to the rapid development of new products, not 
having appropriate processes in place as firms continue to grow and mature 
may be detrimental to the firm and eventually hinder their growth. Firms 
should put efforts into defining the software processes in a way that is 
acceptable to all stakeholders, which helps development proceed in scheduled 
and organized way.  
• Firms developing software products should not customize it too much, because 
then it would not scale globally. Software products should be standardized as 
much as possible. Even firms providing services should implement service 
modules and localize only those parts where local language and other 
sensitivities are required.   
Last but not least, as Cusumano suggests (2004), software start-ups need to be 
strategically flexible, reinventing themselves multiple times during the course of their 
existence. In order for Born Globals to grow and survive at the same time, it is 
important that management team is flexible and balances their entrepreneurial 
orientation with strategies that they choose to take. Taking all sorts of risks no matter 
what may lead to failure, but killing the firms’ entrepreneurial orientation will rule out 
any innovation that is needed for firms to grow and survive.   
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6.4 Recommendations to Support Organizations 
During the interviews conducted for the empirical study, the following two additional 
questions were asked in order to identify how governmental organizations can help 
Born Global software firms to grow and survive in the future.  
1. What is the firm’s view of current government support? 
2. How can government support better the firms in critical decision-making points? 
All four case firms received financial support from TEKES during their growth and as 
such, their views tended to be focused on TEKES. The views varied depending on the 
interviewee but in general, financial support was seen to help the case firms a lot. For 
example, Remedy considered TEKES to be a “fantastic partner” who has been really 
helpful in providing development funds, which is critical for independent game 
developers in reducing some of their risks. They also viewed Finnish educational 
system to be excellent, producing abundant young resources and a good base of 
employees. Some firms such as Smartner and Tectia considered the process for applying 
for the funding to be too complicated at times and the decision for the funding 
extremely slow. Also, it was perceived that TEKES is too much focused on investing 
into firms that seem “safe”, instead of taking risks.  
Based on the in-depth interviews, following recommendations can be made to support 
organizations: 
• More financial support throughout the different growth phases instead of just 
during the introductory phases would be beneficial.  
• Put more emphasis on computer science education, for example, at the Aalto 
University School of Technology, so that more brilliant engineers with technical 
expertise will be born.  
• Since there are so many start-up firms in Finland with high competence in 
technology, more emphasis could be put on building marketing competence.  
• Provide various types of information and make it easy for entrepreneurs to start 
a firm, decreasing the amount of bureaucratic paperwork.   
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6.5 Recommendation for Further Research 
Since this study was explanatory and qualitative in nature, it leaves room for further 
research on various aspects related to Born Global firms’ growth and survival. Although 
the author has tried to cover in detail the growth phases of the four case firms and to 
identify the factors affecting growth and survival of Born Global firms in Finnish 
software business, it is hoped that this study will trigger interest and raise questions in 
the minds of the readers to conduct further research on the topic at hand. Some future 
research recommendations are listed below.  
• This study focused on case firms originating from Finland, which is classified as 
a SMOPEC country. Future research should cover case firms from another 
SMOPEC country or from comparatively larger countries, which has larger 
domestic markets, in order to produce interesting grounds for comparison. A 
study comparing firms from different countries may also be interesting.   
• This study focused on case firms doing software business. Characteristics of the 
software industry are increasingly becoming similar to other knowledge-based 
industries competing internationally (Coviello & Munro, 1997; Hoch, et al., 
2000), thus the findings from this research can be extended to cover other 
knowledge-based industries with caution. However, future research should 
address other industries such as manufacturing and entertainment industries, to 
be able to obtain more generalized results.  
• This study included case firms doing business either in B-to-B or B-to-C. 
Although the author covered some aspects that could differ because of the firms 
operating in different target markets, future research could tackle the differences 
in more depth to investigate whether the growth patterns and factors for growth 
and survival are different between firms operating in B-to-B or B-to-C 
businesses.  
• This study focused on identifying the factors that affects growth and survival of 
Born Global software firms. Although the author did touch upon whether those 
factors positively or negatively affected on the outcomes, it was not the main 
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objective of the study. Thus, further investigation into the level influence may be 
interesting.   
In conclusion, further research is needed to test and refine the growth paths and factors 
influencing growth and survival of Born Global firms. A more accurately and tested 
theory could become a valuable tool for both researchers of Born Global phenomenon 
as well as entrepreneurs and managers of firms.  
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Tectia Corporation Tatu Ylönen Founder & Board Member Dec. 10, 2009 Helsinki 255 min.  
Tectia Corporation Arto Vainio 
Former President & CEO 
(July 2002 - Oct 2008) Dec. 18, 2009 Helsinki 122 min.  
Remedy 
Entertainment Oy Mika Reini CFO (2000- present) Feb. 17, 2010 Espoo 213 min.  
Remedy 
Entertainment Oy Markus Mäki 
Founder & Director of 
Development Feb. 16, 2010 Espoo 91 min.  
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Systems Oy Jussi Räisänen 
Founder & Former VP of 
Business Development 
(2000-2007) Feb. 18, 2010 Helsinki 219 min.  
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Former Product Manager at 
Smartner, currently Director, 
Product Management at 
SEVEN (2004-present) Feb. 22, 2010 Helsinki 132 min.  
Add2Phone Oy Jari Anttonen 
Founder & Former CEO of 
Add2Phone, currently 
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Add2Phone Oy 
Vesa-Matti 
Paananen Founder & Former CTO Jan. 28, 2010 Helsinki 102 min. 
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APPENDIX. GQAT#?WTAON:XXQN/T 
 
0. Background information (asked only if not already known):  
a. Can you describe the firm’s foundation and the persons involved in it?  
b. When was the company founded (initiated & registered & product ready for 
sales)? 
c. Development of size of the firm in sales revenues and number of employees 
from establishment (can you provides statistics on this) 
d. Share of sales outside Finland and its development from establishment (3 
years, 6 years, now) 
e. Share of sales outside Europe and its development from establishment 
(3years, 6 years., now) 
f. Describe how and when initially it became obvious that the firm is seeking 
to internationalize/globalize, and why (Global vision)? 
 
1. Please explain how your company has grown?  
a. Can you see certain phases that your firms have gone through during 
growth?  
b. What have been the most critical decision making points to achieve growths 
in your view since establishment? When? Why? (at what phase) 
c. How the firm and its first product were born (introductory phase) 
i. How did you develop the product and find the market/customer for 
it? 
ii. When did you start initial / pilot sales and to whom?  
d. When did you start sales of your products in large volumes (commercial 
breakthrough) and to which country? Which products?  
e. Explain the expansion to foreign countries, when sales started in each 
foreign country (year, country)  
i. When did you receive first major foreign deals? What country? 
ii. How did you expand to foreign markets from there, which countries 
and why? 
f. How and when did you expand to markets outside Europe (global 
breakthrough) 
i. What countries?  
ii. Did you try to penetrate further markets already entered (Europe and 
outside) and how?   
g. Have you started to align your operations and activities across countries 
globally and when? Please explain what activities have been aligned? (global 
rationalization and maturation) 
h. How the foreign operation modes have developed since establishment? 
i. How the product offering has developed since establishment? 
j. How well the attached picture explain the growth phases of your firm, please 
draw the development. (Introductory phase, Commercial breakthrough, 
Foreign growth, Global break through, Global expansion, Global 
rationalization, Maturation) 
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2. What factors (external or internal) have influenced most the growth of the firm 
a. What factors has contributed to the global growth of the firm?  
b. What factors have limited the global growth of the firm? 
 
3. What challenges have you faced during growth?  
a. Have your company been at risk of going out of business, please describe 
such crisis  (Or in case of non survival: Describe the survival crisis)  
b. What factors (external or internal) contributed to the crisis in your view  
 
4. Pls explain the development of industry environment since establishment of the 
firm? 
a. What has been the industry growth rate? 
b. How similar/different the consumer/customers needs are across countries? 
c. How would you describe competition in your industry? Do you have global 
competitors, please name them? Is it consolidating to few big ones? 
d. Are there trade barriers in the industry, e.g. customs, trade limitations, 
protectionism? 
e. How do you see that nature of industry environment has impacted on your 
firm growth at different phases/critical points you mentioned (Introductory 
phase, Commercial breakthrough, Foreign growth, Global break through, 
Global expansion, Global rationalization, Maturation) 
f. How do you see that nature of industry environment has impacted on your 
firm survival? 
5. Please explain the development of most critical resources and capabilities since 
establishment of the firm? 
a. Why these have been critical?  
b. Explain your main founders and top management team experience as 
entrepreneur and with regards to international experience (how many years 
in total)? 
c. Most important physical resources (equipment/plant), intangible resources 
(experience of people, brand names, innovative human resources), and 
financial resources (internal and external)? 
d. Identify the most important firm capabilities (core competences) in 
technology, marketing and management? 
e. In terms of resources, how have you managed to adapt to the rapid changes 
in the environment? How do you renew your resources and capabilities? 
(Dynamic capabilities) 
f. Describe the nature of your relationships with suppliers, customers, 
competitors or other important contacts? How good you are in building 
networks and leveraging those? (Network capabilities) 
g. Government support received, what type and when?  
h. How these discussed resources and capabilities have impacted on your 
firm’s growth in the critical phases/points you mentioned (Introductory 
phase, Commercial breakthrough, Foreign growth, Global break through, 
Global expansion, Global rationalization, Maturation) 
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i. How do you see that these resources and capabilities have impacted on your 
firm survival? 
 
6. How would you characterize the firm culture in terms of experimenting new 
initiatives and taking risks in failing? How has the culture changed from 
establishment? (Entrepreneurial orientation) 
a. How do you succeed in encouraging emergence of new ideas within the 
firm? (Innovativeness) 
b. What is the firm’s attitude towards failures when implementing initiatives 
(Risk) 
c. Is your firm alert to emerging opportunities or aggressive in pursuing 
initiatives (Proactiveness) 
d. Do you try to predict future development by analyzing current market 
opportunities or do you create the new markets by influencing other parties 
(Causation/ effectuation)) 
e. How aggressively do you compete with competitors (aggressive 
competitiveness)?  
f. Hierarchy, bureaucracy, established practices and traditions (autonomy)? 
g. How good are you in rapidly adapting to changing conditions 
(agility/rigidity) 
h. Is the selection criteria for growth related initiatives based on expected 
returns OR based on affordable loss (Causation and effectuation) 
i. How has the discussed firm entrepreneurial culture (innovativeness, 
proactiveness, risk taking etc.) influenced the growth of the firm ? 
j. How has the discussed firm entrepreneurial culture (innovativeness, 
proactiveness, risk taking etc.) influenced the survival of the firm? 
 
7. What is your view of current government support? How government could support 
better your firm in critical decision-making points and advancing from a particular 
stage to the next? 
 
8. Software Business Specific Factors for Survival and Growth 
a. Can you identify any factors that are specific to Software Business, which 
affect positively or negatively growth and survival of software firms? 
b. How important is compatibility with dominant players in the market? Have 
there been any incidents where you chose wrong strategies for compatibility 
related decisions? 
c. How important is lock-in effects for growth and survival? How do you 
achieve lock-in effects? 
d. How important is customer reference and credibility? Is customer reference 
more important at certain stage of growth phases? What about strength of 
brand? 
e. How good do you think is your software development process? Have you 
evolved the processes over the years and how? Has there been any point of 
time when a not-so-good software development process led to a bad 
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situation, such as delay and schedules or too many bugs leading to losing 
trust and credibility from customers? What did you do to combat this? 
f. What do you think about open source software? Are they your competitors? 
What do you do to compete with them? Do you think open source software 
competitors threaten your business? 
g. What is your growth strategy (scaling, duplicating, granulating)? What is 
your business model (software product, software service, hybrid)? Why 
don’t you concentrate on one of them instead of being a hybrid solution firm, 
since these two business models require different sets of capabilities? 
 
9. Have I forgotten to ask something important about growth and survival? 
 
10. Is there any material that you could distribute that describes your growth 
development?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
